People v. Stanley, 63
| Decision Date | 04 September 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 63,63 |
| Citation | 84 N.W.2d 787,349 Mich. 362 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Daniel William STANLEY, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
John D. O'Connell, Detroit, for appellant.
Gerald K. O'Brien, Pros. Atty., Detroit, by Samuel Brezner, Asst. Pros. Atty., Criminal Appeals Division, Detroit, for the People.
Before the Entire Bench.
Defendant, Daniel William Stanley, was informed against under § 413 of the penal code, C.L.1948, § 750.413 (Stat.Ann. § 28.645) for taking possession of and driving away a motor vehicle. The section in question reads as follows:
'Taking possession of and driving away a motor vehicle--Any person who shall, wilfully and without authority, take possession of and drive or take away, and any person who shall assist in or be a party to such taking possession, driving or taking away of any motor vehicle, belonging to another, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years.'
The facts upon which defendant was arrested and convicted are as follows. On the morning of August 6, 1953, defendant, Daniel William Stanley, and another man appeared at the used car lot of Thomas J. Hart, located at 3780 Gratiot Avenue, Detroit, Michigan, inquired about the price of a 1950 Pontiac automobile, and requested a demonstration. Hart's porter accompanied the two on the drive. When they returned to the lot in the vehicle, the porter stepped out leaving defendant Stanley seated next to his companion, the driver. The two talked together some 15 to 30 seconds while Hart was engaged on the telephone, and then drove off. Hart testified that he was the owner of the car and did not give Stanley and his companion permission to drive it off. He immediately called the police. The porter testified that the automobile was returned and left in the middle of the lot; the porter got out and went to the office to tell Hart that the two prospects wished to pay cash. Hart told him to ask them to wait a minute, but before Hart could get out, the car drove off, with defendant Stanley driving, jumped the curb, almost hit a safety zone, and sped east on Gratiot Avenue. He did not give permission to take the vehicle.
During the trial counsel for defendant requested the court to charge the jury that they must find the defendant intended to steal the car when he drove it away before he could be found guilty. The trial court refused to give this instruction, and stated to the jury that such an intent was not necessary under the statute.
Upon leave being granted defendant appeals and urges that the trial court erred in charging the jury that the People were not required to prove intent to steal the car in question, as such intent is not a...
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People v. Hendricks
...toward an annoying, but relatively harmless type of trespass, aptly described in a trial court charge quoted in People v. Stanley, 349 Mich. 362, 364-365, 84 N.W.2d 787 (1957): "It was early discovered that so many automobiles would be taken, but without intent to permanently deprive the ow......
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...offense does not require felonious intent, only movement of the vehicle without the owner's consent. MCL 750.413; People v. Stanley, 349 Mich. 362, 364, 84 N.W.2d 787 (1957) ("Intent to steal is not an ingredient of the offense.").Instead, UDAA merely requires driving or taking away a motor......
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