People v. Stanworth

• Citation: 114 Cal.Rptr. 250,11 Cal.3d 588
• Decision Date: 03 June 1974
• Docket Number: 16549,Cr. 15018
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 522 P.2d 1058 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis STANWORTH, Defendant and Appellant. In re Dennis STANWORTH on Habeas Corpus. See 522 P.2d 1058 for endors. In Bank

Page 250

114 Cal.Rptr. 250

11 Cal.3d 588, 522 P.2d 1058

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis STANWORTH, Defendant and Appellant.

In re Dennis STANWORTH on Habeas Corpus.

See 522 P.2d 1058 for endors.

Cr. 15018, 16549.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

June 3, 1974.

Rehearing Denied July 3, 1974.

William R. Higham, Public Defender, Permelia A. Hulse and Peter M. Brown, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant and for petitioner.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, George R. Nock, Robert R. Granucci and Jerome C. Utiz, Deputy Attys. Gen., for defendant and respondent.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant Dennis Stanworth ¹ was convicted upon pleas of guilty of two counts of murder (Pen.Code, § 187), ² one count of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery resulting in bodily harm to the victim (§ 209), four counts of kidnaping (§ 207), three counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. 3), one count of oral-genital copulation (§ 288a), and one count of robbery (§ 211). ³ The trial court determined that both murders were of the first degree. After a trial on the issue of penalty in respect to the charges under sections 187 and 209, a jury fixed the penalty on each of the murder counts at death and on the aggravated kidnaping count at life without possibility of parole. Judgment was pronounced accordingly. ⁴ On automatic appeal (§ 1239, subd. (b)), because of Witherspoon error (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776), we reversed the judgment insofar as it imposed the death penalty for the murder counts but affirmed it in all other respects. (People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 842, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889.)

Prior to the second penalty trial, defendant moved to withdraw his pleas of guilty to the murder counts on the basis hat they had been entered involuntarily. The motion was denied. ⁵ Upon retrial, a jury again fixed the penalty on each of the murder counts at death. Judgments were entered accordingly. (See fn. 3, Ante.) Defendant is before us again on automatic appeal. (§ 1239, subd. (b).)

In People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880, we held that the death penalty violated our state constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. (Cal.Const., art. I, § 6.) ⁶ And in Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, the United States Supreme Court ruled that imposition of the death penalty in these circumstances contravened the federal Constitution. As defendant's death penalty must therefore be set aside, it is unnecessary to consider the claims of error arising out of his second penalty trial.

We inquired of defendant whether he desired to assert any grounds for attacking the judgment of guilt as permitted by our decision in People v. Ketchel (1966) 63 Cal.2d 859, 865--866, 48 Cal.Rptr. 614, 409 P.2d 694. As in this case, Ketchel involved an appeal from a second penalty trial. Inasmuch as the judgment of guilt entered after the first trial had been affirmed on the first appeal, the issues which might have been raised on appeal from the second penalty trial normally would have been limited to matters concerning the penalty. However, the defendant sought to attack the judgment of guilt of the basis of decisions rendered After that judgment had become final. He asserted that his confessions were improperly admitted on the issue of guilt in the first trial under newly declared constitutional standards of retroactive application.

As a matter of judicial economy we allowed the defendant to present the argument. We explained that there 'would be an unnecessary expenditure of time and money were we to reverse solely as to penalty and federal habeas corpus relief were later granted on the ground that at the guilt trial evidence was admitted that was inadmissible . . ..' (Ketchel, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 865--866, 48 Cal.Rptr. at p 618, 409 P.2d at p. 698.) And, we observed that the defendant's attack on the issue of guilt was comparable to a collateral attack and the issue would be cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding in this court since it involved a constitutional issue which the defendant had no prior opportunity to raise. ⁷ Under these circumstances, we decided that the ends of justice would be better served by considering issues as to guilt in the second appeal.

In the instant case, defendant, in response to our inquiry, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than a supplemental brief in the appeal. We accepted this mode of attack and issued an order to show cause. The People have filed a return thereto. ⁸

In this framework of review, we proceed to examine defendant's contentions in respect to the issue of guilt. Snce the facts of the case are set forth in our prior opinion (see People v. Stanworth, Supra, 71 Cal.2d 820, 823--828, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889) we refrain from reiterating them at this point but will refer to them and to any additional facts presented by the record now before us as occasion requires in our discussion of a particular issue.

I The Kidnaping Convictions

We first consider defendant's contention that the several kidnaping convictions are invalid under our decision in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225. Defendant takes the position that the rule announced by us in Daniels applies not only to aggravated kidnaping (§ 209) but to so-called simple kidnaping (§ 207). We shall explain that Daniels does not apply to the latter classification.

In Daniels we held that it was the intent of the Legislature to exclude from the reach of section 209 as amended in 1951 'not only 'standstill' robberies . . . but also those in which the movements of the victim are merely incidental to the commission of the robbery and do not substantially increase the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. (Citations.)' (71 Cal.2d at p. 1139, 80 Cal.Rptr. at p. 910, 459 P.2d at p. 238.)

'In People v. Mutch (1971) Supra, 4 Cal.3d 389, 396, 93 Cal.Rptr. 721, 482 P.2d 633, we held that a defendant is entitled to habeas corpus relief under Daniels if there is no material dispute as to the facts relating to his conviction and if it appears that the statute under which he was convicted did not prohibit his conduct. In In re Madrid (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 996, 97 Cal.Rptr. 354, the Court of Appeal held that habeas corpus relief authorized by Mutch is available to a defendant whose conviction was based on a guilty plea.' (In re Crumpton (1973) 9 Cal.3d 463, 467, 106 Cal.Rptr. 770, 773, 507 P.2d 74, 77.) Defendant's plea of guilty to the kidnaping charges, as in Crumpton, preceded the Daniels decision. However, the plea in Crumpton was an integral part of a plea bargain. We reasoned there that '(i)t would be unconscionable to hold a defendant bound by a plea made under such significant and excusable misapprehension of the law.' (Id. at p. 468, 106 Cal.Rptr. at p. 773, 507 P.2d at p. 77.) In the instant case, a fortiori, defendant's plea, which was not part of a plea bargain, should not be binding on him. ⁹

We first examine in the light of these rules defendant's conviction of kidnaping for robbery (§ 209) as charged in count X of the indictment. The facts are briefly these. The victim, Mrs. D., ¹⁰ was walking home from a shopping center in the early evening. Defendant approached her on the road, grabbed her from behind and while holding an ice pick at her throat, threatened to have sexual intercourse with her. He dragged her onto an open field approximately 25 feet from the road, bound her hands with wire and forcibly raped her. Before fleeing, defendant took approximately $15 from the victim's purse.

Comparing the circumstances involving a charge of aggravated kidnaping in People v. Daniels, Supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1124--1125, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, with the undisputed facts in the present case, it is apparent that defendant's conviction cannot stand. In Daniels, the defendants, armed with a gun, forced entry into the victim's apartment. Holding her at gunpoint, they walked her a distance of about 30 feet, first to the kitchen and then to the bedroom where each of them raped her. They warned her not to move and, upon leaving, took money from her purse. In reversing the convictions arising from this incident and similar ones, we said, 'defendants had no interest in forcing their victims to move just for the sake of moving; their intent was to commit robberies and rapes, and the brief movements which they compelled their victims to perform were solely to facilitate such crimes.' (People v. Daniels, Supra, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1130--1131, 30 Cal.Rptr. 897, 904, 459 P.2d 225, 232.) We also concluded that the brief movements of the victims 'did not substantially increase the risk of harm otherwise present.' (Id. at p. 1140, 80 Cal.Rptr. at p. 910, 459 P.2d at p. 238.) In the case at bench, the asportation of the victim was for a distance slightly less and was accomplished for the specific purpose of raping and robbing her. Thus the movement of the victim cannot be regarded as substantial and was merely incidental to the commission of those crimes.

The People assert that the risk of harm was significantly increased here because defendant moved the victim from the road, an area of relative safety, to an adjacent field where it was easier for him to inflict bodily harm upon his prey. (See People v. Hill (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1052--1053, 98 Cal.Rptr. 214.) Under Daniels, the 'risk of harm' factor refers to the risk created by the victim's movements that he will 'suffer significant physical injuries over and above those to which a victim of the underlying crime is normally exposed'; it does not refer to the increased risk that the crime of robbery will be committed. (People v. Timmons (1971) 4...