People v. Stephenson

• Decision Date: 11 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 07SA16.,07SA16.
• Citation: People v. Stephenson, 159 P.3d 617 (Colo. 2007)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Christopher George STEPHENSON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

159 P.3d 617

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Christopher George STEPHENSON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07SA16.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

June 11, 2007.

Bill Thiebaut, District Attorney, Tenth Judicial District, Richard W. Dickerson, Deputy District Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Suzanne C. Reynolds, Deputy Public Defender, Pueblo, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice EID delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The prosecution appeals an order by the Pueblo County District Court suppressing statements made by Defendant Christopher Stephenson in response to police interrogation. The trial court found that Stephenson was in custody when he made the statements and had not been given the proper warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Stephenson was in custody and therefore reverse the suppression order.

I.

The facts of this case come to us from the uncontroverted testimony of Jonathan Post, a Deputy in the Pueblo County Sheriff's Office, who testified at the suppression hearing held in December 2006.

At 11:30 p.m. on September 11, 2006, Deputy Post saw an automobile parked on the right side of the road near the Salt Creek Bridge in Pueblo. The vehicle's hazard lights were blinking while two men poured gasoline into the vehicle's tank. Deputy Post, who was driving a police cruiser, activated his overhead lights and pulled directly behind the parked vehicle. While Deputy Post was parking, the two men entered the parked vehicle.

Deputy Post exited the cruiser and approached the driver's side of the vehicle. There he found Stephenson sitting behind the steering wheel holding the vehicle's keys. Stephenson informed Deputy Post that the vehicle had run out of gas, and that he and his passenger had obtained gas, refilled the tank, and were ready to leave.

Deputy Post believed that Stephenson's appearance and behavior were consistent with the use of a stimulant like methamphetamine. Deputy Post therefore asked Stephenson for his driver's license. Nothing in the record suggests that Deputy Post's request was accompanied by an overt display of force or was made in a threatening manner. Stephenson responded to the request by producing what Deputy Post determined to be a valid driver's license.

Without returning Stephenson's license, Deputy Post then asked for the vehicle's registration. Stephenson was unable to produce the registration, and claimed that the vehicle was loaned to him by its owner, Debra McCarthy. Deputy Post contacted his headquarters to determine the ownership of the vehicle, and was informed that the vehicle's owner was listed as Richard Duvay. Deputy Post told Stephenson of the vehicle's registration, and he again stated that McCarthy had loaned him the vehicle.

Deputy Post then asked Stephenson if he would consent to a search of the vehicle. Again, nothing in the record suggests that Deputy Post's request was made in a threatening manner. Indeed, his exact testimony was that he "asked Mr. Stephenson if [he could] search the vehicle. . . ." Stephenson agreed to the search, and according to Deputy Post, he "had [Stephenson and his passenger] step out of the vehicle [and] behind the vehicle and wait for [him] right next to the bridge." Deputy Post conducted his search while Stephenson and his passenger stood behind the vehicle. The search revealed a small plastic baggie that Deputy Post believed to contain methamphetamine. Deputy Post approached Stephenson and questioned him about it. Stephenson denied its ownership. Deputy Post responded, "Come on, I found this right — right in your seat." Stephenson then admitted that the baggie belonged to him, and was arrested by Deputy Post. At no point during this exchange did Deputy Post provide Stephenson with a Miranda advisement.

The baggie contained methamphetamine, and Stephenson was charged with possession of a Schedule II controlled substance. Stephenson moved to suppress his statements to Deputy Post. At a separate hearing ten days after Deputy Post's testimony, the trial court held that Deputy Post conducted a lawful stop of Stephenson's vehicle, and that the statements made by Stephenson prior to Deputy Post's search of the vehicle were admissible because Stephenson was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. The trial court further held, however, that statements made by Stephenson after Deputy Post's search were inadmissible because he had not been given his Miranda warnings and was in custody when questioned. To support this conclusion, the trial court found that:

By taking the defendant's license and telling the defendant to remain in the car and then returning to the officer's cruiser for a record's check, and at this point ordering the defendant [and] passenger out of the car, it's this Court's position that the defendant or any other reasonable person under those circumstances would have felt that he was not free to leave, technically under arrest at this point.

The prosecution appeals the trial court's suppression order, arguing that Stephenson was not in custody prior to his formal arrest.

II.

This case is concerned solely with whether Stephenson was in custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment at the time he was questioned by Deputy Post about the methamphetamine found in the vehicle. If Stephenson was in custody, then the trial court correctly suppressed his statement because he was not given a Miranda advisement prior to Deputy Post's questioning. See People v. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 887 (Colo. 1994).

Custody for Miranda purposes under the Fifth Amendment is determined under a different analysis from that applied to determine whether there has been a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. A seizure results under the Fourth Amendment where the police conduct in question "would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." People v. Jackson, 39 P.3d 1174, 1182 (Colo.2002) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)). To determine custody for Miranda purposes, "the question is not whether a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave, but rather whether such a person would believe he was in police custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest." People v. Polander, 41 P.3d 698, 705 (Colo.2001). In order to determine whether a defendant is in custody, "the relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would consider herself deprived of her freedom of action in a significant way at the time of the questioning," tantamount to a formal arrest. People v. Dracon, 884 P.2d 712, 716-17 (Colo.1994). Custody is determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's encounter with law enforcement, see People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 468 (Colo. 2002), and we review the trial court's determination de novo, see id. at 459.

A.

The touchstone of custody is significant curtailment of the defendant's freedom of action that is equivalent to a formal arrest. See Polander, 41 P.3d at 705. Significant curtailment often stems solely from the degree of physical restraint placed on the defendant, but sometimes can result from overbearing police interrogation that, accompanied by physical restraint, would cause a reasonable person to believe that he was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Cf. People v. Minjarez, 81 P.3d 348, 357 (Colo.2003) (holding that the tenor and circumstances of the interrogation in question were such that a reasonable person would believe he was under arrest); Matheny, 46 P.3d at 462 ("Miranda identified the principal threat to the privilege against self-incrimination as the compulsive effect of psychological coercion applied during incommunicado interrogation."). We recognized in Matheny that roadside questioning generally does not carry the same degree of psychological coercion as does questioning at a police station. See 46 P.3d at 463-64.

For this reason, we rejected a claim of custody in People v. Reddersen, 992 P.2d 1176 (Colo.2000), where the trial court erred by suppressing statements made by the defendant in the course of a routine traffic stop. Even though the defendant was outside of the vehicle and searched by a law enforcement officer, the lack of any confinement of the defendant by the officer revealed that the defendant was not in custody at the time of his questioning. See id. at 1181. Other cases have focused on the lack of physical restraint when holding that a defendant-motorist was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. See People v. Wallace, 724 P.2d 670, 674 (Colo.1986) (finding that defendant-motorist was not in custody where "inquiry was made in a normal tone of voice, and no restraints had been placed upon the defendant"); People v. Archuleta, 719 P.2d 1091, 1092 (Colo.1986) (rejecting the notion that requiring a defendant-motorist to exit his vehicle created custody, in part because of the absence of any physical restraint).

In contrast, we found that the defendants were in custody when interrogated in People v. Taylor, 41 P.3d 681 (Colo.2002), and People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174 (Colo.1992). In Taylor, the defendant made incriminating statements while "essentially encircled" by law enforcement officers and "pinned" against his vehicle. 839 P.2d at 693, 684. When the defendant in Taylor attempted to move, he was physically restrained by law enforcement. See id. at 684. Likewise, in Thomas, we found that the defendant-motorist was in custody because, prior to his interrogation, he had exited the vehicle and was searched, the search revealed illegal drug paraphernalia, and another officer arrived at the scene to act as backup while the officer...