People v. Smith
Decision Date | 21 January 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 14,14 |
Citation | 393 Mich. 432,225 N.W.2d 165 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Early SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. 393 Mich. 432, 225 N.W.2d 165 |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Atty., Research, Training & Appeals, Thomas M. Khalil P 15938, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
Jane Burgess, and Laurence C. Burgess, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Before the entire Bench except LEVIN and FITZGERALD, JJ.
This is an interlocutory appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision which affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to quash the information.
We reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court and direct that the information be quashed.
Defendant and three others were charged with carrying a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle, M.C.L.A. § 750.227; M.S.A. § 28.424, and after preliminary examination defendants were bound over for trial.
Detroit Police Officer Ward testified at the preliminary examination that he and his partner observed a Ford Econoline van, in which defendant Smith was a passenger, make several erratic U-turns. The van was stopped and Officer Ward while approaching the vehicle observed through the right Defendants filed motions to quash, defendant Smith contending that an M--1 rifle was not a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the statute and that there was no evidence showing that defendant Smith was carrying the weapon involved, so that the examining magistrate abused his discretion in binding the case over for trial.
window what he believed to be the stock of a rifle. He opened the door and grabbed an M--1 rifle from underneath the second seat. Defendant Smith was sitting on the third seat with his feet up. A cartridge belt and clips containing ammunition were found in the front seat between co-defendants Gaut and Turner.
The defendant urges two questions:
QUESTION I
'Is a rifle over 30 inches in length a dangerous weapon within the meaning of MCLA 750.227 if said section is interpreted consistently with the constitution of the State of Michigan and with the intent of the Michigan Legislature?'
'Was the evidence presented at the preliminary examination sufficient to sustain a finding that Robert Smith had acknowledged that a rifle was in the vehicle or that he in any sense intended to carry said rifle, and therefore, support the finding of probable cause to believe that he committed the offense charged?'
Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals gave serious consideration to the objection that an M--1 rifle is not covered by the proscription of M.C.L.A. § 750.227; M.S.A. § 28.424.
We perceive this to be the controlling question.
The statute provides:
(Emphasis added).
The trial court concluded that because an M--1 is a military rifle it comes within the classification of a dangerous weapon. The Court of Appeals majority, observing that the 43 inch rifle is heavy and could also be used as a club, eschewed analysis of the statute because they had 'no doubt that the legislature, when they said 'dangerous weapon', they in fact meant dangerous weapon . . .'.
This misses the real question.
No one suggests that an M--1 rifle is not a dangerous weapon. The question is whether this statute proscribes the carrying of All dangerous weapons or only those of the types specified.
In construing statutes in an effort to ascertain and give effect to the legislative interest, courts are guided by a rule of construction known as 'ejusdem generis'.
This is a rule whereby in a statute in which general words follow a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only things of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated. See 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 214, pp. 407--408.
Thus here the phrase 'or other dangerous weapon except hunting knives adapted and carried as such' following those specified types of stabbing weapons, under the rule would be limited to stabbing weapons. As to that part of the statute we see no intent to include firearms of any sort in the phrase 'other dangerous weapon'.
Nor can we read the word 'pistol' in M.C.L.A. § 750.227; M.S.A. § 28.424 as applying to an M--1 rifle. 'Pistol' is defined in M.C.L.A. § 28.421; M.S.A. § 28.91 to mean any firearm, loaded or unloaded 30 inches or less in length, or any firearm, loaded or unloaded, which by its construction and appearance conceals it as a firearm.
In sum, M.C.L.A. § 750.227; M.S.A. § 28.424 applies only to those dangerous weapons enumerated therein. M--1 rifles are not so included. In reaching this conclusion it is important to stress, however, that the Legislature did not, through inadvertence or intent, neglect to consider the problems and dangers posed by the carrying about of long barreled firearms. The Legislature made specific provision on point in an earlier section of the same act, 1 which reads as follows:
Carrying firearm or dangerous weapon with unlawful intent--Any...
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