People v. Staten

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: McCULLOUGH
• Citation: People v. Staten, 158 Ill.App.3d 971, 511 N.E.2d 938, 110 Ill.Dec. 761 (Ill. App. 1987)
• Decision Date: 30 July 1987
• Docket Number: No. 4-86-0770,4-86-0770
• Parties: , 110 Ill.Dec. 761 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary Lee STATEN, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 938

511 N.E.2d 938

158 Ill.App.3d 971, 110 Ill.Dec. 761

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gary Lee STATEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-86-0770.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

July 30, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 28, 1987.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Springfield, Allen H. Andrews, Asst. Defender, for defendant-appellant.

Thomas J. Difanis, State's Atty., Urbana, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Gwendolyn W. Klingler, Staff Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant was charged by indictment in the circuit court of Champaign County with enforcement of discipline--escape (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-4), a Class 3 felony, for his failure to return to the Urbana Community Correctional Center from furlough on March 24, 1982. He was found guilty following a bench trial on stipulated evidence and was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, to be served consecutive to the sentence in Coles County No. 81-CF-96, the case in which he was serving sentence at the time of his escape.

Defendant appeals, maintaining his conviction should be reversed and, essentially, treated as barred by an agreement of the State's Attorney in Fayette County--the county of defendant's "parent institution," Vandalia, at the time of his escape while a resident at the Urbana Community Correctional Center in Champaign County. The Fayette County State's Attorney agreed orally and in writing directed to Iowa authorities that his office would not charge defendant with escape if defendant pleaded guilty to a robbery charge in Iowa and received a 10-year incarceration on that charge. After serving sentence, defendant was returned to Illinois and the instant charge was brought by the State's Attorney in Champaign County.

Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss the charge, based on the agreement of the Fayette County State's Attorney not to prosecute as a term of the plea agreement concurred in by an Iowa court. The motion was denied. Defense counsel again raised the representation of the Fayette County State's Attorney as an affirmative defense after presentation of the State's case in chief, and made an offer of proof. The trial court reaffirmed its earlier ruling, found defendant guilty, pronounced sentence, and entered judgment. We affirm.

On February 24, 1982, defendant was granted work release from Vandalia Correctional Center in Fayette County, Illinois, and was placed in the Urbana Community Correctional Center in Champaign County, Illinois. Defendant was approved to take a three-hour independent pass from the Urbana Community Correctional Center on March 24, 1982. He failed to return to the center and an escape warrant was issued.

Defendant's whereabouts remained unknown until August 26, 1982, when notification was received by the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) that defendant had been apprehended or arrested in Indianapolis, Indiana, by the sheriff's department of Marion County, Indiana, and was held there on an arrest charge from the State of Iowa. On February 15, 1983, DOC received notification that defendant was serving a 10-year sentence for second degree robbery at the Iowa State Men's Reformatory in Anamosa, Iowa, having been transported from Indiana to Iowa on November 17, 1982. On May 27, 1986, defendant was returned to Illinois by Iowa authorities. On July 3, 1986, the Champaign County State's Attorney filed an indictment charging defendant with the offense of enforcement of discipline--escape.

On January 31, 1983, defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of second-degree robbery in Iowa in Dubuque County case No. 15205 pursuant to a negotiated plea under which the State's Attorney for Fayette County, Illinois, agreed not to prosecute defendant for escape. On appeal, defendant maintains (1) although the escape offense arose in Champaign County, Illinois, the State's Attorney of Fayette County, Illinois, had authority to dismiss the escape charge in Champaign County, citing this court's decision in People v. Wantland (1979), 78 Ill.App.3d 741, 34 Ill.Dec. 92, 397 N.E.2d 548; and (2) since he has served his term of imprisonment in Iowa, his remedy is dismissal of this cause.

At hearings below, defense counsel argued that under this court's decision in Wantland, the State's Attorney of Fayette County had authority to dismiss cases arising in other counties which would bind the State's Attorneys for those counties.

The State argued the representations of the State's Attorney of Fayette County were made without the knowledge of prosecutorial authorities in Champaign County, who had no knowledge of the subsequent apprehension of defendant or the plea agreement conversations which were had with the Fayette County State's Attorney. The prosecutor pointed out that, at the time of the purported promise not to prosecute by the Fayette County State's Attorney, there were no charges pending as such. He stipulated to copies of the letter by the Fayette County State's Attorney and the transcript of plea hearing in Iowa. The prosecutor argued the Fayette County State's Attorney did not have actual authority to prosecute defendant and, therefore, his representation not to prosecute defendant was illusory and a nullity. The prosecutor further argued the burden was on the defendant to seek out the appropriate prosecuting authorities and, if he failed to locate the appropriate authority, he did so at his peril, irrespective of whether it was reasonable for defendant's Iowa counsel to rely on the representation of the Fayette County State's Attorney.

The trial court found Wantland distinguishable as there an Illinois court was involved in the plea agreement in Vermilion County.

The letter of the Fayette County State's Attorney to the Dubuque County, Iowa, prosecutor stated:

"Our office will not prosecute Gary Staten for Escape if he pleads guilty to the Robbery charge in your state and receives a ten year incarceration on that charge as stated in your letter of January 12, 1983."

The transcript of proceedings in Dubuque County, Iowa, criminal No. 15205, shows on January 31, 1983, defendant stated his willingness to withdraw his plea of not guilty to first-degree robbery and enter a plea of guilty to the lesser included offense of second-degree robbery. Defense counsel stated there had been some negotiations with the State of Illinois under which Illinois agreed to forego pursuing escape charges against defendant. The Iowa prosecutor stated:

"The State of Illinois has given us written assurances they will not prosecute the Defendant for escape, and I believe the Defendant will be returned to the State of Illinois once he completes the sentence here, to serve out, I believe, eleven months of a remaining sentence he has over there, which they refuse to make concurrent."

The Iowa court accepted the plea of guilty and sentenced defendant.

At hearing in this cause defense counsel was permitted to make an offer of proof representing what various individuals would say as part of the defense case in chief, without waiving the State's argument the material was neither relevant nor admissible at that stage. These representations included the following: When defendant was in custody in Iowa, and was presented with the opportunity to plea bargain with the State's Attorney of Dubuque County, Iowa, that State's Attorney wrote to an agent of the apprehensions unit of DOC describing the possibility of a plea bargain with defendant and the charges he was facing in Iowa, asking for a description of the penalties defendant would face in Illinois, and requesting that if the agent could not answer the questions, he provide the name of the prosecutor who could. On January 7, 1982, an agent of DOC telephoned Mr. Potter, the prosecutor for Dubuque County, Iowa, and referred him to the State's Attorney of Fayette County. Potter telephoned the Fayette County State's Attorney in January 1983 asking for a commitment not to prosecute defendant, which commitment would be incorporated as part of the plea bargain in Iowa. The Fayette County State's Attorney gave a telephone commitment not to prosecute defendant and confirmed it in a January 1983 letter to Potter in Dubuque County, Iowa. Further, Mr. Day, the attorney appointed to represent defendant in Iowa, advised defendant that he could rely on the commitment from the Fayette County State's Attorney as an essential part of the plea bargain entered in settling the Iowa charges. The offer of proof was that Potter and Day, if called, would testify to the above.

The trial court ruled these matters were not admissible because they did not go to matters raised in the indictment and affirmed its decision denying defendant's motion to dismiss.

Section 3-6-4 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) states the offense of enforcement of discipline--escape, including:

"A committed person who fails to return from furlough or from work and day release is guilty of a Class 3 felony." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-4(a).)

Section 3-6-5 specifically provides:

"When any person is charged with committing an offense while confined by the Department, cognizance thereof shall be taken by the circuit court of the county wherein such crime was committed. Such court shall adjudicate and sentence the person charged with such crime in the same manner and subject to the same rules and limitations as are now established by law in relation to other persons charged with crime." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-5.

The crucial distinction in deciding the issue presented in this case lies in the discrete function of each State's Attorney as set forth under the Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 19) and his duties as set forth in "An Act in regard to...