People v. Snowburger

Decision Date25 May 1897
Citation71 N.W. 497,113 Mich. 86
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesPEOPLE v. SNOWBURGER.

Exceptions from circuit court, Monroe county; Edward D. Kinne, Judge.

Michael Snowburger was convicted of selling adulterated food, and brings exceptions. Affirmed.

Willis Baldwin, Pros. Atty., for the People.

William Look and Ira G. Humphrey (Bowen, Douglas & Whiting, of counsel), for defendant.

LONG C.J.

Respondent was convicted under an information charging that "on the 19th day of April, A. D. 1897, at the city of Monroe, and in the county aforesaid, Michael Snowburger did offer for sale and sell, to Carl Franke, an adulterated article of food, to wit, a quantity of mustard, to wit, a quarter of a pound colored and adulterated with tumeric, whereby the said mustard, as an article of food, was damaged, and its inferiority concealed, and whereby it was made to appear of better and of greater value than it really was, the same not being a mixture or compound recognized as ordinary articles or ingredients of articles of food, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided," etc. The information was filed under Act No. 193, Pub. Acts 1895 entitled "An act to prohibit and prevent adulteration fraud and deception in the manufacture and sale of articles of food and drink." Section 1 provides: "No person shall within this state manufacture for sale, offer for sale or sell any article of food which is adulterated within the meaning of this act." Section 2: "The term 'food,' as used herein, shall include all articles used for food or drink or intended to be eaten or drunk by man, whether simple, mixed or compound." Section 3: "An article shall be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this act: One, if any substance or substances have been mixed with it so as to lower or depreciate or injuriously affect its quality, strength or purity; two, if any inferior or cheaper substance or substances have been substituted wholly or in part for it; three, if any valuable or necessary constituent or ingredient has been wholly or in part abstracted from it; four, if it is sold under the name of another article; five, if it consists wholly or in part of a diseased, decomposed, putrid, infected, tainted or rotten animal or vegetable substance or article, whether manufactured or not, or, in case of milk, if it is the product of a diseased animal; six, if it is colored, coated, polished or powdered whereby damage or inferiority is concealed, or if by any means it is made to appear better or of greater value than it really is; seven, if it contains an added substance or ingredient which is poisonous or injurious to health: provided, that the provisions of this act shall not apply to mixtures or compounds recognized as ordinary articles or ingredients of articles of food, if each and every package sold or offered for sale be distinctly labeled as mixtures or compounds, and are not injurious to health." Section 19 makes any violation of the act a misdemeanor, and provides a penalty by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $500, or by imprisonment in the county jail, etc. On the trial, respondent admitted that on the 19th day of April, 1897, he, at the city of Monroe, this state, offered for sale, and did sell, to Carl Franke, a quantity of mustard, to wit, a quarter of a pound, which was afterwards found upon a chemical examination to be colored and adulterated with tumeric, whereby the said mustard as an article of food was damaged, and its inferiority concealed, and it was thereby made to appear of greater and better value than it really was; the same not being a mixture or compound recognized as an ordinary article or ingredient of articles of food. But he claimed that said article of mustard so sold was purchased by him as a pure article in good faith, and that he believed at the time of the purchase by him, and also at the time of the sale to the said Franke, that the same was pure mustard, free from any coloring and adulteration with tumeric or any other coloring or adulterant, and that no inferiority was concealed whereby it was made to appear of greater or better value than it really was; that, at the time he purchased the same; he asked for pure mustard, and that the same was warranted to him as pure; that he did not make or cause to have made a chemical examination of the same, and did not inform himself or endeavor to ascertain the methods of determining pure from impure mustards, but relied upon the representations of his vendor and the appearance of the article to the eye; and that he did not intend to violate the law. From such conviction, respondent appeals.

It is the contention of counsel for respondent that it was the intent of the legislature to provide by the act that no person should be convicted and punished for selling adulterated food or drink without showing that he knew the same to be adulterated; that the information does not charge such knowledge, and the proofs disclose that respondent acted in good faith, and in the belief that the article sold was pure and unadulterated. The act cannot be so construed. The offense under the act consists in selling an article intended to be eaten or drunk which is adulterated. Section 8 of the act shows conclusively that the legislature did not intend to make criminal intent or guilty knowledge a necessary ingredient of the offense. As a rule, there can be no crime without a criminal intent, but this rule is not universal. In People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 18 N.W 365, the respondent was convicted of the offense, under the statute, of keeping his saloon open on Sunday. It was there said: "It is contended that, to constitute an offense under the section referred to (How. Ann. St. � 2274), there must be some evidence tending to show an intent on the part of the respondent to violate it. *** The action under which Roby is prosecuted makes the crime consist, not in the affirmative act of any person, but in the negative conduct of failing to keep the saloon closed. As a rule, there can be no crime without a criminal intent; but this is not by any means a universal rule. One may be guilty of the high crime of manslaughter when his only fault is gross negligence, and there are many other cases where mere neglect may be highly criminal. Many statutes which are in the nature of police regulations, as this is, impose criminal penalties, irrespective of any intent to violate them; the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible." Many cases are cited in that case where convictions were sustained, although the element of guilty knowledge was lacking. Thus, in Massachusetts a person may be convicted of the crime of selling...

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