People v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 03 October 1917
• Docket Number: No. 11220.,11220.
• Citation: 279 Ill. 435,117 N.E. 119
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SNYDER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

279 Ill. 435

117 N.E. 119

PEOPLE

v.SNYDER.

No. 11220.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 21, 1917.

On Petition for Rehearing, Oct. 3, 1917.

Error to Circuit Court, Macon County; William K. Whitfield, Judge.

William H. Snyder was convicted of impersonating another in violation of Cr. Code, § 104, and he brings error. Affirmed.Redmon, Hogan & Redmon and Whitley & Fitzgerald, all of Decatur, for plaintiff in error.

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Jesse L. Deck, State's Atty., of Decatur, C. W. Middlekauff, of Freeport, and Charles F. Evans, of Decatur, for the People.

CARTER, C. J.

At the October term, 1916, of the Macon county circuit court, the grand jury returned an indictment against plaintiff in error and also against John Parks and Clifton C. Richardson. The indictment charged all three with a violation of section 104 of the Criminal Code of this state (Hurd's Rev. St. 1915-16, c. 38), which provides, substantially, that every person who shall falsely represent or personate another and in such assumed character do any act in the course of any suit, proceeding, or prosecution, whereby any person or body politic may be injured in any event or his right or interests may in any manner be affected, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary, etc. The indictment originally contained three counts. The first and second counts, on motion of the defendants, were quashed. Afterwards Park and Richardson entered pleas of guilty and were by order of the court released on probation prior to the time of plaintiff in error's trial, and both testified as witnesses on behalf of the state against plaintiff in error, Snyder.

It is insisted that the third count of the indictment, upon which plaintiff in error was tried, was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. The evidence in the record showed that plaintiff in error, Snyder, had become surety on the bond of Frank Davis, who was the defendant under an indictment charging him with burglary and larceny, pendingin said circuit court; that Davis did not appear for trial; and that a forfeiture was taken upon his bond. The evidence of Parks and Richardson, who pleaded guilty and were released upon probation, tended to show that Snyder requested Parks to procure some person to represent Davis and to enter a plea of guilty in Davis' case, and that Snyder agreed that he would then get the person who so entered a plea of guilty released on parole; that Parks became acquainted with Richardson, who until that time was a stranger to him; and that Parks induced Richardson to falsely represent to the state's attorney and the court that he was Davis and to enter a plea of guilty in the Davis case; and that after the plea of guilty was so entered the forfeiture of the Davis bond, which had been signed by Snyder, was set aside.

The third count of the indictment under which plaintiff in error was tried charged, in substance, that on June 10, 1916, there was pending in the circuit court of Macon county, Ill., a case entitled People v. Davis, wherein the indictment charged said Davis with burglary and grand larceny, and that William H. Snyder and John Parks did procure Clifton C. Richardson to falsely represent himself to be the defendant, Davis, and in such assumed character to appear in said court and enter a plea of guilty in the suit then and there pending against Davis, and that Richardson did so appear and falsely represent himself to be Davis, the indictment concluding:

‘And so the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do present that the said William H. Snyder, John Parks and Clifton C. Richardson did then and there, in the said suit and proceeding in the said court, while the said suit was then and there pending in the said court, as aforesaid, unlawfully, feloniously and falsely personate the said Frank Davis, whereby, and by reason of the said false personation as aforesaid, the said people of the state of Illinois were then and there and thereby injured in the administration of public justice, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the said people of the state of Illinois.’

Counsel for plaintiff in error insist that the concluding part of the indictment is faulty in omitting one element of the crime; that is, that any act was done by plaintiff in error, Snyder, by which any person or body politic was injured. Section 6 of division 11 of the Criminal Code of this state declares that every indictment shall be sufficient which states the offense in the terms and language of the statute creating the offense or so plainly that its nature may be easily understood by the jury. It is a fundamental rule of criminal pleading that an indictment must allege all of the facts necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged, and an indictment which does not set forth such facts with sufficient certainty will not support a conviction. People v. Trumbley, 252 Ill. 29, 96 N. E. 573. The pleader may, if he chooses, however, state the circumstances of the offense as in an indictment against an accessory before the fact, yet the indictment must contain an allegation charging the defendant as principal. In this state an accessory before the fact may be indicted and punished as principal, and it is the ordinary practice to indict as principal an accessory before the fact. People v. VanBever, 248 Ill. 136, 93 N. E. 725. ‘Perhaps it would be advisable to describe the circumstances of the offense as they actually transpired, as it is in an indictment against an accessory before or at the fact; but if the stating part of the indictment be that way, it should conclude as for murder, for that is really the offense of which the party is guilty, if at all.’ Baxter v. People, 3 Gilman, 368. Indeed, accessories before the fact must be indicted as principals, or not at all, after they are declared by the Criminal Code (§ 274) to be principals. Usselton v. People, 149 Ill. 612, 36 N. E. 952;Fixmer v. People, 153 Ill. 123, 38 N. E. 667. Without question the pleader in this indictment intended to set out the facts charging plaintiff in error as an accessory before the fact, and then, in the concluding part of the indictment quoted above, to charge him as a principal. It is sufficient if the words of the indictment so far particularize the offense that the defendant is notified, with reasonable certainty, of the precise offense with which he is charged. People v. Scattura, 238 Ill. 313, 87 N. E. 332, and cited cases.

It seems to us from a reading of said third count that no one could be misled as to the crime with which plaintiff in error was charged. It sets out clearly that plaintiff in error and one Parks induced Richardson to impersonate one Davis and plead guilty to the crime of burglary and grand larceny for which Davis was under indictment. If we understand the argument of counsel for plaintiff in error on this point, it is conceded that these facts were aptly set out in the body of the indictment; but it is argued that they should have been again stated in the concluding part of the indictment; that is, that the plaintiff in error, Snyder, and Parks and Richardson, should all have been charged in the concluding part of the indictment, in apt terms, with the act of impersonation. We do not think the rules of pleading or the statute requires restatement of all these facts in the concluding portion of the indictment. The words in the concluding part, ‘as aforesaid,’ plainly refer back to the body of the indictment, where the indictment described in detail the manner and method in which the impersonation was acted out by the three defendants. We think such objection to the indictment was properly overruled.

It is further argued by counsel for plaintiff in error that the indictment is not sufficient because it does not allege that the people of the state of Illinois are a body politic. The statute under which this indictment was drawn-that is, section 104 of the Criminal Code-states, as already noted, that if any person falsely represents or impersonates another in doing any act in the course of any suit, proceeding, or prosecution, whereby any person or body politic may be injured, etc. The indictment charges the offense, and concludes, after alleging the facts upon which the indictment was based:

‘The said people of the state of Illinois were then and there and thereby injured in the administration of public justice, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the people of the state of Illinois.’

If the people of the state of Illinois are properly understood and described to be a body politic, then there is nothing in this objection. It is not necessary to state a conclusion of law resulting from the facts of a case. It is sufficient to state the facts and leave the court to draw the inferences. Wharton on Crim. Pl. & Pr. (9th Ed.) § 154. It is not necessary that there should be an express averment of matter which appears by necessary implication from that which is expressed. Joyce on Indictments, § 273. State courts will take judicial notice of the divisions of the United States into states, and of their own state into counties, cities, and towns, and of the corporate character of civil divisions of the state. 7 Ency. of Evidence, 970, 972. A fact of which judicial notice is taken need not be pleaded or proved. Id. 1033, 1034. A ‘body politic’ is defined to be ‘the collective body of a nation or state as politically organized or as exercising political functions.’ 8 Corpus Juris, 1137. ‘Body politic’ is defined by lexicographers as the state or nation as an organized political body of people collectively. New Standard Dict.; Webster's New Int. Dict. ‘The ‘state’ means the whole people united in one body politic, and the ‘state’ and the ‘people...