People v. Stephensbush

• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
• Citation: 100 N.Y.S.3d 322,172 A.D.3d 1108
• Docket Number: 2015–10516,Ind. No. 2876/13
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Christopher STEPHENSBUSH, also known as Bris, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 15 May 2019

172 A.D.3d 1108
100 N.Y.S.3d 322

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent,
v.
Christopher STEPHENSBUSH, also known as Bris, Appellant.

2015–10516
Ind. No. 2876/13

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—February 5, 2019
May 15, 2019

100 N.Y.S.3d 323

Paul Skip Laisure, New York, N.Y. (David P. Greenberg of counsel), for appellant.

John M. Ryan, Acting District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Aurora Alvarez–Calderon of counsel), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

172 A.D.3d 1108

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Barry Kron, J.), rendered October 20, 2015, convicting him of sex trafficking, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

100 N.Y.S.3d 324

On November 19, 2013, a grand jury indicted the defendant on 38 charges, including multiple counts of kidnapping in the first degree and rape in the first degree. On May 14, 2015, the defendant pleaded guilty to sex trafficking in full satisfaction of the indictment. The defendant executed a waiver of his right to appeal as part of the plea agreement. After pleading guilty, but prior to sentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty. The Supreme Court denied the motion without a hearing.

On appeal, the defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.

A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its determination generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion (see CPL 220.60[3] ; People v. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d 482, 483–484, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802 ; People v. Street, 144 A.D.3d 711, 711–712, 39 N.Y.S.3d 824 ; People v. Howard, 109 A.D.3d 487, 487–488, 970 N.Y.S.2d 86 ). " ‘When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea, the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry rest[s] largely in the discretion of the Judge to whom the motion is made and a hearing will be granted only in rare instances’ " ( People v. Bennett, 115 A.D.3d 973, 974, 982 N.Y.S.2d 554, quoting People v. Howard, 109 A.D.3d at 487, 970 N.Y.S.2d 86 ; see People v. Anderson, 98 A.D.3d 524, 524, 949 N.Y.S.2d 207 ).

The defendant retains the right to challenge the voluntariness of his plea regardless of the validity of his waiver of the

172 A.D.3d 1109

right to appeal (see People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968, 541 N.E.2d 1022 ). Nevertheless, the record here supports the Supreme Court's determination that the defendant's plea of guilty was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see People v. Fiumefreddo, 82 N.Y.2d 536, 543, 605 N.Y.S.2d 671, 626 N.E.2d 646 ). The defendant's postplea assertions that he was innocent and was coerced into pleading guilty contradicted the admissions he made under oath at his plea allocution and...