People v. Steedly

• Court: New York Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: HYMAN BARSHAY
• Citation: People v. Steedly, 271 N.Y.S.2d 752, 50 Misc.2d 921 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966)
• Decision Date: 20 May 1966
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Robert STEEDLY.

Page 752

271 N.Y.S.2d 752

50 Misc.2d 921

PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Robert STEEDLY.

Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Kings County, Part I.

May 20, 1966.

Aaron E. Koota, Dist. Atty., Kings County, Brooklyn, for the People; William I. Siegel, Brooklyn, of counsel.

Pokorny, Schrenzel & Pokorny, Brooklyn, for defendant; Marvin Emmer, Brooklyn, of counsel.

MEMORANDUM

HYMAN BARSHAY, Justice.

This is an application in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis to vacate and set aside a judgment of the former Kings County Court dated June 17, 1957, convicting the defendant on his plea of guilty, during trial, of the crime of murder in the second degree and sentencing him to a term of not less than 20 years to life with commitment to the Elmira Reception Center. The defendant was granted a hearing at which it was stipulated that the court decide the application on the basis of the minutes of the plea of guilty entered on May 8, 1957. The sole issue to be determined is whether the facts elicited at the time the defendant pleaded guilty as aforesaid were consistent with the essential elements of the crime of murder in the second degree (People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 206 N.E.2d 330).

The defendant and one John K. Witherspoon were indicted for the crime of murder in the first degree in that on or about December 25, 1956, in the County of Kings, the defendants acting in concert, wilfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought struck one Enrico Pavedora with a knife inflicting divers wounds upon him and as a result of which he died on or about December 25, 1956. On the second day of the trial after proof was submitted that the co-defendant Witherspoon stabbed the deceased, and the petitioner, Steedly, stabbed another who recovered from the wound, defendants requested permission to withdraw their plea of not guilty and to be permitted to plead guilty to the crime of murder in the second degree. The following colloquy then ensued between the court and the petitioner:

'BY THE COURT:

Q Mr. Robert Steedly, how old are you? A Sixteen.

Q You talked this over with your lawyers, Miss Santangelo and Mr. Norman Johnson? A Yes, sir.

Q And your parents? A Yes, sir.

Q You know exactly what you are doing? A Yes, sir.

Q Are you doing so of your own free will? A Yes, sir.

Q Did you participate with Mr. Witherspoon in the killing of this sailor? A Yes, sir.

Q You know you are going to be punished for it?

A I had no intention of killing anyone or anything like that. I can't explain it. It is one of those things that happened. I am sorry for what happened.

Q It was Christmas night and you are sorry for what happened?

A I didn't stab the sailor.

Q I know you didn't but you had a knife with you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Which one did you stab? A The red-headed sailor.

Q They were all together, were they not? A Yes.

Q And you did this to that person together with Witherspoon?

A No, sir.

Q Well, I guess the probation officer will be a little bit more painstaking in detail with respect to that. Do you wish to plead guilty of your own free will?

A Yes.

THE COURT: Take the pleas.'

The defendant claims that at the time he pleaded guilty he was 16 years of age and that the minutes of plea demonstrate that he did not realize that by pleading guilty he was admitting that he had committed a homicide. He believed that he was only admitting that he had been 'a party in a fight in which a person had been killed by the hands of someone other than your petitioner.' Defendant alleges that the facts elicited by the court at the time the defendant pleaded guilty cast doubt as to whether he was guilty of the crime of murder in the second degree or whether some other crime would be more appropriate.

In support of his contention the defendant relies on the case of People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386, 206 N.E.2d 330. In that case the defendant who had been indicted for murder in the first degree was permitted to plead guilty to the crime of murder in the second degree. Before accepting the plea of guilty the trial court interrogated the defendant who gave a version of the occurrence different from that of the People, and indicating that he had been guilty of the lesser charge of manslaughter in the first degree rather than of murder in the second degree. The trial judge instead of rejecting the plea of guilty or advising the defendant that his admissions might not amount to the crime to which he was pleading guilty and inquiring further whether he nevertheless wished to plead guilty 'for instance, to avoid the risk of a jury verdict of first degree murder', deciding that the defendant was not subject to belief, accepted the plea and thereafter sentenced the...