People v. St. Pierre, No. 69238

• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: CLARK
• Citation: 167 Ill.Dec. 1029,588 N.E.2d 1159,146 Ill.2d 494
• Docket Number: No. 69238
• Decision Date: 20 February 1992
• Parties: , 167 Ill.Dec. 1029 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Robert ST. PIERRE, Appellant.

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588 N.E.2d 1159 146 Ill.2d 494, 167 Ill.Dec. 1029 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,
v.
Robert ST. PIERRE, Appellant. No. 69238. Supreme Court of Illinois. Feb. 20, 1992.
Rehearing Denied March 30, 1992.

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[146 Ill.2d 497] [167 Ill.Dec. 1031] Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, and Allen H. Andrews, Asst. Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for appellant.

[146 Ill.2d 498] Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Jack O'Malley, State's Atty., Chicago (Terence Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Renee Goldfarb and James E. Fitzgerald, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the court:

This is the second time defendant's, Robert St. Pierre's, murder convictions have been before this court. Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant was found guilty of the murders of Sybil and Benjamin Gibons. In addition, defendant was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit murder, two counts of armed robbery, and two counts of concealing a homicidal death. A jury sentenced defendant to death for the murders, and the trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive 60-year extended prison terms on the armed robbery convictions; two concurrent 7-year terms on the conspiracy convictions; and two concurrent 5-year terms on the convictions for concealment of a homicidal death. Defendant's sentence of death was stayed (134 Ill.2d R. 609(a)) pending direct appeal to this court. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(b); Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(i); 134 Ill.2d R. 603.

On appeal, this court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded the cause to the circuit court for a new trial. (People v. St. Pierre (1988), 122 Ill.2d 95, 118 Ill.Dec. 606, 522 N.E.2d 61.) The reversal was based on the admission at trial of defendant's inculpatory statements in violation of his fifth and fourteenth amendment rights. See St. Pierre, 122 Ill.2d at 113, 118 Ill.Dec. 606, 522 N.E.2d 61.

On remand, on August 8, 1988, defendant executed a written jury waiver form, and pled guilty to the murders of Sybil and Benjamin Gibons, as well as to two counts each of armed robbery, conspiracy to commit murder, [146 Ill.2d 499] and concealment of a homicidal death. Defendant waived his right to a jury for the sentencing phase of the proceedings. During the first phase of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found defendant eligible for the death penalty because he was at least 18 years of age at the time of the murders, and because two statutory aggravating factors were present (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(b)(3), (b)(6)). At the second stage of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. Consequently, the trial court sentenced defendant to death. Also, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 60 years for the two counts of armed robbery, 7 years for the two counts of conspiracy to commit murder, and 5 years for the two counts of concealment of a homicidal death. Defendant's death sentence was stayed (134 Ill.2d R. 609(a)) pending direct appeal to this court (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(b); 134 Ill.2d R. 603).

Defendant argues on appeal that: (1) his decision to plead guilty was not voluntary because it was motivated by the dangerous conditions in which he was confined at the Cook County jail; (2) his decision to waive a jury for sentencing was not voluntary because it was motivated by the dangerous conditions in which he was confined at the Cook County jail; (3) his decision to waive a

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[167 Ill.Dec. 1032] jury for sentencing was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary because he was not told that the vote of only one juror would preclude the imposition of the death sentence; (4) his decision to waive a jury for sentencing was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary because he was not told that a jury would be unaware that he had been previously sentenced to death for these murders; (5) his death sentence was disproportionate to the sentences of natural life imprisonment received by Barry Wilson and Jacqueline Gibons, who orchestrated these murders; (6) [146 Ill.2d 500] the trial court erred when it refused to consider his good behavior in prison as a mitigating factor, and in finding that he did not appreciate the seriousness of his crimes; (7) he was denied due process and his eighth amendment right to a fair sentencing hearing because the prosecutor argued that defendant should be sentenced to death because he might escape from prison; (8) the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and article I, section 2, of the Illinois State Constitution were violated where defendant was permitted to waive the preparation of a presentence investigation report; (9) his convictions for the inchoate offense of conspiracy to commit murder must be reversed; (10) the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it places the burden of proof on the defendant; and (11) the Illinois death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it does not sufficiently minimize the risk of arbitrarily or capriciously imposed death sentences.

The facts regarding defendant's arrest and conviction for the murders of Sybil and Benjamin Gibons are not in dispute and are adequately set forth in this court's earlier opinion on direct appeal. (See St. Pierre, 122 Ill.2d 95, 118 Ill.Dec. 606, 522 N.E.2d 61.) Consequently, certain facts will be repeated here only when necessary as each issue is dealt with serially. The first issue that defendant raises is that his decision to plead guilty was not voluntary because it was motivated by dangerous conditions at the Cook County jail.

Due to the unusual and peculiar nature of this case, we will relate in some detail the discussions between the trial judge, defense counsel and defendant regarding defendant's entering of a guilty plea. As noted above, on March 30, 1988, this court overturned defendant's convictions and remanded this cause to the circuit court of Cook County for a new trial. (St. Pierre, 122 Ill.2d 95, 118 Ill.Dec. 606, 522 N.E.2d 61.) Subsequent to this court's decision, defendant was apparently transferred from the Illinois Department of [146 Ill.2d 501] Corrections' Menard facility to the Cook County jail. Thereafter, on July 26, 1988, defendant informed the trial court that he wished to enter a blind plea of guilty (there was no plea agreement with the State) for the murders of Sybil and Benjamin Gibons. According to defendant's court-appointed counsel, defendant was entering this blind plea of guilty because he could not "adjust" to the conditions at the Cook County jail.

Immediately after defendant's surprising announcement that he wished to plead guilty, the trial judge stated that he wanted defendant examined by a psychiatrist so as to determine defendant's fitness to enter a plea of guilty. On August 8, 1988, Dr. Albert Stipes, a psychiatrist at the Cook County Psychiatric Institute, testified that he examined defendant on August 4, 1988, and that he found defendant "fit for trial, for pleading, or for sentencing." In addition, Dr. Stipes stated that "[defendant's] knowledge of the charges against him, as well as the proceedings and the duties of court personnel, are quite sophisticated." After Dr. Stipes testified, the trial judge stated:

"I think at this point it should be made clear in the record that there was no general indication of any specific abnormality on the part of [defendant] that required me to ask for a [fitness] examination. It was merely the unusual circumstances that someone who has gone through an appeal process whose case is overturned and then gets the case sent back here for trial and has the opportunity to be represented by able counsel and has a right to defend himself, then decides in spite of it all to plead guilty to

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[167 Ill.Dec. 1033] the same charges for which he has now been granted a new trial * * *.

* * * * * *

The only thing that bothers me and the only thing that should be clear in the record is that if the decision to plead guilty is not based on one of guilt but is based on one of inconvenience, then I don't know if I can accept it [146 Ill.2d 502] and there will be, and I intend, during the next phase of this hearing which we are going to go into right know, to ask a number of questions along that line * * *." (Emphasis added.)

Following these comments, there were further discussions between the trial judge, defense counsel and defendant regarding the entering of a guilty plea and defendant's disdain with being incarcerated in the Cook County jail. Specifically, defense counsel stated that defendant was pleading guilty due to the gangs, homosexuality, drugs and weapons which were prevalent at the Cook County jail. However, counsel also stated that if defendant could be transferred into an Illinois Department of Corrections facility, he would be willing to assist defense counsel in the preparation of a defense. In response, the trial judge explained that he understood that there are many people in the Cook County jail, but that an accused's indication that he is "uncomfortable" in a certain jail is not a factor to be used to determine where a specific defendant is incarcerated. Rather, the trial judge explained that he was required to send an individual to the penitentiary after a conviction or, in the interim, to remand the accused individual to the custody of the Cook County sheriff, who has control over the incarceration.

Moreover, the trial judge reiterated:

"[I] cannot in good conscience accept a plea of guilty from someone who would tell me that he is only pleading guilty because he's uncomfortable with the conditions, and let me finish, who would not admit that in fact he's guilty of the crimes charged.

If it turns out that the defendant in...