People v. Steele
| Decision Date | 21 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 78562 |
| Citation | 412 N.W.2d 206,429 Mich. 13 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chester J. STEELE, Defendant-Appellee. 429 Mich. 13, 412 N.W.2d 206 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., James P. Hoy, Pros. Atty., J. Ronald Kaplansky, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Atty. Gen., Pros. Attys. Appellate Service, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellant.
P.E. Bennett, Asst. Defender, Lansing, for defendant-appellee.
Before the entire bench.
In this case, we must decide whether the trial court was correct in denying the defendant's request for instructions on lesser included misdemeanor offenses. The defendant was charged with two counts of delivery of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). M.C.L. Sec. 333.7401(1), (2)(b); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7401)(1), (2)(b). He admitted possession and transfer, but claimed that he believed the substance to be mescaline--not LSD. 1 The trial court denied defendant's request to instruct the jury on the lesser included misdemeanors of possession of LSD, M.C.L. Sec. 333.7403(1); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7403)(1), and use of LSD, M.C.L. Sec. 333.7404(1); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7404)(1). The court concluded that, pursuant to this Court's decision in People v. Stephens, 416 Mich. 252, 330 N.W.2d 675 (1982), the requested misdemeanor instructions were not supported by a rational view of the evidence.
The Court of Appeals reversed, 150 Mich.App. 728, 389 N.W.2d 164, finding the instructions to be supported by a rational view of the evidence, and that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the requests.
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that an appropriate, rational view of the evidence did not warrant an instruction on either requested misdemeanor.
The defendant was the object of an undercover operation by the Michigan State Police Narcotics Unit. One officer posed as a drug dealer who was buying controlled substances for resale in Canada. Other Michigan State Police officers provided surveillance and support. The undercover officer testified that he gained the defendant's confidence by arranging a meeting through a third party. He then established his interest in purchasing marijuana and LSD.
The charges against the defendant for delivery of LSD resulted from two separate transactions. The first occurred on April 30, 1984. The officer testified that he arrived at the defendant's residence in the early evening and was invited inside. After exchanging greetings, the defendant stated, "YOU'RE JUST THE GUY I'M LOOKING FOR. i've got some acid And marijuana for sale." After the officer and the defendant agreed on a price for twenty units of what was analyzed to be LSD, the defendant transferred a portion of the total from a tray in his possession, and the remainder from an envelope in his wife's possession.
The second transaction occurred on June 13, 1984. The officer arrived at the defendant's residence in the evening and was invited in. He testified that he inquired about purchasing more LSD and the defendant stated that they could drive to a point near his source. They left the residence and the officer drove to a location as directed by the defendant. The defendant got out of the vehicle, walked to his source, and returned, stating that only six units were available. They agreed on a price and agreed that the defendant would receive one unit as his payment for procuring the drugs. The defendant left and then obtained six units of LSD after which they returned to the defendant's residence. At the residence, the officer gave one unit of LSD to the defendant, as they had agreed. There was no testimony indicating that the defendant injested this unit.
The officer testified that the term "acid" was one of the many street names for LSD. Other synonyms he had encountered were "cid, scleen, ... trippers, sunshine, dots, mescaline." He testified that "mescaline" was, to his knowledge, a different chemical compound, but the terms were used interchangeably for LSD in the drug subculture. In fact, he testified that he had never encountered pure mescaline in his experience as an undercover officer, and, regardless of the term used, "when it's tested and analyzed at the lab, [it] comes back as LSD."
The officer stated that he had repeatedly requested to purchase "LSD" and had used that term. He testified that the defendant had referred to the requested LSD by several street names, including "acid" and mescaline; but did not recall him using the term "LSD."
After the issue of entrapment was decided in favor of the state at a pretrial hearing, the defendant testified at trial. He stated that the only reason he became involved with the undercover officer was to get the drugs out of his town.
The defendant testified that he did not believe mescaline and LSD were the same. He stated that he had taken a pill like the one he received in payment for the June 13 transaction, He stated that LSD was an hallucinogen and that only the undercover officer had used the term "LSD."
The defendant did not deny the possession or transfer of the LSD on either occasion in question.
At the close of proofs, the defendant requested lesser included misdemeanor instructions. The trial court referred to the trial brief in which defendant requested instructions on possession of LSD and use of LSD. Circuit Judge William F. Hood denied the requests:
The jury returned guilty verdicts for both charges of delivery of LSD.
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's entrapment claim, but reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding the refusal to give the requested misdemeanor instructions to be prejudicial error.
In People v. Stephens, supra, this Court overruled a prior decision which disallowed certain lesser misdemeanor offense instructions. 2 We realized that a more flexible approach was required. In essence, the standard we adopted was:
"Whenever an adequate request for an appropriate misdemeanor instruction is supported by a rational view of the evidence adduced at trial, the trial judge shall give the requested instruction unless to do so would result in a violation of due process, undue confusion, or some other injustice." Id., 416 Mich. at 255, 330 N.W.2d 675. 3
We concluded that this rule for lesser included misdemeanor instructions would better serve the goals of preventing harassment of the defendant, limiting compromise verdicts, and avoiding jury confusion.
The rule which we developed was adopted from the United States Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Whitaker, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 344, 447 F.2d 314 (1971). Indeed, our conditions parallel the Whitaker reasoning. Although we do not follow the federal approach for lesser included felony offenses, we do so in the separate misdemeanor realm. This distinction must be made because the federal courts acknowledge only necessarily lesser included offenses; cognate offenses instructions are simply not allowed. Hence, instructions for lesser misdemeanor offenses are less freely given, and, even when the conditions of Stephens are met, a trial court retains "substantial discretion" to accept or deny a request. There are five conditions in the Stephens test.
The first condition of Stephens is that a proper request be made. That is, the party must inform the court of exactly what lesser offenses are being requested. See also People v. Herbert Smith, 396 Mich. 362, 240 N.W.2d 245 (1976).
The second condition requires that an "appropriate relationship" exist between the charged offense and the requested misdemeanor. This "appropriate" or "inherent" relationship has a two-part inquiry. First, the greater and lesser offenses must both relate to the protection of the same interests. Second, they must be related in an evidentiary manner, so that, generally, proof of the misdemeanor is necessarily presented as part of the proof of the greater charged offense. 4
The third condition of Stephens demands that the requested misdemeanor be supported by a rational view of the evidence at trial. This requirement differs significantly from our decision in Ora Jones, 395 Mich. 379, 236 N.W.2d 461 (1975), in which instructions on necessarily included felonies are automatically given, and instructions on cognate included felonies are given if the evidence could support a conviction. For a request for an instruction on a lesser included misdemeanor to be granted, not only must the evidence justify a conviction of the misdemeanor, but, as the Whitaker court required:
"[P]roof on the element or elements differentiating the two crimes must be sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense." 144 U.S.App.D.C. at 347, 447 F.2d 314.
This Court found additional guidance from the United States Supreme Court.
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...sense such that proof of the misdemeanor is necessarily presented as proof of the greater charged offense. People v. Steele, 429 Mich. 13, 19, 412 N.W.2d 206 (1987). However, proof of drug use is never necessarily presented as part of the proofs supporting possession with intent to deliver.......
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