People v. Speight

• Decision Date: 19 November 1992
• Docket Number: No. 73084,73084
• Citation: 180 Ill.Dec. 97,606 N.E.2d 1174,153 Ill.2d 365
• Parties: , 180 Ill.Dec. 97 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Anthony SPEIGHT et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1174

606 N.E.2d 1174

153 Ill.2d 365, 180 Ill.Dec. 97

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Anthony SPEIGHT et al., Appellees.

No. 73084.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 19, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 1, 1993.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Chicago (Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, Andrew R. Dalkin, and Randall E. Roberts, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, and Martin Carlson, Asst. Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago (Michael T. Benz, Chapman and Cutler, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Anthony D. Speight.

Rita Fry, Public Defender, Chicago (Donald S. Honchell, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), Chicago, for appellee Melvin Whitten.

Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendants, Anthony Speight and Melvin Whitten, were charged in the circuit court of Cook County with armed robbery of Grady Guilty and attempted armed robbery of Patricia Gamble. After a bench trial, Whitten was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison, while Speight was found guilty of the same charges after a simultaneous jury trial. Speight was sentenced to 15 years in prison.

The appellate court reversed the convictions of both defendants and remanded for a new trial. (222 Ill.App.3d 766, 165 Ill.Dec. 213, 584 N.E.2d 392.) The appellate court held that the trial court erred in Whitten's case when it sua sponte took judicial notice of facts which partially discredited a defense witness. Speight's conviction was reversed based upon the improper introduction of evidence of other crimes. (222 Ill.App.3d at 768, 165 Ill.Dec. 213, 584 N.E.2d 392.) We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 315). In addition, defendant Speight has requested cross-relief (134 Ill.2d R. 315(g)), arguing that (1) the State's definition of reasonable doubt in its closing argument as "something substantial" improperly shifted the burden of proof, (2) the State's misstatement of the law in its closing argument regarding the use at trial of tape-recorded statements was prejudicial and improperly implied that defense counsel was trying to confuse the jury, and (3) the cumulative impact of the prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument and the improper evidence of other crimes requires reversal of his convictions.

Testimony at trial revealed that on Thursday, January 14, 1988, at approximately 5:45 p.m., Grady Guilty and his cousin Patricia Gamble were walking by an alley near the corner of Jackson and Sacramento Streets when two black men stepped in front of them. One man said to them, "Hey, get back and give it up." According to Guilty, one of the men, allegedly defendant Speight, was dark-skinned and wore a green field jacket and a black skullcap on his head. The other man, allegedly defendant Whitten, was lighter-skinned and wore a black navy "peacoat." Guilty testified that the darker-skinned man pushed him back into the alley and demanded that Guilty give him his money. Guilty testified that he gave him $37. Meanwhile, the lighter-skinned man grabbed Gamble around her collar, held a knife to her throat, and frisked her. Gamble did not have any money, and the assailants told Gamble and Guilty to walk down the alley and not look back.

After walking a short distance, Guilty turned back and followed the two men for several blocks to a gas station. Guilty phoned the police to report the robbery and described the two men. Minutes later, the police picked up Guilty and drove him to where defendants Speight and Whitten were being detained. Guilty positively identified the two men as the two who had just robbed Gamble and him, stating that the darker-skinned man took his money and the lighter-skinned man possessed the knife. At trial, both Guilty and Gamble identified the lighter-skinned man as defendant Whitten and the darker-skinned man as defendant Speight.

We will first address whether defendant Speight was denied a fair trial. The appellate court reversed Speight's convictions for armed robbery and attempted armed robbery due to testimony that Speight was carrying a "pony pack" at the time of his arrest. (222 Ill.App.3d at 770, 165 Ill.Dec. 213, 584 N.E.2d 392.) Because the appellate court held that Speight was denied a fair trial due to the introduction of this "pony pack" evidence, it refused to consider Speight's other claims of error which he now raises in his motion for cross-relief. (222 Ill.App.3d at 770, 165 Ill.Dec. 213, 584 N.E.2d 392.) For reasons of judicial economy, we will address Speight's claims of error which were raised before the appellate court, but not resolved.

Before this court, the State responds to all of Speight's claims of error in the same fashion, i.e., Speight suffered no prejudice because any alleged error was cured when the trial judge admonished the jury after each alleged error to disregard the improper testimony or statement. Further, even if the trial judge's admonishments were insufficient to cure the alleged errors, the State claims the errors were harmless due to the overwhelming evidence against defendant.

We now reverse the appellate court, and will discuss each error in turn.

During direct examination, the prosecutor elicited the following testimony from Officer Touss regarding drug paraphernalia found on defendant Speight at the time of his arrest:

"Q. [Prosecutor]: In the course of this search what, if anything, did you discover, Officer?

A. [Officer Touss]: $27.

* * * * * *

Q. Did you find anything else in the course of your search of this individual?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that?

A. There was cigarettes, some keys, there was some empty pony pack.

Q. What is a pony pack, officer?

A. It is a piece of white paper approximately four by four commonly used to --

[Defense Counsel]: Objection.

[Court]: Sustained. The jury will disregard testimony concerning anything that has been related, has been called a pony pack.

Q. [Prosecutor]: What did you do with those other items?

A. Turned them over to the gentleman." (Emphasis added.)

A "pony pack" is a piece of white paper used to conceal cocaine.

"Evidence of crimes for which a defendant is not on trial is inadmissible if relevant merely to establish his propensity to commit crime." (People v. Thingvold (1991), 145 Ill.2d 441, 452, 164 Ill.Dec. 877, 584 N.E.2d 89; People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill.2d 129, 137, 37 Ill.Dec. 348, 402 N.E.2d 238.) "Such evidence overpersuades the jury, which might convict the defendant only because it feels he is a bad person deserving punishment." (Thingvold, 145 Ill.2d at 452, 164 Ill.Dec. 877, 584 N.E.2d 89; Lindgren, 79 Ill.2d at 137, 37 Ill.Dec. 348, 402 N.E.2d 238.) Here, the appellate court determined that the testimony regarding the "pony pack" was prejudicial to Speight because it implied the defendant used drugs, and further, that the trial judge's admonishment to the jury did not "eradicate" the prejudicial effect of this evidence. 222 Ill.App.3d at 770, 165 Ill.Dec. 213, 584 N.E.2d 392.

We disagree. It is important to note that there was no testimony that Speight possessed cocaine or any other narcotic at the time of his arrest. Indeed, Speight was not charged with an offense involving a controlled substance. There was no testimony that a "pony pack" is drug paraphernalia, as the appellate court concluded. Although we do not doubt that a "pony pack" is the "street" term for the packaging of cocaine, we are not as easily convinced as the appellate court that the jurors necessarily made this inference.

Further, even assuming that the jurors knew what a "pony pack" was, for prejudice to occur it must be assumed that the jurors disregarded the trial judge's admonishment to ignore the testimony about the "pony pack." Generally, "[i]f a timely objection is made at trial, either to improper interrogation, or to an improper remark by counsel to the jury, the court can, by sustaining the objection or instructing the jury to disregard the answer or remark, usually correct the error." (People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 577, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233; People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill.2d 19, 30, 27 Ill.Dec. 792, 389 N.E.2d 1200; People v. Barrow (1989), 133 Ill.2d 226, 266, 139 Ill.Dec. 728, 549 N.E.2d 240; People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill.2d 111, 135, 97 Ill.Dec. 430, 492 N.E.2d 1303; People v. Terry (1984), 99 Ill.2d 508, 517, 77 Ill.Dec. 442, 460 N.E.2d 746; People v. Hampton (1969), 44 Ill.2d 41, 253 N.E.2d 385.) However, in People v. Garreau (1963), 27 Ill.2d 388, 391, 189 N.E.2d 287, this court deemed the prosecutor's remarks so prejudicial that the trial judge's admonishment to the jury did not cure the error. In Garreau:

"[The prosecutor] referred to the defendant as a pervert, a weasel and a moron; told the jury that the defendant, who raped his mother's friend, would rape a dog and would rape each and every member of the jury; told the jury that the defendant would always be a danger to society, even if he lived to be 80 years old; and told the jury that they should fix a punishment of at least 199 years." Garreau, 27 Ill.2d at 391, 189 N.E.2d 287.

In Speight's case, we find that the judge's prompt action in sustaining counsel's objection and instructing the jurors to disregard the "pony pack" evidence cured any alleged error. Following the admonishment, the prosecutor never revisited this evidence, and thus, we do not think Speight was prejudiced by this testimony.

The second error at Speight's trial occurred during rebuttal when the prosecutor attempted to define reasonable doubt for the jury:

"[Prosecutor]: Reasonable doubt, well what does reasonable doubt mean? It means a doubt that has to be substantial, ladies and gentleman." (Emphasis added.)

Immediately after this statement, the trial judge sustained defense counsel's...