People v. Souza

• Decision Date: 28 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. S032488,S032488
• Citation: 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 569,885 P.2d 982,9 Cal.4th 224
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 885 P.2d 982, 63 USLW 2437 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Carlos SOUZA, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 569

36 Cal.Rptr.2d 569

9 Cal.4th 224, 885 P.2d 982, 63 USLW 2437

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Carlos SOUZA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S032488.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

Dec. 28, 1994.

Rehearing Denied March 16, 1995.

Lawrence A. Gibbs, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Berkeley, and Blair Griffith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Santa Cruz, for defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald A. Bass, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald S. Matthias, Martin S. Kane and Richard Rochman, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

KENNARD, Justice.

When a person takes "flight" at the sight of a police officer, may the officer temporarily detain the person for questioning? Because under the Fourth Amendment the lawfulness of a temporary detention depends not on any one circumstance viewed in isolation, but upon the totality of the circumstances known to the detaining officer, we decline to establish a "bright-line" rule that flight without more provides cause to detain. We recognize, however, that flight in response to the appearance of a uniformed officer or a marked patrol car ordinarily is behavior that police may legitimately regard as suspicious, and therefore also can be a key factor in establishing reasonable cause to detain in a particular case. Applying these conclusions to the facts here, we uphold the temporary detention at issue as lawful, and we reverse the Court of Appeal.

I

Defendant Carlos Souza, who was charged with possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351), moved to suppress the prosecution's evidence against him, contending it was the fruit of a warrantless search after an unlawful detention (Pen.Code, § 1538.5). ¹

At the hearing on the suppression motion, Watsonville Police Officer Lance Stackhouse testified that at approximately 3 a.m. on July 27, 1991, he was in uniform and patrolling a residential area of Watsonville in a marked police car. He described the neighborhood as a "a high crime area" known for burglary and drug activities.

Near the intersection of Pennsylvania Avenue and Hammer, in the exact area where he had recently made two arrests, including one for burglary, Officer Stackhouse noticed two people, a man and a woman, standing near a blue Ford automobile parked at the curb. The area was almost completely dark as the streetlights were out of order. The man (later identified as defendant) appeared to be talking to someone in the parked car. Suspecting an auto burglary in progress, the officer stopped his car behind the Ford and activated the patrol car's spotlight, shining it into the Ford. Immediately, two people in the front seat of the Ford bent down toward the floorboard, and defendant took off running. Officer Stackhouse stopped defendant and conducted a cursory search for weapons. During the "pat-down," a plastic baggie containing 14.5 grams of cocaine fell out of defendant's clothing.

The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine, concluding that Officer Stackhouse had reasonable cause to detain defendant. Dispositive to the court's ruling was defendant's flight from the approaching police car.

Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351); he was sentenced to five years' probation conditioned on serving one hundred eighty days in county jail.

On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m).) The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that Officer Stackhouse lacked reasonable cause to suspect defendant of criminal activity, thus rendering his subsequent detention unlawful and the cocaine found in the pat-down search inadmissible as evidence in defendant's criminal trial. The Court of Appeal directed the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and to grant defendant's suppression motion.

The Court of Appeal gave no weight to Officer Stackhouse's description of the neighborhood as "a high crime area" because, in the court's words, "Stackhouse did not testify that any specific type of criminal activity relevant to this detention regularly occurred in this area." In contrast to the trial court, the Court of Appeal placed little significance on defendant's flight. Rather, the Court of Appeal concluded that all of the facts known to the officer, including defendant's flight, "did not support an objectively reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in criminal activity." In support of this conclusion, the court cited People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 198 Cal.Rptr. 538, 674 P.2d 240. There, this court invalidated a detention based on the defendant's flight from a parking lot when police entered the lot, which was known as a site for drug transactions. The Aldridge court stated that a detention involving flight was valid only when flight was an additional factor to confirm other evidence of the defendant's involvement in criminal activity. (Id. at p. 479, 198 Cal.Rptr. 538, 674 P.2d 240.)

We granted the Attorney General's petition for review, to consider the continuing validity of People v. Aldridge, supra, 35 Cal.3d 473, 198 Cal.Rptr. 538, 674 P.2d 240, and to decide whether a person's flight upon encountering a police officer is in itself sufficient to justify an investigative detention.

II

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative stops, when they are "unreasonable." (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19 & fn. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878 & fn. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889; United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605.) Our state Constitution has a similar provision. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) A seizure occurs whenever a police officer "by means of physical force or show of authority" restrains the liberty of a person to walk away. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878, fn. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.)

At issue in Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, was the constitutionality of a police procedure commonly known as a "frisk" or "pat-down" in which police officers conducting an investigation search a suspect for concealed weapons. Describing the procedure as "a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person," the United States Supreme Court nevertheless concluded that it was not "unreasonable" if the police officer could "point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts," would warrant the intrusion. (Id. at pp. 17, 20-21, 88 S.Ct. at pp. 1877-1878, 1879-80.) Because the "intrusion upon the sanctity of the person" consists not only of the pat-down itself but also of the temporary detention during which the pat-down occurs, to justify frisking or patting down a person during an on-the-street stop, "the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop." (Id. at p. 32, 88 S.Ct. at p. 1885 (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.), original italics.)

When are facts known to a police officer constitutionally sufficient to justify a forcible stop? On a number of occasions since its landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, the high court has reiterated that a police officer's seizure of a person need not in all cases be justified by probable cause to arrest for a crime. (Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229.) Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer " ' "warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be arrested].' " (Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 208, fn. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254, fn. 9, 60 L.Ed.2d 824, quoting Carroll v. United States (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543.) By contrast, the temporary detention of a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal activity may, because it is less intrusive than an arrest, be based on "some objective manifestation" that criminal activity is afoot and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that activity. (United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417 & fn. 2, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 & fn. 2, 66 L.Ed.2d 621; see also In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957 [in which this court articulated a two-part test: (1) that some activity relating to crime has taken place, is occurring, or is about to occur; and (2) that the person to be detained is involved in that activity.].)

In United States v. Cortez, supra, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, the high court stressed the importance of taking into account "the totality of the circumstances" in determining the propriety of an investigative stop or temporary detention: "Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person. Terms like 'articulable reasons' and 'founded suspicion' are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances--the whole picture--must be taken into account. Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." (Id. at pp. 417-418, 101 S.Ct. at p. 695.)

In United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, the high court reiterated its view that the "reasonable suspicion" necessary to justify a brief, investigative detention is a level of suspicion that is "obviously less demanding than that for probable cause" and can be established by "considerably less than proof of...