People v. Solomon

Decision Date25 May 1962
Docket NumberNo. 36542,36542
Citation182 N.E.2d 736,24 Ill.2d 586
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Eugene SOLOMON, Plaintiff in Error.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Joseph R. Perozzi, Chicago Heights, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., and John T. Gallagher and Matthew J. Moran, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.

DAILY, Justice.

A jury in the criminal court of Cook County found defendant, Eugene Solomon, guilty under an indictment charging both robbery and armed robbery, and he was thereafter sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 5 to 12 years. He has sued out this writ of error for review.

As his first ground for reversal defendant asserts he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial due first to the refusal of the trial court to grant a motion for continuance and, second, because his appointed counsel was incompetent. Facts relevant to these claims show that defendant was arrested on December 20, 1960, and was arraigned on December 29, at which time, without objection by defendant, the public defender was appointed as his counsel. On the same date defendant entered a plea of not guilty, demanded a jury trial, and trial was set for January 11, 1961. The public defender contacted defendant in jail on December 30 but he refused to give any information, refused to sign an affidavit that he was financially unable to procure counsel and requested the defender to contact the religious sect of which defendant claimed to be a member to see if they would send counsel for him. On January 4, 1961, an official of the sect advised that if defendant was found to be a member in good standing, and if legal counsel was available, the public defender's office would be contacted. Such a call, however, was never made.

On January 9, 1961, an assistant public defender again met with defendant at the jail, informed him of the status of the request for other counsel, and advised him that his trial would commence on January 11 and that he should co-operate so a defense could be planned. Defendant still refused to co-operate in any way. The following day, January 10, the public defender presented a motion alleging facts substantially as heretofore related and requested a continuance so that defendant could have ample opportunity to obtain counsel of his choice. After pointing out that the cause had been set for trial approximately two weeks before, the court denied the motion and advised defendant to co-operate with counsel. The trial was held January 12, 1961, and, in its course, defendant did not testify in his own behalf, nor was any evidence introduced or admitted in his behalf.

The granting of a continuance to permit preparation for a case, or for the substitution of counsel, necessarily depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the request, and is a matter resting within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. (People v. Surgeon, 15 Ill.2d 236, 154 N.E.2d 253; People v. Clark, 9 Ill.2d 46, 137 N.E.2d 54.) Before a judgment of conviction will be reversed because of the denial of such a motion, it must appear that the refusal of additional time in some manner embarrassed the accused in preparing his defense and prejudiced his rights. (People v. VanNorman, 364 Ill. 28, 2 N.E.2d 891; see also: Holt v. United States, (8th cir.) 267 F.2d 497; United States ex rel. Thompson v. Nierstheimer, (7th cir.) 166 F.2d 87; Crono v. United States, (9th cir.) 59 F.2d 339.) In the instant case the public defender was appointed as defendant's counsel approximately two weeks before trial in ample time to prepare a defense, if one in fact existed. Since defendant utterly refused to co-operate with his counsel, he cannot now be heard to complain that the denial of the motion for continuance embarrassed his defense or prejudiced his rights. We would add, too, that the same conduct of defendant serves greatly to estop the contentions that counsel was incompetent because he made no preparation for trial and because he did not call defendant as a witness. The record discloses that the appointed counsel did his utmost to fulfill his duty to defend, but was effectively frustrated in his efforts by defendant's lack of co-operation. It would be a strange anomaly indeed if an accused could refuse to aid or co-operate with counsel then, on review, advance counsel's lack of preparation as a ground of incompetency. Further, on the question of the trial strategy, defendant's vulnerability to impeachment shown by a long line of convictions revealed to the court before sentence was imposed, greatly suggests that the best trial tactics might have been to keep defendant from the witness stand. Cf. People v. Stokes, 18 Ill.2d 371, 375, 164 N.E.2d 26.

Nor, under the circumstances reflected in this record, can it be said the trial court was guilty of an abuse of discretion because it failed to grant a continuance in the face of defendant's efforts to obtain other counsel. While an accused in a criminal case does indeed have the constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing, it is likewise true that such right may not be employed as a weapon to indefinitely thwart the...

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137 cases
  • People v. Langdon
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 19, 1979
    ...thwart the administration of justice, or to otherwise embarrass the effective prosecution of crime." (People v. Solomon (1962), 24 Ill.2d 586, 590, 182 N.E.2d 736, 738, Cert. denied, 371 U.S. 853, 83 S.Ct. 94, 9 L.Ed.2d 87.) Determination at the point at which a defendant's right to counsel......
  • People v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • April 18, 2002
    ...and the defendant's right to counsel of his choice cannot be employed as a shield against an inevitable trial (People v. Solomon, 24 Ill.2d 586, 590, 182 N.E.2d 736 (1962)). See People v. West, 137 Ill.2d 558, 588, 148 Ill.Dec. 196, 560 N.E.2d 594 Here, Swano entered his appearance on the e......
  • People v. Williams
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 12, 1981
    ...It is within the trial court's sound discretion to grant or deny a continuance for the substitution of counsel. (People v. Solomon (1962), 24 Ill.2d 586, 182 N.E.2d 736.) A defendant, represented by court-appointed counsel, who on the day of trial requests a continuance to obtain a lawyer o......
  • People v. Heineman
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 30, 2021
    ...indefinitely thwart the administration of justice, or to otherwise embarrass the effective prosecution of crime." People v. Solomon , 24 Ill. 2d 586, 590, 182 N.E.2d 736 (1962). It is well settled that a defendant's right to counsel of choice must be measured against the trial court's inter......
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