People v. Stafford
| Decision Date | 22 January 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 83317,83317 |
| Citation | 434 Mich. 125,450 N.W.2d 559 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Susan STAFFORD, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Richard P. Thompson, Pros. Atty., Oakland County, Robert C. Williams, Chief, Appellate Div. by Thomas S. Richards, Asst. Pros. Atty., Pontiac, for plaintiff-appellant.
Faintuck, Shwedel & Wolfram by William G. Wolfram, Franklin, for defendant-appellee.
The issue before the Court involves whether the examining magistrate in this case erred in binding over the defendant, Susan Stafford, for second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals held that the magistrate abdicated, and therefore abused, his discretion in the manner in which he relied on People v. Oster, 67 Mich.App. 490, 241 N.W.2d 260 (1976), to bind the defendant over for second-degree murder at a remanded preliminary examination. 168 Mich.App. 247, 423 N.W.2d 634. We conclude that the Court of Appeals did not clearly err, and affirm that Court's decision.
The prosecutor charged defendant with open murder for the stabbing death of her boyfriend, Jeffrey Huff, on July 16, 1985. The facts developed at the preliminary hearing and at trial revealed that defendant and Huff met in West Virginia in either September or October 1984. Huff relocated to Michigan the following month, and he and defendant became live-in companions in Oxford, Michigan, soon afterwards. Defendant testified that she and Huff lived together fairly happily for the first three months of 1985. However, beginning in March 1985, and ending with Huff's death on July 16, defendant testified that numerous incidents of violent abuse occurred where Huff physically threatened, slapped, choked and battered her.
A number of attacks preceded the stabbing on July 16. On July 12, defendant testified that Huff attacked her while out horseback riding, threatening to kill her and nearly causing her horse to go out of control. Defendant called the police and they advised her to remove from her residence guns she had purchased earlier as a gift for Huff. Huff hid nearby until the police departed.
Two days later, on July 14, while driving in an automobile, Huff and defendant argued over the removal of the guns, and Huff subsequently pushed defendant from the moving automobile. The violence escalated at defendant's residence when defendant's teenage daughter, Murphy, intervened. Huff and Murphy struggled, and Huff slammed the girl's face against the ground. Murphy suffered broken teeth and lacerations of the mouth which required stitches at a hospital. The police again responded to this incident, but did not arrest Huff.
Defendant and Huff sought counseling from an alcohol and drug abuse counselor on July 16. Later that evening, Huff took defendant's car to buy food for that evening's meal. Defendant testified she began to worry when Huff failed to return after some period of time. She testified that she and her daughter had decided to leave the residence to prevent further abuse of her daughter once Huff returned with her automobile.
Eventually Huff, smelling of alcohol, returned accompanied by a male friend, Mills, in Mills' car. Defendant testified that while she spoke on the telephone, Huff entered and began attacking her. As a subterfuge, defendant casually told Huff she needed to get a cigarette, but instead ran to a female neighbor's house nearby. Upon arrival, defendant urgently asked the neighbor, Farden, to telephone the police for assistance. Defendant then telephoned her residence to check on her daughter but, upon receiving no answer, returned in haste with Farden to her home. On her way out, defendant grabbed a large butcher knife from Farden's kitchen, and Farden retrieved a baseball bat and collared her German shepherd dog.
Once at defendant's residence, defendant asked Farden to call for her daughter Murphy to come out of the house. Murphy came outside, followed shortly afterward by Huff. Defendant and Huff exchanged angry words in the dark night and an altercation ensued in which Huff initially attacked both Farden and defendant. At some point during the struggle, the knife held by defendant penetrated Huff's chest. He walked a few steps and fell, dying at the scene. Defendant followed him, and seeing blood on the knife exclaimed numerous times, "Oh my God, I've stabbed him." The police arrived just minutes later and arrested defendant for murder.
At the conclusion of the initial preliminary examination, the magistrate declined to bind the defendant over for either first- or second-degree murder. The magistrate explicitly noted a lack of evidence of premeditation on the defendant's part and the existence of facts indicating that she acted in self-defense and without malice, including testimony that she had sought police protection in the past, had called the police just prior to the stabbing, and that the victim had initiated the fatal altercation. The magistrate nevertheless concluded that the defendant's conduct in stabbing decedent with a knife evidenced probable cause of a reckless indifference for life supporting a binding over for manslaughter. Consequently, the magistrate bound the defendant over for trial on the charge of involuntary manslaughter only.
Before trial, the prosecution moved to remand the case to the examining magistrate to present additional evidence on probable cause of second-degree murder. Specifically, the prosecution desired to present testimony of the medical examiner and to introduce into evidence the knife wielded by defendant on the night of the homicide. 1 The trial court granted this motion over the objection of defense counsel, and remanded the case for further preliminary proceedings.
The medical examiner alone testified on remand before the magistrate. He speculated that the knife wound inflicted on the decedent indicated a "hook type" thrust. He also opined that the defendant would necessarily have been aware of impaling and withdrawing the knife. His testimony contradicted the defendant's testimony that only after decedent fell did she realize she had stabbed him. Additionally, the prosecution introduced the homicide weapon into evidence.
In its closing argument, the prosecution for the first time cited the case of People v. Oster, supra, and contended that Oster required the magistrate to bind the defendant over for second-degree murder. At the conclusion of the examination, the magistrate reversed his initial decision and bound the defendant over for second-degree murder as requested by the prosecution.
The magistrate, although he referred to "new evidence," did not explicitly find any new facts or retreat from his findings at the initial examination. However, the magistrate asserted that "[i]t was never the intention of the Court to analyze the evidence of the testimony of the witnesses to weigh the evidence to such an extent as to prepare or give a defense for the defendant." Nonetheless, the magistrate reiterated his initial findings of strong evidence indicating self-defense:
The magistrate focused on People v. Oster in his concluding and dispositive remarks:
The Court has had an opportunity to read People versus Oster as been [sic] presented by the prosecutor. And the Court will read the one paragraph that I find is interesting or pertinent or guiding in this case. On Page 496, Later on in that opinion, the Court of Appeals refers to those paragraphs as guidelines and the Court will use this as a guideline in this case as to the obligations of an examining magistrate.
While the Court could very easily take the information or the evidence presented and weigh as to the--as between the degrees of the homicide, it's not the duty of the Court to, from all of the evidence presented, to stand in the shoes of the trier of fact, and I follow that and try to follow that. In this case, if the People versus Oster says that that's the sufficient amount to bind over the defendant on second-degree murder, then I think that the argument must continue with the trier of fact as to what the meaning of the fight was and whether the defendant was in such heat that--to reduce this to manslaughter and that's something for the trier of fact to find.
The Court's satisfied by the addition of the information, witnesses, that the minimum amount of evidence has been presented to support the bindover on second-degree murder in this case, that being set out in the paragraph that I just read to you out of People v. Oster. I do specifically find, though, that there was no premeditation, and no malice aforethought to support first degree murder, and based upon [sic] that I will not bind over on open murder charge. The rest of the degrees is left for the trier of fact, from the evidence, and their [sic] interpretation of what the evidence was. (Emphasis supplied.)
The magistrate consequently bound the defendant over for second-degree murder. A jury convicted Stafford of involuntary manslaughter, and she appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, 2 holding that the magistrate erred in binding the defendant over for second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals also held that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
King v. State
...to revoke plaintiff's license. This erroneous abdication of discretion is, in itself, an abuse of discretion. People v. Stafford, 434 Mich. 125, 134 n. 4, 450 N.W.2d 559 (1990). Therefore, in this case, the commissioner cannot be said to be engaging in a "reasonable exercise of discretion."......
-
Council of Organizations and Others for Educ. about Parochiaid v. Governor of Michigan
...it is only when absolutely unavoidable that the courts will decide questions of a constitutional nature. People v. Stafford, 434 Mich. 125, 132, n. 3; 450 N.W.2d 559 (1990). When the validity of an act of the Legislature is drawn into question, even if a serious doubt of constitutionality i......
-
People v. Borom
...offense charged has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it. See People v. Stafford, 434 Mich. 125, 133, 450 N.W.2d 559 (1990).ANALYSISAs stated, under the prosecution's theory of the case, first-degree child abuse serves as the predicate felony......
-
Loutts v. Loutts
...and hence an abuse of discretion.’ ” Rieth v. Keeler, 230 Mich.App. 346, 348, 583 N.W.2d 552 (1998), quoting People v. Stafford, 434 Mich. 125, 134 n. 4, 450 N.W.2d 559 (1990). MCR 3.206(C)(2)(a) provides: A party who requests attorney fees and expenses must allege facts sufficient to show ......
-
Preliminary hearings
...acts of dishonesty. [For explanations of the difference between permissible and impermissible inquiries, see People v. Stafford , 434 Mich. 125, 450 N.W.2d 559 (1990); State v. Dunn , 121 Wisc.2d 389, 359 N.W.2d 151 (Wisc. 1984); Hunter v. District Court , 190 Colo. 48, 53, 543 P.2d 1265, 1......