People v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 01 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. 111382.,111382.
• Citation: 959 N.E.2d 656,2011 IL 111382,355 Ill.Dec. 242
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant and Cross–Appellee, v. Deandra SNYDER, Appellee and Cross–Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2011 IL 111382

355 Ill.Dec. 242

959 N.E.2d 656

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant and Cross–Appellee,

v.Deandra SNYDER, Appellee and Cross–Appellant.

No. 111382.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 1, 2011.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Kevin W. Lyons, State's Attorney, of Peoria (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Erica Seyburn, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Terry A. Mertel and Dawn Duffy, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Samuel L. Snyder, of East Peoria, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[355 Ill.Dec. 243] ¶ 1 Pursuant to a partially negotiated plea, defendant, Deandra Snyder, pled guilty to intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12–6(a)(1) (West 2008)) and criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21–1(1)(a) (West 2008)) and was sentenced to concurrent extended terms of imprisonment of 10 and 6 years, respectively, followed by one year of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Her sentences were to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case. She was also ordered to pay restitution.

¶ 2 On appeal, defendant argued that (1) the circuit court of Peoria County erred in imposing extended-term sentences on both convictions; (2) her sentence was excessive; (3) the court should not have ordered her sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case; and (4) the court failed to admonish her about the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. The appellate court vacated the extended-term portion of her criminal damage to property sentence, reducing the sentence for that offense to three years; found that, other than the extended-term sentencing issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing her; held that the trial court did not err in ordering her sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case; and vacated the restitution order because the trial court failed to admonish her about the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. 403 Ill.App.3d 637, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137.

¶ 3 We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff.Feb. 26, 2010). Defendant also seeks cross-relief, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum 10–year extended-term sentence for intimidation. For the following reasons, we reverse that portion of the appellate court's judgment vacating the restitution order and affirm the appellate court's judgment in all other respects.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On August 20, 2008, defendant, who had been dating Corey Simmons and was seven months pregnant with his child, drove to his apartment complex. When she arrived, she saw a parked car belonging to Jessica King, who had also been dating Simmons. She got a knife from her vehicle and slashed the convertible top and all four tires of King's car, causing $2,891 in damage. When King and Simmons confronted her, she began yelling and swinging the knife at them. Eventually, she got in her vehicle and left.

¶ 6 Defendant was charged with armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A–2(a) (West 2008)), two counts of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8–4(a), 9–1 (West 2008)), unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24–1.1(a) (West 2008)), intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12–6(a)(1) (West 2008)), and criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21–1(1)(a) (West 2008)). She agreed to plead guilty to intimidation and criminal damage to property in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. There was no agreement as to sentencing.

¶ 7 Before accepting defendant's guilty plea, the trial court admonished her that she faced a minimum of probation and a maximum of extended prison terms of 10 years for intimidation and 6 years for criminal damage to property, followed by one year of MSR. The court failed to admonish her as to the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution or fines.

¶ 8 Defendant's presentence investigation report indicates that, in June 2007, she pled guilty to arson and obstruction of justice, stemming from an incident in which she set fire to King's vehicle. She was sentenced to three years in prison for arson and directed to have no contact with King or Simmons. For obstruction, she was sentenced to 30 months of probation and ordered to take anger management classes. In January 2008, she was released from prison and began serving MSR on the arson conviction. At the time of the present offenses, she was in violation of the court's order prohibiting her from having contact with King or Simmons, was on probation for arson, was on MSR for obstruction of justice, and had not yet begun her anger management classes. She also had 2005 misdemeanor convictions for theft and criminal damage to property and was on probation for those offenses when she committed the 2007 arson.

¶ 9 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that, in imposing sentence, it had considered aggravating and mitigating factors. The aggravating factors included defendant's prior criminal history and the fact that she was on probation and MSR when she committed the present offenses. The court also emphasized the need to deter others. In mitigation, the court noted that defendant had a newborn child and that there was some culpability by King and Simmons, who were involved in a “love triangle” with defendant. The court found that defendant was a very dangerous person with serious mental and anger management issues that needed to be addressed.

¶ 10 After considering the presentence investigation report, counsel's arguments, evidence in aggravation and mitigation, and defendant's statement in allocution, the court sentenced her to concurrent extended terms of imprisonment of 10 years for intimidation and 6 years for criminal damage to property, followed by one year of MSR. The sentences were to be served consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in the unrelated arson case. She was also ordered to pay $2,891 in restitution. She filed a motion to reconsider sentence but did not seek leave to withdraw her guilty plea. Her motion to reconsider sentence was denied. She filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 11 On appeal, defendant first argued, and the State conceded, that the trial court erred in imposing extended-term sentences on both of her convictions. 403 Ill.App.3d at 639, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137. The appellate court agreed and vacated the extended-term portion of her criminal damage to property sentence, reducing the sentence on that offense from six to three years. Id. at 640, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137.

¶ 12 Defendant next argued that her sentence was excessive. The appellate court disagreed, finding that, other than the extended-term sentencing issue, which was corrected, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. Id. at 641, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137. The appellate court noted that, in determining her sentence, the trial court had properly considered the presentence investigation report, defendant's statement in allocution, counsel's arguments, and the aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 640, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137. The appellate court found that prison sentences of 10 years for intimidation and 3 years for criminal damage to property were not excessive given the significant aggravating factors in the case. Id. at 641, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137.

¶ 13 Defendant next argued that the trial court erred in ordering her sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in the unrelated arson case. The appellate court disagreed.

¶ 14 Finally, defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to admonish her as to the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. The appellate majority agreed, finding that the trial court's failure to admonish her as to the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 1997). Id. at 641, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137. Following the Fourth District's opinion in People v. Jenkins, 141 Ill.App.3d 602, 95 Ill.Dec. 861, 490 N.E.2d 953 (1986), the appellate majority held that the appropriate remedy for such an error was to vacate the restitution order. 403 Ill.App.3d at 642, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137. The majority reasoned that this court had adopted Jenkins' approach in People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill.2d 177, 298 Ill.Dec. 545, 840 N.E.2d 658 (2005).

¶ 15 Justice Schmidt dissented as to the vacatur of the restitution order, noting that the Fourth District had impliedly repudiated Jenkins' holding that a court's admonishments constituted an implied promise; that Whitfield neither referred to nor relied on Jenkins; that Whitfield was based on a negotiated plea for a specific sentence, not an open plea; and that, here, defendant was not denied the benefit of any bargain with the State because there was no agreement as to sentencing. 403 Ill.App.3d at 642–44, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137 (Schmidt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Schmidt would have followed the Second District's approach in People v. Seyferlich, 398 Ill.App.3d 989, 338 Ill.Dec. 686, 924 N.E.2d 1212 (2010), reasoning that it was not the court's role to bargain with defendant and that if she regretted her plea as a result of the restitution order, the proper remedy was to allow her to withdraw her plea. 403 Ill.App.3d at 645, 343 Ill.Dec. 497, 935 N.E.2d 137 (Schmidt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Schmidt opined that there was no indication that defendant was prejudiced or denied real justice as...