People v. Springs
Decision Date | 02 June 1980 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 78-3954 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ezekiel SPRINGS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. 101 Mich.App. 118, 300 N.W.2d 315 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[101 MICHAPP 120] Arthur J. Tarnow, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., David H. Sawyer, Pros. Atty., Carol S. Irons, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before V. J. BRENNAN, P. J., BEASLEY and BOWLES, * JJ.
Defendant was charged with felonious assault, contrary to M.C.L. § 750.82; M.S.A. § 28.277, and unlawfully, feloniously and wickedly inducing, persuading, inveigling or enticing a female person to become a prostitute (pandering), [101 MICHAPP 121] contrary to M.C.L. § 750.455; M.S.A. § 28.710. Defendant was acquitted by a jury on the assault charge but was found guilty on the pandering charge. He was sentenced as an habitual offender to a 15 to 40 year term of imprisonment and now appeals as of right.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor's conduct throughout the course of the proceedings deprived him of a fair trial. It is the duty of the prosecutor to present evidence against a defendant in a zealous manner within proper limits. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), People v. Brocato, 17 Mich.App. 277, 169 N.W.2d 483 (1969), People v. Farrar, 36 Mich.App. 294, 193 N.W.2d 363 (1971). The foremost obligation of the prosecutor is to seek justice. 1 As Michigan Supreme Court Justice Campbell noted almost a century ago:
"Nothing can bring more contempt and suspicion on the administration of justice than the failure of its ministers to respect justice." 2
The thrust of the prosecutor's strategy in this case was to depict defendant as a bad man by making repeated references to other illegal acts allegedly committed by defendant or other witnesses. The prosecutor made his "game plan" obvious during argument on whether a certain question was proper:
These sentiments were repeated after the trial court ruled that a witness could be asked a question about her prior association with a person involved in pornography, but unrelated to defendant, for the limited purpose of impeachment. The prosecutor objected to this limitation upon testimony elicited by the question and the following ensued:
Defendant was subject to a litany of allegations concerning his past conduct which were not charged in the information. During his case in chief the prosecutor brought before the jury.
1. Hearsay testimony from complainant's guardian detailing the events in question and possibly leading jurors to infer that defendant was using 13 and 14-year-old girls as prostitutes,
2. Evidence concerning marijuana use by defendant at a disco that he owned and that he supplied marijuana to others,
3. Testimony from Betty Scott, repeated on several occasions, that defendant was her pimp,
8. Testimony from Roger Fee that he had told the complainant that he had heard defendant was known to beat women this was elicited despite a court ruling that the testimony was not admissible, and
9. Testimony from Susan Hatfield that Donna [101 MICHAPP 124] Decker had told her that defendant was currently on parole or that he had been in prison.
The prosecutor also inquired into the collateral matter of the alleged criminal conduct of other persons. Donna Decker was asked, over objection, whether she had committed an act of prostitution at the age of 16, long before she had met defendant. Ms. Decker was also asked to detail her activities with a Mr. Tabor, an individual with absolutely no connection to this case. 3
Similarly, Susan Hatfield was asked about her relationships with Mr. Tabor and whether she had induced Ms. Decker to engage in prostitution at the age of 16.
Defendant, himself, was asked about his alleged failure to pay child support and personal debts. The prosecutor further inquired about his living off the earnings of prostitutes.
It is patently clear that the prosecutor exceeded the bounds of legitimate prosecutorial zeal and tactics. Due process requires that a defendant not be convicted for what he has done in the past. The United States Supreme Court held in Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-476, 69 S.Ct. 213, 218-219, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948), that:
(Footnotes omitted).
The most disturbing aspect of the prosecutor's behavior was his blatant injection of race as an issue in the trial. Defendant was black, while most of the women allegedly involved with him were white. At the outset of trial the prosecutor established that the complainant's boyfriend was white. One witness was asked if many white girls frequented defendant's disco. Other witnesses were asked if alleged prostitutes working for defendant were white or black. Inquiries were also made concerning the race of the men who sought defendant's prostitutes. The prosecutor read a letter written by defendant to the judge before trial accusing the prosecution of a racial motivation in bringing the case. He also inquired about the race of defendant's prior trial counsel. 4
Had the prosecutor otherwise acted properly in all respects this would have mandated reversal. The injection of race into a trial constitutes reversible error. People v. Hill, 258 Mich. 79, 87-89, 241 N.W. 873 (1932), United States v. Grey, 422 F.2d 1043, 1045-1046 (CA 6, 1970).
Defendant also contends that certain comments made by the trial judge require reversal of his [101 MICHAPP 126] conviction. This claim of error relates to an incident during trial when one of the jurors expressed concern over the fact that defendant was looking at the list of jurors' names. The trial judge interviewed each juror in chambers separately with counsel.
After assuring each juror individually that he or she need not worry, he stated in the presence of all:
Admittedly, the trial judge faced a most difficult and sensitive problem, but the court's remarks, particularly when considered with the conduct of the prosecutor, had the effect of characterizing...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Williams
...404 So.2d 968 (1981). Nor may a prosecuting attorney emphasize race, even in neutral terms, gratuitously. See People v. Springs, 101 Mich.App. 118, 125, 300 N.W.2d 315, 318 (1980) (prosecutor's many references to the race of the parties and persons associated with them held prejudicial); Pe......
-
Williams v. Branker
...v. Wilson, 404 So. 2d 968 (1981). Nor may a prosecuting attorney emphasize race, even in neutral terms, gratuitously. SeePeople v. Springs, 101 Mich. App. 118, 125, 300 N. W.2d 315, 318(1980) (prosecutor's many references to the race of the parties and persons associated with them held prej......
-
Stermer v. Warren
...white jurisdiction.1 People v. Bahoda , 448 Mich. 261, 266, 531 N.W.2d 659, 663 (1995) ; see also People v. Springs , 101 Mich. App. 118, 125, 300 N.W.2d 315, 318 (1980) ("The most disturbing aspect of the prosecutor's behavior was his blatant injection of race as an issue in the trial."). ......
-
Lankford v. Foltz
...bearing on felony murder was an inadmissible confession. 55 Mich. App. at 173-74, 222 N.W.2d at 308. Finally, People v. Springs, 101 Mich. App. 118, 300 N.W.2d 315 (1980), involving the Michigan pandering statute, and the court specifically stated that the information could have been amende......