People v. Stead, No. 92SA227

Docket NºNo. 92SA227
Citation845 P.2d 1156
Case DateFebruary 08, 1993
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado

Page 1156

845 P.2d 1156
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Timothy R. STEAD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 92SA227.
Supreme Court of Colorado,
En Banc.
Feb. 8, 1993.
Rehearing Denied March 8, 1993.

Page 1157

Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert Mark Russel, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger G. Billotte, Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Enforcement Section, Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Robin Desmond, Katherine Brien, Deputy State Public Defenders, Denver, for defendant-appellant.

Justice VOLLACK delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Appellant Timothy Richard Stead (Stead) appeals from a district court order in People v. Stead, No. 91CR0897, wherein the district court ruled that application of a drug offender surcharge set forth in section 18-19-103, 8B C.R.S. (1992 Supp.), does not violate the proscription against ex post facto laws. We disagree and reverse the district court order.

I.

On August 22, 1990, several police officers executed a search warrant for Stead's residence. The officers seized several containers of marijuana, several plastic bags containing psilocybin mushrooms, and several items of drug paraphernalia. A charging document was filed in county court on November 14, 1990, charging Stead with possession of a controlled substance in violation of section 12-22-309, 5A C.R.S. (1991), and section 18-18-105, 8B C.R.S. (1986); possession of marijuana in violation of section 18-18-108, 8B C.R.S. (1986); and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of section 12-22-504 5A C.R.S. (1991). On February 26, 1991, the county court issued a warrant for Stead's arrest, and Stead was subsequently arrested on March 16, 1991. On August 12, 1991, Stead entered a plea of guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of section 18-18-106, and, as a result of the plea agreement, the three remaining charges against Stead were dismissed.

On October 21, 1991, the district court sentenced Stead to three years probation and forty-eight hours of public service. The district court ordered Stead to pay $100 to the victim compensation fund, $100 to the victim assistance fund, $30 court costs, $20 per month for supervision fees, $10 for intake urinalysis, and $50 to the useful public service fund. The district court additionally ordered Stead to pay $1,000 to the drug offender surcharge fund. Stead subsequently filed a motion contending that imposition of the $1,000 surcharge pursuant to section 18-19-103, and imposition of forty-eight hours of public service, violated the proscription against ex post facto laws. The district court ruled

Page 1158

that the $1,000 surcharge was a cost, not a penalty, and thus did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The district court did conclude that the useful public service was an increase in penalty, and accordingly vacated that portion of the order. Stead subsequently filed an appeal in this court pursuant to C.A.R. 3.

II.

Stead contends that the district court's order requiring him to pay $1,000 to the drug offender surcharge fund pursuant to section 18-19-103, 8B C.R.S. (1992 Supp.), violates the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws. We agree.

A.

Section 18-19-103 was enacted as part of an act "concerning the elimination of substance abuse in the criminal justice system." Act approved May 29, 1991, ch. 82, 1991 Colo.Sess.Laws 436-47. In Article 11.5 of the act, the General Assembly declared:

Substance abuse is a significant factor in the commission of crimes and it is a significant factor in impeding the rehabilitation of persons convicted of crimes which results in an increased rate of recidivism. Therefore, the general assembly hereby resolves to curtail the disastrous effects of substance abuse in the criminal justice system by providing for consistency in the response to substance abuse throughout the criminal justice system and to improve and standardize substance abuse treatment for offenders at each stage of the criminal justice system and to provide punitive measures for offenders who refuse to cooperate with and respond to substance abuse treatment while such offenders are involved with the criminal justice system.

§ 16-11.5-101, 8A C.R.S. (1992 Supp.). Article 11.5 accordingly calls for the development of a standardized procedure for assessing use of controlled substances by offenders, and a system of programs for education and treatment related to substance abuse by offenders. § 16-11.5-102, 8A C.R.S. (1992 Supp.).

Article 19 of the act creates a drug offender surcharge fund in order to implement plans developed pursuant to section 16-11.5-102(3), 8A C.R.S. (1992 Supp.), by covering the costs associated with substance abuse assessment, testing, education, and treatment in Colorado. § 18-19-103(4), 8B C.R.S. (1992 Supp.). 1 The drug offender surcharge fund is designed to consist solely of surcharges levied upon "drug offenders." 2 § 18-19-103, 8B C.R.S. (1992 Supp.).

Section 18-19-103(1) thus provides:

On and after July 1, 1991, each drug offender who is convicted, or receives a deferred sentence pursuant to section 16-7-403, C.R.S., shall be required to pay...

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21 practice notes
  • State v. Scruggs, No. 2014AP2981-CR
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • February 23, 2017
    ...punishment than the discretionary statute. Similar arguments support both punitive intent and punitive effect.Compare People v. Stead , 845 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Colo. 1993) (resting its conclusion that a drug offender surcharge had a punitive intent in part on the ground that "[t]he surcharge a......
  • State v. Parker, No. 920732-CA
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Utah
    • March 16, 1994
    ...by the authority of the law and the judgment and sentence of a court." Black's Law Dictionary 1234 (6th ed. 1990); see People v. Stead, 845 P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Colo.1993) (finding surcharge accompanying fine was punishment because it directly served the purposes of prevention and rehabilita......
  • People v. Howell, No. 01CA0905.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals of Colorado
    • September 12, 2002
    ...See In re Cardwell, supra. Likewise, the imposition of costs does not serve the goals of retribution and deterrence. Cf. People v. Stead, 845 P.2d 1156 (Colo. 1993)(drug offender surcharge considered punishment because it serves goals of retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence). The sta......
  • Hayden v. State, No. 18A04-0202-CR-85.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • July 16, 2002
    ...distinction in concluding that the statute being challenged was punitive (substantive) in intent. See e.g., People v. Stead, 845 P.2d 1156 (Colo.1993) (holding that retroactive application of a criminal statute imposing a thousand dollar surcharge solely against persons convicted of certain......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
21 cases
  • State v. Scruggs, No. 2014AP2981-CR
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • February 23, 2017
    ...punishment than the discretionary statute. Similar arguments support both punitive intent and punitive effect.Compare People v. Stead , 845 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Colo. 1993) (resting its conclusion that a drug offender surcharge had a punitive intent in part on the ground that "[t]he surcharge a......
  • State v. Parker, No. 920732-CA
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Utah
    • March 16, 1994
    ...by the authority of the law and the judgment and sentence of a court." Black's Law Dictionary 1234 (6th ed. 1990); see People v. Stead, 845 P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Colo.1993) (finding surcharge accompanying fine was punishment because it directly served the purposes of prevention and rehabilita......
  • People v. Howell, No. 01CA0905.
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals of Colorado
    • September 12, 2002
    ...See In re Cardwell, supra. Likewise, the imposition of costs does not serve the goals of retribution and deterrence. Cf. People v. Stead, 845 P.2d 1156 (Colo. 1993)(drug offender surcharge considered punishment because it serves goals of retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence). The sta......
  • Hayden v. State, No. 18A04-0202-CR-85.
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • July 16, 2002
    ...distinction in concluding that the statute being challenged was punitive (substantive) in intent. See e.g., People v. Stead, 845 P.2d 1156 (Colo.1993) (holding that retroactive application of a criminal statute imposing a thousand dollar surcharge solely against persons convicted of certain......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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