People v. Stephens

• Decision Date: 01 May 1982
• Docket Number: Docket No. 65691
• Citation: 416 Mich. 252,330 N.W.2d 675
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Lee STEPHENS, Defendant-Appellant. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 675

330 N.W.2d 675

416 Mich. 252

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Robert Lee STEPHENS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 65691, May Term, 1982.

Calendar No. 1.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued May 12, 1982.

Decided Dec. 23, 1982.

Opinion Released Jan. 13, 1983.

Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Appellate Div., Edwin R. Brown, Asst. Pros.Atty., Robert E. Weiss, Pros.Atty., Flint, for plaintiff-appellee.

Michael E. Thomas, P.C., Flint, for defendant-appellant.

RYAN, Justice.

In this casewe are called upon to reconsider the so-called "misdemeanor cutoff"rule of People v. Chamblis, 395 Mich. 408 429, 236 N.W.2d 473(1975).¹After careful consideration, we conclude that the policies behind the Chamblis rule would be better served by a more flexible approach to lesser included offense instructions on misdemeanors.Whenever an adequate request for an appropriate misdemeanor instruction is supported by a rational view of the evidence adduced at trial, the trial judge shall give the requested instruction unless to do so would result in a violation of due process, undue confusion, or some other injustice.While the Chamblis rule may be applied to jury instructions given within 30 days after the release of this opinion, adherence to the standards set forth in this opinion shall be required thereafter.²

I

The defendant, Robert Lee Stephens, was charged with the felony of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony or larceny.³The evidence presented to the jury established that on the afternoon of April 27, 1978, the apparently intoxicated defendant was observed repeatedly falling into the path of traffic on Fenton Road, a busy thoroughfare located in Flint, Michigan.The police were called in order to protect the safety of the defendant.Before the police arrived, the defendant kicked in the glass door of his family doctor's office, which was closed, and crawled through the opening.The defendant was apprehended by the police while still in the building.He was found in possession of a pad of the doctor's prescription blanks and $56 crumpled into his pocket, the exact amount of money which the doctor later testified was missing from his cash box.When questioned by the police the next day, the defendant stated that he went to the doctor's office to obtain money, but didn't remember too much because of his consumption of "downers" and alcohol.The defendant did not dispute the allegation of breaking and entering into the doctor's office.Indeed, those facts were admitted during closing argument by defense counsel.The defense theory was that the defendant lacked the requisite intent to commit larceny.⁴The evidence of intoxication was used to bolster the argument that Mr. Stephens lacked the intent to commit larceny.

At the close of the proofs, defense counsel requested a lesser included offense instruction on the misdemeanor of entering without permission.⁵Although expressing dissatisfaction with the "misdemeanor cutoff rule", the trial judge felt compelled by our Chamblis opinion to deny the request.The jury was instructed that it must choose one of two possible verdicts: guilty as charged, or not guilty.The defendant was found guilty, and his motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion.While feeling constrained to follow Chamblis, the Court of Appeals also urged reconsideration of that policy rule.We accepted that invitation by granting leave to appeal.411 Mich. 974(1981).

II

In Chamblis, the Court advanced several theoretical reasons in support of a misdemeanor cutoff rule: to prevent harassment of the defendant, ⁶ to serve the cause of justice by limiting compromise, ⁷ and to avoid confusing the jury with too long a list of instructions.⁸The policy against prosecutorial harassment is never implicated where, as in this case, the defendant requests the lesser included misdemeanor instruction.Nor is the situation so fraught with potential for prosecutorial abuse that a prophylactic rule is required.Of course, in those instances where it appears on the record that the prosecutor has abused his discretion in requesting instructions on lesser included misdemeanors, the trial judge may properly refuse the instructions.Cf.Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich. 115, 121, 215 N.W.2d 145(1974).

While any lesser included offense instruction creates the possibility of a compromise verdict, this only serves to caution against the indiscriminate use of such instructions ⁹ and does not justify an arbitrary limitation according to the maximum term of confinement.The Chamblis rule went far beyond precluding a misdemeanor assault and battery instruction in a first-degree murder case.It precluded an instruction on a lesser included misdemeanor offense, even if the value of the property involved was the only element separating the misdemeanor from the felony, and even if the value of the property was actually in dispute.SeePeople v. Miller, 406 Mich. 244, 277 N.W.2d 630(1979), where the Chamblis rule was modified to allow such a misdemeanor instruction.

We fail to see how a dispute over the value of property can be distinguished from a dispute over the defendant's assaultive intent, seePeople v. Joeseype Johnson, 407 Mich. 196, 274, 284 N.W.2d 718(1979)(Opinion by Levin, J.), or a defendant's intent with regard to marijuana, seePeople v. Potter, 115 Mich.App. 125, 320 N.W.2d 313(1982);People v. Vasher, 97 Mich.App. 372, 296 N.W.2d 30(1980); or the defendant's level of intoxication, seePeople v. Harold Johnson, 96 Mich.App. 652, 293 N.W.2d 664(1980);People v. Pipkin, 93 Mich.App. 817, 287 N.W.2d 352(1979).Instead of continuing to erode the Chamblis rule on a crime-by-crime basis, we are of the view that the rule should be abrogated.

From the defendant's point of view, a misdemeanor lesser included offense instruction may serve the cause of justice by preventing a felony conviction unsupported by the jury's belief of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.¹⁰From the prosecutor's point of view, a defendant should not be granted immunity from prosecution for misdemeanors simply because the defendant's conduct might also be characterized as a more serious felony.The fact that the prosecutor may have overestimated the strength of his or her case does not justify an acquittal for any misdemeanors that may have been committed as well.The requirement that there be a "realistic relationship" between the offense charged and the offense returned by the jury would require prescience on the part of the prosecutor.

The goal of avoiding confusing the jury with too long a list of instructions is an important one.However, we are satisfied that the limitations imposed on misdemeanor instructions in this opinion will suffice to limit the number of such lesser included offense instructions.In addition, we would note that less confusion should result from a number of lesser included offenses all rationally supportable by the evidence than from an equal number of lesser included offenses not supportable by any rational view of the evidence.SeePeople v. Lovett, 396 Mich. 101, 238 N.W.2d 44(1976);People v. Kamin, 405 Mich. 482, 500, 275 N.W.2d 777(1979).

Our abandonment of the rigid misdemeanor cutoff rule was presaged by our unanimous opinion in People v. Cazal, 412 Mich. 680, 316 N.W.2d 705(1982).In Cazal, we refused to apply the Chamblis rule to bench trials, holding that a judge sitting as a trier of fact was well-equipped to avoid confusion and improper compromise verdicts.Implicit in that decision was the view that if the possibility of confusion and improper compromise could be reduced in jury trials, the rationale for the Chamblis rule would disappear.We believe that the following standard will provide, in practice, the advantages that the theoretical Chamblis approach failed to provide during its seven-year trial, and we, therefore, overrule that part of Chamblis setting forth the "misdemeanor cutoff" rule.

III

The lesser included offense rule for misdemeanors we adopt in this case is derived from the federal rule established in United States v. Whitaker, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 344, 447 F.2d 314(1971).The Whitaker case is remarkably similar to this case in that an apparently intoxicated defendant battered down the door of a dwelling house and entered.Once inside, defendant Whitaker did not take or disturb anything.The occupants detained the defendant until the police arrived and arrested him.The defendant was charged with first-degree burglary, for which a conviction could be obtained upon proof of an unlawful entry with intent to commit a crime.The principal issue raised by defense counsel was the lack of intent to commit a crime; the defendant testified at trial that he was looking for his friend Williams.The trial court rejected the defense request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of unlawful entry, and the jury returned with a verdict of guilty as charged.

The first condition for a lesser included offense instruction is a proper request.This requirement is not novel or extraordinary; except for cases involving first-degree murder, seePeople v. Jenkins, 395 Mich. 440, 236 N.W.2d 503(1975), the trial judge may, but need not, sua sponte instruct on lesser included offenses.People v. Henry, 395 Mich. 367, 236 N.W.2d 489(1975);People v. Johnson, 409 Mich. 552, 562, 297 N.W.2d 115(1980).However, the prosecutor or defense counsel must adequately apprise the trial judge of exactly what lesser included offenses are being requested; a general request for "the lesser included offense" will not suffice.People v. Herbert Smith, 396 Mich. 362, 240 N.W.2d 245(1976).

The second condition is that there must be an appropriate relationship between the charged offense and the requested misdemeanor.As the Whitaker court put it,

"there must also be...