People v. Solis

• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: MARK C. DILLON
• Citation: 111 A.D.3d 654,974 N.Y.S.2d 132,2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 07203
• Decision Date: 06 November 2013
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Jefferson SOLIS, appellant.

111 A.D.3d 654
974 N.Y.S.2d 132
2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 07203

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,
v.
Jefferson SOLIS, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Nov. 6, 2013.

Scott Brettschneider, Uniondale, N.Y., for appellant.

[974 N.Y.S.2d 133]

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano and Jeanette Lifschitz of counsel; Lorrie A. Zinno on the brief), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Buchter, J.), rendered October 4, 2011, convicting him of assault in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Although the defendant validly waived his right to appeal, his claim with respect to the voluntariness of the plea survives such a waiver ( see People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022;People v. Joseph, 103 A.D.3d 665, 959 N.Y.S.2d 261;People v. Cohen, 100 A.D.3d 919, 953 N.Y.S.2d 900). The defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty was properly denied. The record establishes that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his plea of guilty after being informed, through an interpreter, of the rights he would be forfeiting by pleading guilty and the direct consequences of his plea ( see People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 16–17, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61, 459 N.E.2d 170;People v. Andrea, 98 A.D.3d 627, 949 N.Y.S.2d 654;People v. Lu Yang Tong, 238 A.D.2d 607, 657 N.Y.S.2d 960). In support of his motion to withdraw his plea, the defendant's new attorney alleged that the defendant's former counsel had advised the defendant that he would not prevail at trial and would be subject to a much greater sentence if convicted after trial. Even if these allegations are true, they do not constitute coercion on the part of his former attorney ( see People v. Elting, 18 A.D.3d 770, 771, 795 N.Y.S.2d 699;People v. Charles, 256 A.D.2d 472, 473, 683 N.Y.S.2d 438;People v. Samuel, 208 A.D.2d 776, 777, 617 N.Y.S.2d 494). Nor did the Supreme Court's remarks regarding the defendant's sentence exposure in the event he were to be convicted after trial constitute coercion ( see People v. Bravo, 72 A.D.3d 697, 698, 899 N.Y.S.2d 280). In any event, the defendant's claims of coercion are belied by his statements under oath on the record acknowledging that no one had forced or coerced him...