People v. Spoor

• Decision Date: 18 June 1908
• Citation: 235 Ill. 230,85 N.E. 207
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SPOOR.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

235 Ill. 230

85 N.E. 207

PEOPLE

v.SPOOR.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 18, 1908.

Error to Circuit Court, Sangamon County; R. B. Shirley, Judge.

William C. Spoor was convicted of bigamy, and he brings error. Affirmed.

Vickers, J., dissenting.

Shutt & Fain, for plaintiff in error.

W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and F. L. Hatch, State's Atty. (W. St. J. Wines, of counsel), for the People.

CARTER, J.

Plaintiff in error was found guilty of bigamy in the circuit court of Sangamon county and sentenced to the penitentiary. He was married November 16, 1903, at the age of 18, with the consent of his parents, to Sarah Stanton, aged 19. They lived together in Springfield, Ill., for several months, when they separated, the wife going to Peoria and the husband to Missouri. After working as a teamster and farm hand at various places, he returnedto Springfield about three months later and worked in a coal mine. August 26, 1906, he was married to Grace Watts. Both marriages were performed by the same justice of the peace, and both licenses were obtained from the same county clerk. Plaintiff in error lived with his second wife in Springfield until May 30, 1907, when he was arrested for bigamy on the complaint of the first wife. The second, wife, after an interview with the first, left plaintiff in error, and did not again live with him. Plaintiff in error introduced both wives to neighbors and friends during the respective times he lived with them and introduced the second wife to a number of persons who had met the first one. His reputation appears to have been good. The facts, so far, appear to be practically undisputed. Plaintiff in error, however, attempted to prove that he had received from his first wife a number of letters; one or more asking for money with which to procure a divorce, and one stating that she had obtained a divorce, and another telling him she was married again and hoped he was happy. It does not appear from the record that before attempting to prove the contents of these letters he offered to show that the letters themselves could not be produced. Questions were asked of his mother and sisters as to whether they had seen these letters, and as to whether the first wife had not admitted, in the office of the state's attorney, that she had written such letters. These questions were objected to, and the objections were sustained. The court also sustained an objection to the introduction of testimony of plaintiff in error that the testimony of two of his friends would show that they had visited Peoria and saw his wife living there with a man as his wife, and that she told them she was married again. It appears that these witnesses were not present, but a motion was made to continue the case to obtain their testimony. This motion was denied.

Plaintiff in error contends that, when he married the second wife, he believed his former wife had obtained a decreeof divorce and remarried, but no evidence along this line was permitted to be presented to the jury. The refusal to admit this evidence is the chief error urged. This question has never been presented to this court for decision. While it is true that there is authority to the effect that belief in information as to the divorce or death of the former wife, when acted on cautiously and circumspectly and without fault, has been held to relieve one from the criminal intent of a second marriage (Bishop on Statutory Crimes [3d Ed.] §§ 596a, 596b, 608; Queen v. Tolson, 8 Am. Crim. Rep. 59), yet we think that the decided weight of authority in this country holds that proof of the fact that the second marriage was entered into in good faith, under an honest, but mistaken, belief that the first wife was dead or had obtained a divorce, constitutes no defense to the charge of bigamy (4 Elliott on Evidence, §§ 2871, 2872). Where a legal divorce, granted before the second marriage, is offered as a defense, the burden is on the defendant to prove the validity of the decree. 4 Elliott on Evidence, § 2873.

It is contended in this connection that the evidence offered as to the divorce obtained by the first wife tended to show lack of criminal intent on the part of the plaintiff in error, and therefore should have been admitted. The intent may be inferred from the criminality of the act itself. The rule on this question is thus stated by Lord Mansfield: ‘Where an act, in itself indifferent, becomes criminal if done with a particular intent, there the intent must be proved and found; but, where the act is in itself unlawful, the proof of justification or excuse lies on the defendant, and in failure thereof the law implies a criminal intent.’ State v. Goodenow, 65 Me. 30. See, also Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263, 26 Am. Rep. 21;Davis v. Commonwealth, 76 Ky. 318;State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 Pac. 802,34 L. R. A. 784, 62 Am. St. Rep. 800. The criminal statute on this question in this state reads as follows: ‘Whoever, having a former husband or wife living, marries another person, or continues to cohabit with such second husband or wife in this state, shall be deemed guilty of bigamy, and be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than on enor more than five years, and fined not exceeding $1,000: Provided, nothing herein contained shall extend to any person whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of five years together, prior to said second marriage, and he or she not knowing...