People v. Staryak

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FULTON
• Citation: People v. Staryak, 396 Ill. 573, 72 N.E.2d 815 (Ill. 1947)
• Decision Date: 19 May 1947
• Docket Number: No. 29873.,29873.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. STARYAK.

396 Ill. 573

72 N.E.2d 815

PEOPLE

v.STARYAK.

No. 29873.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 19, 1947.

Rehearing Denied May 19, 1947.

Error to Circuit Court, Macoupin County; Victor Hemphill, judge.

John Staryak was convicted for robbery while armed, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

John Staryak, pro se.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., for the People.

FULTON, Justice.

Plaintiff in error, John Staryak, in May, 1936, upon a plea of guilty of robbery while armed, was sentenced by the circuit court of Macoupin county to imprisonment in the Illinois State Penitentiary for a term of not less than one year and until discharged by due process of law. He has sued a writ of error out of this court to review the record of his conviction. Three other defendants were indicted along with plaintiff in error. One E. N. Nevins was appointed to represent two of the defendants, and J. P. Madden, an attorney, was appointed to represent plaintiff in error and the other defendant. The indictment was returned on May 25, 1936, and on May 27, 1936, all four defendants were arraigned. The record shows that each defendant was furnished with a copy of the indictment and a list of witnesses. The right to trial by jury was waived in writing. Each defendant was duly cautioned and admonished by the court as to the consequence of his plea and each pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery while armed in manner and form as charged in the indictment, and sentence followed.

Plaintiff in error has filed only the common-law record containing the judgment entered in his case. He has specified three alleged errors. The first alleged error is assigned as follows:

‘1. The Court below erred, when it furnished the defendant with a copy of the indictment, appointed counsel, arraigned him, accepted his plea and convicted him on the same day, thereby depriving said defendant of procedural due process of law, contrary to section 1, of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and Article 2, Section 2, of the Illinois constitution in that it forced him into trial with such expedition as to deprive him of a fair trial with the effective aid and assistance of counsel.’

The return of the indictment and all of the following proceedings above outlined transpired on the same day, and plaintiff in error contends that he was thereby deprived of due process of law; that he was forced into trial with such expedition as prevented him from having a fair trial with the effective aid and assistance of counsel.

We see nothing in the record in this case which indicates that plaintiff in error was either rushed or forced into trial against his wishes. Upon being arraigned, counsel was appointed to represent him. There was no application for delay. He concedes there is no question about the competency of counsel thus appointed. Very often, in cases of like character, there is an urge on the part of a defendant to have the trial at once. Here, he was warned and admonished as to the consequences of a plea of guilty. Every safeguard appears to have been afforded him. In People v. White, 300 Ill. 239, 133 N.E. 213, 214, a defendant was indicted for burglary and receiving stolen property. When the case was called for trial he had no lawyer and the court appointed counsel to represent him. A jury was impaneled and sworn, and the trial concluded the same day, resulting in a verdict of guilty. On review of the record in this court, it was urged as ground for reversal that the court abused its discretion in permitting the defendant charged with two felonies to be tried on the same day counsel was appointed to defend him. This court there stated: ‘The record does not show, and it is not asserted by counsel, that plaintiff in error or the attorney appointed by the court to defend him asked or desired time to prpeare for trial. For aught that appears, they were ready and desired an immediate trial.’ In People v. Street, 353 Ill. 60, 186 N.E. 534, 535, we said: ‘It is only where the record shows that the trial court has abused its discretion in denying reasonable time for the preparation of the defense that a reviewing court will interfere.’ We do not find any support in the record for the assertion that the court abused its discretion in accepting the plea of guilty in this case and imposing sentence on the same date.

The second error assigned is based upon the record showing that the court proceeded to render judgment upon a plea of guilty without first requiring the defendant to persist in his plea and then accepting and recording the same as required by section 4 of division XIII of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, Chap. 38, par. 732), constituting, it is alleged, a denial of due process of law.

Section 4 of division XIII of the Criminal Code is in part as follows:

‘I...