People v. Sprinkle

• Decision Date: 25 March 1963
• Docket Number: No. 37203,37203
• Citation: 189 N.E.2d 295,27 Ill.2d 398
• Parties: The PEOPLE of State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. James Edward SPRINKLE, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 295

189 N.E.2d 295

27 Ill.2d 398

The PEOPLE of State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. James Edward SPRINKLE, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 37203.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 25, 1963.

John Verklan, Joliet, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Frank H. Masters, Jr., State's Atty., Joliet (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for defendant in error.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

Defendant was found guilty of burglary at the conclusion of a five-day jury trial in the circuit court of Will County, and was thereafter sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of one year to life. He now brings the cause to us by writ of error, contending that the court erred in ruling defendant's confession to have been voluntarily made, and, further, that the trial judge usurped the functions of counsel during the trial in a manner that indicated to the jury the judge's belief that the defendant was guilty and thereby deprived defendant of a fair trial.

The facts establish a brutal assault upon the complaining witness and an ensuing burglary of her home. Defendant, a 17-year-old youth, confessed the assault and forcible entry of the home, but contended on the trial that the confession was the result of being confined for three days and nights in a so-called 'sweat box', an admittedly uncomfortably warm area involving the mezzanine cell block of the county jail, in which defendant testified it was so hot he could neither eat nor sleep, and from which he was transferred following his confession. A substantial portion of the record is devoted to conditions as they existed in the jail, and the alleged coercion used to secure the confession, but no useful purpose would be served in relating these matters here in view of the result we reach.

We turn at once to a consideration of the problem involving the conduct of the trial judge, and are immediately confronted with the State's contention that the failure of the public defender to object to the comments and questions during the trial and the omission of any specific reference thereto in the motion for a new trial preclude our consideration of this question. We agree that failure to make a proper and timely objection or to specify the objectionable matter in the motion for a new trial should and would ordinarily prohibit its review. However as we said in People v. Finn, 17 Ill.2d 614, 617, 161 N.E.2d 354, 356, 'Although no objection was made by defense counsel to the remarks as the reporter read them, and although the record does not show any objection to them either during or after the trial, under the circumstances it is our opinion that the record was infected with error upon the occasion of the sanity hearing and the defendant is, therefore, entitled to a new hearing and trial. However strong the evidence against an accused may be, and in this case the defendant was caught in the house he was burglarizing with some of the stolen property in his pockets, a fair trial, in all its stages, is a fundamental requirement in a criminal prosecution and when such requirement is not met, it amounts to a denial of due process of law. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158.' And in People v. Moore, 9 Ill.2d 224, 232, 137 N.E.2d 246, 250, we quoted with approval from Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill.2d 293, 313, 134 N.E.2d 249, 250, 58 A.L.R.2d 1008, as follows: 'If prejudicial arguments are made without objection of counsel or interference of the trial court to the extent that the parties litigant cannot receive a fair trial and the judicial process stand without deterioration, then upon review this court may consider such assignments of error, even though no objection was made and no ruling made or preserved thereon'.

In our judgment this reasoning applies even more forcefully to the situation before us. The conduct complained of here consists of actions of the trial judge. The making of an objection to questions or comments by a judge poses a practical problem for the trial lawyer. It can prove embarrassing to the lawyer, but, more importantly, assuming that most juries view most judges with some degree of respect, and accord to them a knowledge of law somewhat superior to that of the attorneys practicing before the judge, the lawyer who objects to a comment or question by the judge may find himself viewed with considerable suspicion and skepticism by the very group whom he is trying to convert to his client's view of the facts, thereby perhaps irreparably damaging his client's interests. If he fails to object, he may, on appeal, be faced, as defendant here is, with the claim that his failure to act has precluded consideration of the error, and it is not always a sufficient answer to this situation to say that the objection can be made and ruling secured outside the hearing of the jury. It is particularly incumbent upon the trial judge to exercise a higher degree of care in his comments regarding, or interrogations of, witnesses before a jury in order to avoid influencing the jurors to any extent, and we therefore hold that a less rigid...