People v. Stanley
Citation | 170 P.3d 782 |
Decision Date | 05 April 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 04CA2164.,04CA2164. |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Eugene STANLEY, a/k/a Rick Eugene Stanley, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Matthew D. Grove, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Haddon, Morgan, Mueller, Jordan, Mackey & Foreman, P.C., Norman R. Mueller, Rachel A. Bellis, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge J. JONES.
Defendant, Richard Eugene Stanley, appeals his convictions for two counts of attempting to influence a public official, contending, among other things, that the statute he was convicted of violating, § 18-8-306, C.R.S.2006, was applied to him in violation of his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree with defendant's constitutional argument, and affirm the judgment of conviction.
On September 7, 2002, defendant was charged with violating City of Thornton Municipal Code § 38-237 by carrying a dangerous weapon—namely, a loaded .357 magnum handgun. Thornton Municipal Judge Charles Rose presided at defendant's trial. Defendant, representing himself, argued that § 38-237 is unconstitutional in that it infringed on his rights under the Colorado Constitution to defend himself and to bear arms. Judge Rose found defendant guilty after a bench trial, and sentenced defendant to serve ninety days in jail and to pay a $500 fine.
Defendant appealed his conviction to the Adams County District Court, again arguing that § 38-237 is unconstitutional. Judge Donald W. Marshall, Jr. affirmed defendant's conviction. Defendant did not further appeal this conviction or sentence.
Defendant failed to appear on the date ordered to begin serving his sentence. Instead defendant's secretary, at defendant's direction, hand delivered a document to the City of Thornton Municipal Court labeled, "Notice and Order." The "Notice and Order" stated:
This NOTICE to Judge Charles Rose is in regard to Stanley's gun charge and arrest of openly carrying a weapon, in violation of Thornton Ordinance TRMC38-237. This ordinance violates Colorado Constitution Art. 2, Sec.3, by interfering with his natural, essential, and inalienable right to self defense, under the color of law, for the arrest, charge, and conviction against Rick Stanley. The signing of SB25 on March 18, 2003, affirms Article 2, Sec. 3, of the State Constitution, and preempts this ordinance. Rick Stanley demands that Judge Charles Rose, overturn this conviction of Stanley on constitutional grounds. Failure to do so will result in a treason charge against Charles Rose for failure to uphold the oath of office to defend the Constitutions, which this Court has a copy of, and Charles Rose swore to, as a "condition" of his office. This treason charge, will result in a Mutual Defense Pact Militia warrant for Charles Rose's arrest if the following conditions are not met:
1. Overturn the unconstitutional conviction of Rick Stanley for violation of TRMC 38-237 because TRMC 38-237 violates the constitutional rights of Rick Stanley, under the guise of "color of law."
2. Return the $1,500.00 bond to Rick Stanley.
3. Return Rick Stanley's property which consists of 1 each Smith and Wesson 6 shot .357 pistol and 6 each .357 bullets.
This court is notified, once more, as Stanley gave Notice from the beginning of the proceeding against him, Thornton Municipal Court has "NO" jurisdiction over him in this matter.
Accordingly, this ORDER is affirmed.
Rick Stanley
On the following day, defendant's secretary, again at defendant's direction, mailed a similar "Notice and Order" to Judge Marshall at the Adams County District Court and to the Adams County District Court.
Defendant was charged, in separate cases, with two counts of attempting to influence a public servant in violation of § 18-8-306, a class four felony. The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Acting pursuant to § 18-1-1001, C.R.S. 2006, the court issued protection orders against defendant for the benefit of Judge Rose and Judge Marshall, both of which defendant refused to accept. In addition, both Judge Rose and Judge Marshall were placed under police and SWAT team protection.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the ground § 18-8-306 is unconstitutionally overbroad as applied in this case because the "Notices" constituted speech protected by the First Amendment. Following a hearing, the court denied that motion.
Senior Judge Joseph R. Quinn, a former Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, presided at defendant's trial, at which defendant was represented by counsel. A jury found defendant guilty of both charges. Judge Quinn sentenced defendant to six years imprisonment in the Department of Corrections (three years for each offense, to run consecutively), plus three years of mandatory parole. Judge Quinn also assessed a total of $10,000 in fines ($5,000 for each offense), and ordered defendant to pay $8,249.64 in restitution.
Defendant argues that his convictions must be reversed because the statements contained in the two "Notices" were protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, defendant argues that § 18-8-306 is unconstitutionally overbroad as applied in this case because his statements did not constitute "true threats." While we agree that the threats of violence prohibited by § 18-8-306 are limited to "true threats," as that term is properly understood in the First Amendment context, we disagree with defendant's contention that the People did not prove that his statements constituted true threats. Accordingly, we conclude that § 18-8-306 was not unconstitutionally applied to defendant.
Section 18-8-306 provides:
Any person who attempts to influence any public servant by means of deceit or by threat of violence or economic reprisal against any person or property, with the intent thereby to alter or affect the public servant's decision, vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter which is to be considered or performed by him or the agency or body of which he is a member, commits a class 4 felony.
"The critical elements of this offense are (1) an attempt to influence a public servant (2) by means of deceit or by threat of violence or economic reprisal (3) with the intent to alter or affect the public servant's decision or action." People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261, 1269 (Colo.1985); accord People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Colo.1994); People v. Schupper, 140 P.3d 293, 298 (Colo. App.2006).
While the First Amendment protects the right to free speech, its protection is not absolute. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 1547, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003). Some categories of speech are unprotected by the First Amendment, and the government may permissibly regulate speech that falls within these categories. Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 358, 123 S.Ct. at 1547; People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 638 (Colo. 1999). One such category is "true threats." Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. at 1547-48; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) ( ); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 1401, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969); Janousek, supra, 871 P.2d at 1193 ( ).
The "true threat" requirement is generally regarded as having its origin in the Supreme Court's decision in Watts, supra. The defendant in that case was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 871, which proscribes making a threat against the President. The conviction was based on the defendant's statement at a political rally against the Vietnam War that "[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." Watts, supra, 394 U.S. at 706, 89 S.Ct. at 1401. While the Court held that the statute was constitutional on its face, it also held that it must be interpreted to distinguish between "true threats," which may be proscribed, and "political hyperbole," which may not be. Watts, supra, 394 U.S. at 707-08, 89 S.Ct. at 1401. Because the Court determined that the statement, considered in context, could not be interpreted as other than political hyperbole, it reversed the defendant's conviction. Watts, supra, 394 U.S. at 708, 89 S.Ct. at 1402.
Since Watts, the Supreme Court has not definitively articulated the meaning of "true threats." In Black, supra, however, the Supreme Court said: "`True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." Black, supra, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. at 1548; see also Janousek, supra, 871 P.2d at 1198 (Mullarkey, J., specially concurring) ().
Any statute that criminalizes threats must, of course, be applied and interpreted consistently with the First Amendment. Watts, supra, 394 U.S. at 707, 89 S.Ct. at 1401; Hickman, supra, 988 P.2d at 639-41. Accordingly, we agree with the parties that § 18-8-306 must be interpreted to limit criminal culpability to statements constituting "true threats." See Watts, supra, 394 U.S. at 708, 89 S.Ct. at 1401; Hickman supra, 988 P.2d at 639-41; State v. Johnston, 156...
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