People v. Steger

• Decision Date: 12 March 1976
• Docket Number: Cr. 18711
• Citation: 16 Cal.3d 539,128 Cal.Rptr. 161,546 P.2d 665
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 546 P.2d 665, 83 A.L.R.3d 1206 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cheryl Lynn STEGER, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 161

128 Cal.Rptr. 161

16 Cal.3d 539, 546 P.2d 665, 83 A.L.R.3d 1206

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Cheryl Lynn STEGER, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 18711.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

March 12, 1976.

Volney F. Morin, Volney F. Morin, Jr., Hollywood, and Sandra S. Sawyer, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Howard J. Schwab and Jack T. Kerry, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendant Cheryl Lynn Steger appeals from a judgment convicting her of the first degree murder of her three-year-old stepdaughter Kristen. She contends, inter alia, that the evidence at her trial was insufficient to justify a jury instruction on murder by means of torture. The contention is meritorious.

Kristen died from head injuries. Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the evidence discloses the fatal injury, a subdural hemorrhage covering almost the entire left half of the brain, was undoubtedly caused by trauma. The child's body was also covered from head to toe with cuts, bruises and other injuries, most of which could only have been caused by severe blows. Among the injuries were hemorrhaging of the liver, adrenal gland, intestines, and diaphram; a laceration of the chin; and fractures of the left cheek bone and right forearm. Medical evidence revealed that most of the injuries were inflicted at different times in the last month of Kristen's life. Defendant failed to seek medical help for the injuries.

Defendant's own statements provided much of the case against her. In testimony she admitted she was continually frustrated by her inability to control Kristen's behavior. The child would wet her pants, stick her tongue out, and generally disobey. To effect discipline, defendant beat Kristen on the buttocks with a belt and a shoe. The beatings were inflicted daily for the final week of the youngster's abbreviated life. Defendant admitted striking Kristen on the back and twice punching her in the arm, causing her to fall down and hit her head on the floor.

Defendant also told the police in a written statement that on the day before the death, she hit Kristen on the shoulder, knocking her down; she pushed her, banging her head against a wall; and she struck her on the side of the head. Moreover, she orally told an officer, 'I want to make a full confession. I want you to know that I did it. I beat her.'

Section 189 of the Penal Code provides in relevant part: 'All murder which is perpetrated by means of . . . torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first degree . . ..'

Three decades ago, this court strictly construed the definition of torture in section 189. In People v. Heslen (1945), Cal., 163 P.2d 21, 27, modified (1946), 27 Cal.2d 520, 165 P.2d 250, we said: 'Implicit in that definition is the requirement of an intent to cause pain and suffering in addition to death. That is, the killer is not satisfied with killing alone. He wishes to punish, execute vengeance on, or extort something from his victim, and in the course, or as the result of inflicting pain and suffering, the victim dies. That intent may be manifested by the nature of the acts and circumstances surrounding the homicide.'

This restrictive definition of torture was reemphasized in People v. Tubby (1949), 34 Cal.2d 72, 77, 207 P.2d 51, 54: 'In determining whether the murder was perpetrated by means of torture the solution must rest upon whether the assailant's intent was to cause cruel suffering on the part of the object of the attack, either for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or to satisfy some other untoward propensity. The test cannot be whether the victim merely suffered severe pain since presumably in most murders severe pain precedes death.'

As will be shown below, we have consistently followed this strict construction of torture in cases applying section 189. However, a few Courts of Appeal, in cases somewhat similar to the present, have upheld torture murder convictions by liberally construing the Heslen and Tubby holdings. ¹ These courts have inferred the presence of 'specific intent to cause cruel suffering' almost exclusively from the severity of the wounds on the victim's body. For example, the court in People v. Misquez (1957) supra, 152 Cal.App.2d 471, 480, 313 P.2d 206, 212, reasoned, 'The brutal and revolting manner in which defendant mistreated the child leads inevitably to the conclusion that he intended to cause cruel pain and suffering.' To determine whether such a liberal construction of Heslen and Tubby is permissible we must examine how torture fits into the scheme of first degree murder in California.

Murder, the unlawful killing of another human being with malice aforethought, is undoubtedly one of the most heinous crimes that can be committed in a civilized society. Given the gravity of the act, it may not be readily apparent why the law should distinguish between degrees of murder. In fact, the early common law made no distinctions: murder, regardless of its characteristics, was punished with death. (1 Warren on Homicide (1914) § 77, p. 353.) But in 1794 Pennsylvania adopted a statute defining two degrees of murder, and other states soon followed.

There appear to be two major reasons for delineating separate degrees of murder and imposing different punishments. (See Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968) pp. 60--61; Pike, What is Second Degree Murder in California? (1936) 9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 112, 133.) First, some murders can more easily be prevented than others by the deterrent effect of severe penalties: e.g., a hired assassin is more likely to reflect upon the possibility of imprisonment for life than an enraged husband who shoots his wife in a drunken Saturday night quarrel. (See Zimring & Hawkins, Deterrence (1973) pp. 194 ff.) Second, society draws a Moral distinction between murders: as morally wrong as murder per se is, some murders are more deplorable than others. Society instinctively senses a greater revulsion for a calculated, deliberate murder than it does for any other type of killing. As Professor Hart puts it, there is a distinction 'universally felt between, E.g., the cold-blooded murderer out for gain and the woman who kills an imbecile child to whom she can no longer attend.' (Hart, Op. cit. supra at p. 61.) Only by appropriately circumscribing the application of first degree murder can society preserve that pervasive moral distinction.

These goals are a significant aspect of the law of homicie in California. Under section 189 of the Penal Code, first degree murder is primarily wilful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. With a few limited exceptions, all other unlawful killing is second degree murder or manslaughter.

In interpreting the statutory standard of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, this court, perhaps with greater consistency than courts in many states, 'affords more than lip service to the strict definitions.' (Note, Deliberation and Premeditation in First Degree Murder (1961) 21 Md.L.Rev. 349, 353.) Thus, the prosecution is required to prove not only the elements of murder, but also the aggravating elements of first degree murder. (People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 895, 156 P.2d 7.) We have held, 'By conjoining the words 'willful, deliberate, and premeditated' in its definition and limitation of the character of killings falling within murder of the first degree, the Legislature apparently emphasized its intention to require as an element of such crime substantially more reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to kill.' (Id. at p. 900, 156 P.2d at p. 18.) Further, we have declared that "Deliberation means careful consideration and examination of the reasons for and against a choice or measure.' (Citation.)' (People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 183, 163 P.2d 8, 19.)

In this perspective the phrasing of section 189 becomes clearer: 'All murder which is perpetrated by means of . . . torture, or by Any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first degree . . ..' In labeling torture as a 'kind' of premeditated killing, the Legislature requires the same proof of deliberation and premeditation for first degree torture murder that it does for other types of first degree murder. ²

The element of calculated deliberation is required for a torture murder conviction for the same reasons that it is required for most other kinds of first degree murder. It is not the amount of pain inflicted which distinguishes a torturer from another murderer, as most killings involve significant pain. (People v. Tubby (1949) supra, 34 Cal.2d 72, 77, 207 P.2d 51.) Rather, it is the state of mind of the torturer--the cold-blooded intent to inflict pain for personal gain or satisfaction--which society condemns. Such a crime is more susceptible to the deterrence of first degree murder sanctions and comparatively more deplorable than lesser categories of murder.

Accordingly, we hold that murder by means of torture under section 189 is murder committed with a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain. In determining whether a murder was committed with that intent, the jury may of course consider all the circumstances surrounding the killing. Among those circumstances, in many cases, is the severity of the victim's wounds. We admonish against giving undue weight to such evidence, however, as the wounds could in fact have been inflicted in the course of a killing in the heat of passion rather than a calculated torture murder.

We do not hold that a defendant must have had a premeditated intent to Kill in order to be convicted of murder by means of torture; such an interpretation would render superfluous the specific inclusion of...