People v. Stanis, Docket No. 12205

• Decision Date: 27 June 1972
• Docket Number: No. 2,Docket No. 12205,2
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George A. STAINS, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 473

200 N.W.2d 473

41 Mich.App. 565

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George A. STAINS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 12205.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2.

June 27, 1972.

Released for Publication Sept. 26, 1972.

Robert M. Crites, Flint, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Robert F. Leonard, Pros. Atty., Donald A. Kuebler, Chief Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before McGREGOR, P.J., and LEVIN and TARGONSKI, ^* JJ.

TARGONSKI, Judge.

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his 2 1/2-month-old son. M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. At preliminary examination in the Flint Municipal Court, the charge was reduced and defendant was bound over to the circuit court on a charge of second-degree murder. M.C.L.A. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549. He was convicted of manslaughter in a trial without a jury. M.C.L.A. § 750.321; M.S.A. § 28.553. Defendant is now before this Court after his application for delayed appeal was granted on Auguat 13, 1971. We do not recite herein in any detail any of the facts leading up to the death of the minor child or any of the details of the trial other than the procedural steps that were taken and the testimony relative to the defendant's ability to comprehend his constitutional rights and his capacity to voluntarily waive them at the time of his confession. There is always the desire to make the dispositions as brief as possible to conserve space in the publication of the opinion and to save the time of those having to read the opinion in connection with the jurisprudence of this State. Considerations of judicial economy, however, cannot outweigh the defendant's right to a fair and complete hearing of this matter. Consequently, those matters which are presented are presented in thorough-going detail.

In order to fully appreciate and get the full impact of the various matters developed procedurally and at hearings pertaining to the voluntariness of the defendant's confession and its admissibility, we must have this background material on the defendant and his development to the time of the commission of the offense in question. The defendant is the son of his father and defendant's sister, who was 16 years old when defendant was born. The girl kept the defendant as an infant, but neglected and mistreated him to the point where defendant was removed from the home three months later. At the age of 2, defendant was placed in the Lapeer State Home & Training School where he remained as a ward of the State until his final discharge about 23 years later. Defendant met his wife in the Lapeer State Home. The woman had spent about twelve years of her life, between the ages of 10 and 22, in the Home. The deceased infant was their first and only child. Defendant's wife was permitted to testify against him at the trial. Examination of the record leaves one convinced that there could be no conviction in this proceeding without the matters contained in the defendant's confession.

November 13, 1967: Defendant arraigned on the information in the Genesee County Circuit Court. Defendant stood mute. Plea of not guilty was entered by the court.

January 17, 1968: Order entered committing defendant to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry of the Department of Mental Health for a two-month period to determine whether or not defendant was competent to stand trial.

February 27, 1968: Center filed a diagnostic report concluding defendant was not competent to stand trial.

March 11, 1968: Circuit Court entered an order committing defendant to the Department of Mental Health for treatment 'for so long as his incompetency shall endure, not to exceed 18 months from the entry of this order'.

July 22, 1969: Department of Mental Health filed a report expressing the opinion that the defendant was competent to stand trial.

August 14, 1969: Circuit Court order entered declaring defendant to be competent to stand trial.

November 12, 1969: Defendant filed a motion requesting a Walker hearing ¹ to determine the admissibility of his statements made to the police on the date of his arrest.

December 3, 1969: Walker hearing held in the circuit court. Matter taken under advisement by the court.

We interrupt this chronology to set forth some of the elements of the defendant's claim in his petition for Walker hearing and the developments as the result of the Walker hearing. Defendant alleged that he was incapable of understanding his Miranda ² rights because of his mental condition and, therefore, the self-incriminating statements should be suppressed. During the course of the Walker hearing serious doubts arose in the minds of the court and counsel concerning defendant's competency. As a result of such doubts defendant was again committed and the following events ensued.

December 16, 1969: Circuit Court entered an order committing the defendant to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry of the Department of Mental Health 'for the performance of a psychiatric evaluation concerning his competency to stand trial'.

March 27, 1970: Department of Mental Health Report filed showing that defendant was competent to stand trial.

March 27, 1970: Circuit Court other that self-incriminating statements made by defendant to police were admissible.

April 8, 1970: Notice of insanity defense filed by defendant.

June 18, 1970: Defendant files motion for rehearing regarding admissibility of self-incriminating statements.

June 24, 1970: Circuit Court order denying motion for rehearing Re: admissibility of self-incriminating statements.

June 25, 1970: The defendant appears for trial and waives trial by jury in open court.

On appeal defendant raises two issues. The first one is directed to the question of whether or not the people had established the Corpus delicti of the crime prior to the introduction of his confession. The necessity of disposing of this issue hinges upon our disposition of the second issue raised by the defendant. Inasmuch as a discussion of the first issue will not add significantly to the jurisprudence of this State, we will undertake consideration of the second issue first. The second issue is directed to the question of the defendant's ability to comprehend and voluntarily waive his constitutional rights prior to the time that he confessed.

The question usually revolves around the issue of whether or not the police at the time prior to the interrogation had advised the defendant of his constitutional rights in accordance with Miranda. ³ The gist of the Miranda requirement is the warning to the defendant that he has a right to remain silent, they any statement he does make amy be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may elect to waive these rights and such waiver has full force and effect only if made Voluntarily, knowingly and Intelligently.

In his November 12, 1969 petition for the Walker hearing defendant contended that, although the police probably informed him of his constitutional rights before he made the self-incriminating statements, he was unable to comprehend and understand said rights because of his mental condition and, therefore, he could Not have effectively waived his Miranda rights. During the December 3, 1969 Walker hearing a member of the State Police testified that he had first questioned the defendant on October 2, 1967, at approximately 7:45 in the evening. He further testified that he again spoke to the defendant at 9 p.m. and that he and another member of the State Police interrogated the defendant for a third time at 10:30 p.m. on that date and that in each instance the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights. He further testified that the defendant was responsive to each question and that his demeanor and manner were the same on each of the interrogations and that in the opinion of said detective the defendant appeared to understand what he was being told; that the defendant was advised that he was under arrest for the murder of his infant son; that no threats, promises, coercion or overbearing were employed to get the defendant to confess; that in his opinion the statements which the defendant made during all three interrogations were freely and voluntarily made; that he and Corporal Spurlin made a tape recording of the third conversation with the defendant; and that the tape of that conversation had been in his possession ever since it was made. This detective testified further that no tape recordings were made of the first two conversations with the defendant because he told a different story as to what had happened to the infant son and admitted that they had questioned the defendant for nearly two hours before he made any admission. On the other hand, the defendant in his testimony indicated that he had been questioned all night without a break. The timetable testified to by the officer indicates that three hours had intervened from the beginning of the first interrogation to the beginning of the third interrogation without any indication as to when the third interrogation concluded. This tape was 'played' into evidence during the course of the Walker hearing.

Under cross-examination the detective in question also testified that the defendant appeared 'a little nervous, moving his hands in a nervous state' during the interrogations. Before the defendant took the stand during the Walker hearing, the judge asked him if he could read and write the English language and the defendant answered, 'Well, I can't read very good.' When the judge questioned him as to his understanding of the English language, the defendant answered, 'Well, not very well.' When he took the stand he testified that he was being held in the county jail; that prior to being brought to the jail, he had spent 18 months in Ionia Mental Hospital; that he now felt 'one hundred per cent better'; that ...