People v. Stansberry

• Decision Date: 25 January 1971
• Docket Number: Nos. 40386,42521 and 43126,s. 40386
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Charles STANSBERRY, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James HARVEY, Appellant. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Lonnie HATCH, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 431

268 N.E.2d 431

47 Ill.2d 541

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Charles STANSBERRY, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James HARVEY, Appellant.

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Lonnie HATCH, Appellant.

Nos. 40386, 42521 and 43126.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 25, 1971.

Rehearing Denied March 31, 1971.

Sam Adam, Edward M. Genson, Kermit Coleman and Santo J. Volpe, Chicago, for appellants.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert A. Novelle and Arthur L. Belkind, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice.

On separately docketed direct appeals to this court, these cases have been consolidated because there is a similarity of facts and similar application of a legal principle. Defendants Charles Stansberry and Lonnie Hatch were found guilty in the circuit court of Cook County of the crime of illegal possession of heroin, a narcotic drug. They were convicted in a bench trial and sentenced to the penitentiary for terms of not less than two nor more than four years, and not less than two nor more than two years and a day respectively. After a jury trial, defendant James Harvey was found guilty in the circuit court of Cook County of the crime of possession of marijuana, a narcotic drug, and sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than two nor more than five years.

Each defendant contends that his constitutional rights were violated by the refusal of the trial court to quash the search warrants and suppress the incriminating evidence produced by the execution of said warrants. It is argued that the allegations of the complaints which led to the finding of probable cause by a judicial officer in the first instance were false and fraudulent and that they should have a right to controvert those allegations. In addition, each defendant contends that a warrant issued pursuant to an affidavit signed with a false or fictitious name is void.

We have recently had occasion to consider the first question posed and have held that there is no constitutional or statutory right to controvert the matters declared under oath which occasioned the finding of probable cause and the issuance of a search warrant by a judicial officer. (People v. Mitchell, 45 Ill.2d 148, 258 N.E.2d 345; People v. Bak, 45 Ill.2d 140, 258 N.E.2d 341, cert. denied October 26, 1970, 400 U.S. 882, 91 S.Ct. 117, 27 L.Ed.2d 121.) We have likewise been urged, as we are in these cases, to reconsider the BakMitchell decisions and we have declined to do so. (People v. Nakon, 46 Ill.2d 561, 264 N.E.2d 204.) Once again we find no reason to change our opinion and, based on the reasoning of the above cases, we find that the trial court properly refused to permit defendants to challenge the truth of the affidavits upon which the finding of probable cause was based.

In support of their contention that the search warrants were void, defendants cite United States ex rel. Pugh v. Pate (7th Cir. 1968), 401 F.2d 6, holding that a warrant issued pursuant to an affidavit signed with a false or fictitious name is void. Contrary to this finding we have previously held that the use of a fictitious name by an affiant to a search warrant does not constitute a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. (People v. Mack, 12 Ill.2d 151, 145 N.E.2d 609; People v. Smith, 40 Ill.2d 501, 241 N.E.2d 185.) The question thus presented is whether the Pugh case has any binding effect on this court when the issue has not been passed on by the United States Supreme Court. We find the question to be an elusive one though it is discussed generally in an annotation in 147 A.L.R. 857 and in 21 C.J.S. Courts § 206. These references indicate a lack of unanimity among the several States with the majority favoring the rule that such decisions should have no binding effect until the issue is considered and determined by the Supreme Court. This would appear to be the most logical conclusion, for oftentimes there is a conflict between decisions of the various Federal courts on constitutional matters and until finally determined by the United States Supreme Court there can be no definitive ruling by which a State court can be bound. (See: United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods (7th Cir.), 432 F.2d 1072.) For instance, on the question first posed in this opinion some lower Federal courts have held that a defendant is not entitled to inquire behind a search warrant and the affidavit supporting it, (Kenney v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 157 F.2d 442; United States v. Gianaris (D.C.D.C.) 25 F.R.D. 194) whereas the contrary view is expressed in United States v. Suarez (2d Cir.), 308 F.2d 713; United States v. Gillette (2d Cir.), 383 F.2d 843; United States v. Roth (7th Cir.), 391 F.2d 507. And the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon the question. (Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887.) Under such circumstances decisions of the lower Federal courts can be held to be no more than persuasive and certainly not binding on State courts.

Following our previous decisions in People v. Mack, 12 Ill.2d 151, 145 N.E.2d 609, and People v. Smith, 40 Ill.2d 501, 241 N.E.2d 185, we reaffirm that the use of a fictitious name by an affiant to a search warrant does not constitute an abridgment of constitutional rights. People v. O'Kiersey, 46 Ill.2d 198, 263 N.E.2d 488.

We shall now discuss the additional points raised by defendants Hatch and Harvey.

Hatch contends that the police officers did not file and docket the search warrant until after it was served and he was arrested. This procedure admittedly was in compliance with section 108--4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 108--4) which provides in part that a complaint upon which a warrant is issued need not be filed with the clerk until the warrant has been executed or has been returned 'not executed'. He argues that the statute itself is unconstitutional because it permits and 'encourages uncontrolled and unsupervised police harassment and intrusion upon a citizen in his home,' and affords no remedy to the innocent in whose home nothing incriminating is found. Such argument ignores the fact that before a warrant is issued a written complaint must be submitted to a judicial officer, as in this case, which states facts sufficient to show probable cause and particularly describes the place or person to be searched and the items to be seized. The purpose of the statute questioned is as stated in the Committee Comments, '* * * to enhance the law enforcement process by providing for a lack of public knowledge concerning the warrant until it has been executed.' (S.H.A. ch. 38, § 108--4.) We find no constitutional objection to exercising such precautions as may be necessary to forestall the possibility of one obtaining foreknowledge of an impending search. See: People v. Price, 46 Ill.2d 209, 263 N.E.2d 484.

Harvey contends that the police wrongfully delayed one day after issuance of the warrant before executing it in order to inculpate him for the offense, that a statement of his was improperly admitted into evidence when admittedly he had not previously been warned of his constitutional rights, that the trial court erred in not forcing the State to produce the affiant on the complaint for a search warrant at the trial, that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his sentence was excessive.

The search warrant was issued on October 28, 1967, and provided for a search of the person and the premises at the headquarters of the Afro-American Student Association, located at 3856 S. Parkway in Chicago. It was not served until the next day, October 29, because the police had learned that Harvey was not present at the Association office but that he was expected the next day. When the police did approach the office they were met by a young lady, and upon identifying themselves, they were admitted. According to the police the warrant was presented to Harvey and he read it in the presence of four other men. The officers, accompanied by Harvey, searched the premises consisting of three small rooms. In one of the rooms they found boxes and bags of old, dirty clothes and shoes and on the wall, hanging on hangers, a trench coat and several clean...