People v. Stephan
| Decision Date | 06 September 2000 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 218463. |
| Citation | 241 Mich. App. 482,616 N.W.2d 188 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Hanna STEPHAN, a/k/a/ Hanna Stephen, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Daniel L. Lemisch, Chief, Appellate Division, and Anica Letica, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
John A. Basch, Waterford, for the defendant.
Elwood Brown, President, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy A. Baughman, Detroit, amicus curiae Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
Before: JANSEN, P.J., and SAAD and GAGE, JJ.
In this prosecutor's interlocutory appeal, we consider if the Legislature's 1994 amendment of the statute governing the criminal defense of legal insanity1 serves as an implicit amendment or partial repeal of the statute governing the "guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI) verdict2. Although we appreciate the prosecutor's concern that the 1994 amendment created an inconsistency between the two statutes with respect to the allocation of burdens of proof, the prosecutor's requested relief is contrary to the doctrine of the separation of powers. We therefore affirm.
The prosecutor asks us to correct a contradiction between the statutes governing the criminal defense of insanity and the GBMI verdict. In 1994, the Legislature amended the insanity defense statute to require criminal defendants who assert an insanity defense to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 1994 PA 56. Previously, when a defendant asserted an insanity defense, the prosecutor was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not legally insane. However, the Legislature did not amend the GBMI statute in the same manner.3
The Michigan State Bar Standing Committee on Standard Criminal Jury Instructions has issued Criminal Jury Instructions for both the insanity defense statute and the GBMI verdict statute. CJI2d 7.11, 7.12. Both sets of instructions reflect the mandates and requirements of their related statutes, including the burdens of proof with respect to proving or disproving insanity and mental illness. Consequently, when a trial court gives both jury instructions, as required by statute, the instructions will state that the defendant bears the burden of proving mental illness and legal insanity for purposes of an insanity defense, but that the prosecutor bears the burden of proving lack of insanity for purposes of a GBMI verdict. Therefore, these instructions contradict each other and will create an irreconcilable conflict for the jury trying to apply them. This matter is further complicated by the requirement of the GBMI verdict statute that the prosecutor prove the defendant's mental illness beyond a reasonable doubt.
To correct this irreconcilable conflict between these inextricably intertwined statutes, the prosecutor asks us to infer that the Legislature implicitly repealed the portion of the GBMI verdict statute that imposes this contradictory burden on the prosecutor. The prosecutor also asks us to infer that the Legislature implicitly repealed the requirement of the GBMI verdict statute that the prosecutor prove mental illness. We agree with the prosecutor that the discrepancies between the statutes render it impossible to fashion jury instructions that are simultaneously consistent with each other and faithful to the statutory requirements. Also, we sympathize with the trial courts and juries left to muddle through the paradox these conflicting statutes create. Nonetheless, our due regard for the doctrine of separation of powers precludes our invading the province of the Legislature by inferring that any statute has been implicitly amended, repealed, or partially repealed. The separation of powers doctrine, as provided by our constitution, prohibits our judicial branch from exercising powers that properly belong to the legislative branch. Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2. Judicial Attorneys Ass'n v. Michigan, 459 Mich. 291, 296, 586 N.W.2d 894 (1998). Here, in order to reconcile the GBMI verdict statute with the insanity defense statute, we would have to significantly revise the plain language of the GBMI verdict statute by eliminating the prosecutor's evidentiary burden with respect to the defendant's lack of insanity and affliction by mental illness. We recognize that the conflict between these two statutes creates serious problems for trial courts, juries, prosecutors, and defense counsel. We are unable, however, to solve these problems because the Legislature alone holds the authority to correct the statutory discrepancy. Therefore, we defer to the Legislature to make these necessary changes.
The prosecutor charged defendant with first-degree murder, assault with intent to murder, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.4 Defendant filed a notice of intent to assert an insanity defense, as required by M.C.L. § 768.20a; MSA 28.1043(1).
Before trial5, the prosecutor requested the court to instruct the jury on the correct, current burden of proof for insanity defenses and GBMI verdicts. The prosecutor pointed out the conflict between the two sets of Criminal Jury Instructions. Consistent with the 1994 statutory mandate, the Criminal Jury Instruction for the insanity defense properly imposes the burden of proof on the defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. MCL 768.21a; MSA 28.1044(1); CJI2d 7.11. However, the Criminal Jury Instruction for GBMI verdicts, consistent with the nonamended GBMI statute, continues to place the burden of proof on the prosecutor to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not insane. MCL 768.36; MSA 28.1059; CJI2d 7.12.
Although these two sets of Criminal Jury Instructions, as they are currently written, are consistent with their respective related statutes, the prosecutor contended that the court should not instruct the jury that the prosecutor carries the burden of proving that the defendant was not legally insane for purposes of a GBMI conviction. By making this request, the prosecutor asked the trial court to infer that the GBMI verdict statute was implicitly amended along with the insanity defense statute, so that the two statutes are consistent in their allocation of proofs with respect to a defendant's alleged insanity and mental illness. Pointing out that M.C.L. § 768.29a; MSA 28.1052(1) requires the court to read these instructions together, the prosecutor contended that the instructions contradict each other and that the jury would be confused by the contradictory instructions on burden of proof. In response, defense counsel averred that the instructions were correct and unambiguous. The court issued a written order holding:
The court, having reviewed the arguments of the parties in light of the relevant Michigan law, denies the Prosecutor's Motion ... and will read the jury instructions as drafted by the Michigan Supreme Court.[6] The court is satisfied that if there is a contradiction between the jury instructions and the statutes cited, it must be addressed by the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, this Court granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal.7
Before October 1, 1994, if a criminal defendant raised the affirmative defense of insanity, the prosecutor was required to "produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time the crime was committed." In re Certified Question (Duffy v. Foltz), 425 Mich. 457, 465, 390 N.W.2d 620 (1986). In other words, if the defendant asserted an insanity defense, the prosecutor would bear the additional burden of disproving insanity. Concerned that the imposition of this burden on the prosecutor created an opportunity for defendants to abuse the insanity defense, the Legislature amended the insanity defense statute effective October 1, 1994. Currently, M.C.L. § 768.21a; MSA 28.1044(1) provides:
(1) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a criminal offense that the defendant was legally insane when he or she committed the acts constituting the offense. An individual is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness.... that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law. Mental illness or being mentally retarded does not otherwise constitute a defense of legal insanity.
* * *
(3) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. [Emphasis added.]
The legislative history of this amendment explains the Legislature's policy reasons for modifying the statute:
Currently, a defendant needs to present only slight evidence of insanity, even without expert testimony, for the burden of proof to shift to the prosecutor, who then must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane. Faced with this heavy burden of proof, the prosecution usually will find it necessary to present expert testimony that the defendant was not insane, which can be both time-consuming and difficult. As a result, many defendants, already having been found to have perpetrated the criminal acts charged, are excused from any culpability for their behavior. By requiring a defendant to prove insanity, the bill would save the prosecution time, trouble, and expense, and make it less likely that guilty defendants would go free. Reportedly, about half the states require defendants to prove their insanity by a preponderance of the...
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