People v. Steskal
| Decision Date | 01 October 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 44118,44118 |
| Citation | 55 Ill.2d 157,302 N.E.2d 321 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Raymond STESKAL et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Edward F. Tarabilda, Springfield (Barbara O'Toole, American Civil Liberties Union, Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.
Richard A. Hollis, State's Atty., Springfield (Robert Barewin, Asst. State's Atty., and David Dorris Senior Law Student, of counsel), for the People.
Defendant, Raymond Steskal, appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon County declaring certain movie films and photographs to be contraband and ordering them destroyed.
The facts herein are not in dispute. Pursuant to search warrants issued by that court, the Illinois State Police, on May 23, 1969, conducted searches of certain premises owned by the defendant and seized films, photographs, magazines and photographic equipment owned by him. He was then charged with a violation of the Illinois Obscenity Statute in that he possessed obscene materials with knowledge of their content and with the intent to disseminate them. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 38, par. 11--20.) Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to suppress the items which had been seized pursuant to these warrants. The circuit court, relying on Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 88 S.Ct. 2103, 20 L.Ed.2d 1313, granted said motion and ordered the materials returned to defendant. Although the State filed an appeal, its subsequent motion to withdraw the same was allowed on January 11, 1971.
Defendant then petitioned the circuit court to order the materials returned. The State, however, filed a 'Complaint for Declaratory Judgment' against defendant alleging that he offered these materials for sale or rent to the public. It sought to have the materials declared obscene as hard-core pornography and prayed that they be destroyed.
Defendant filed a motion to strike contending that he was not a proper party for this was a civil action and the proper party-defendant was the material at issue; that the State was precluded from bringing this action because of the trial court's prior order to return the items; and, that since the items 'at most' could be described as derivative contraband they could not be destroyed for to do so would violate defendant's fourth-amendment rights and would be in contravention of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Thereafter the complaint was amended to include as a party-defendant the items sought to be forfeited.
After the trial court had viewed several films, defense counsel stipulated that all but one of the remaining films depicted acts of intercourse, fellatio and cunnilingus. The court then found these films and all photographs and booklets depicting similar sexual conduct to be contraband and ordered their destruction. The remaining items were ordered returned.
This action is in the nature of a forfeiture proceeding. While no statute specifically details forfeiture of obscene material, the Code of Criminal Procedure does provide that contraband shall not be returned even if a person is released without charges being preferred. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 108--2.) Moreover, if a motion to suppress improperly seized evidence is granted, property shall be returned 'unless otherwise subject to lawful detention.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 114--12(b).) Since obscene materials may be considered contraband (United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376--377, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 28 L.Ed.2d 822, 834; United States v. Wild (2d Cir. 1969), 422 F.2d 34, 38; People v. Kimmel, 34 Ill.2d 578, 582, 217 N.E.2d 785), they may be subject to forfeiture. The issue presented is whether these items in this instance may be so treated. Defendant does not contend that certain items were not obscene or hard-core pornography but argues that they are not contraband. The State maintains that these materials are contraband.
As enunciated in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170, there are two categories of contraband. Contraband Per se consists of those items whose possession alone constitutes a criminal offense and such articles need not be returned even if improperly seized. (See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 1234, 92 L.Ed. 1663, 1672.) Derivative contraband are articles which are not inherently illegal, but are used in an unlawful manner. These may also be subject to forfeiture. See also People v. Moore, 410 Ill. 241, 102 N.E.2d 146.
Obscene material must come under the latter classification to be declared contraband, for ...
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People v. Williams
...speaks of an order itself, not merely of issues upon which the order may or may not have turned. For example, in People v. Steskal (1973), 55 Ill.2d 157, 161, 302 N.E.2d 321, we cited Taylor in observing that the prior grant of a suppression motion could not be relitigated. In People v. Ken......
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U.S. v. Farrell, 78-1279
..."Derivative contraband are articles which are not inherently illegal, but are used in an unlawful manner." People v. Steskal, 55 Ill.2d 157, 302 N.E.2d 321, 323 (1973). 5 The money claimed by Farrell, which was used in an "unlawful manner" as an instrumentality of crime falls within this se......
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Kane v. McDaniel
...property not otherwise illegal, but which are subject to forfeiture according to the use to which they are put. See People v. Steskal, 55 Ill.2d 157, 302 N.E.2d 321 (1973). The Court is presented with one of those delicate constitutional balances that are always involved when intrusions int......
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People v. Braden
...before it no competent evidence to make this factual finding, and we cannot condone such a summary procedure. See People v. Steskal (1973), 55 Ill.2d 157, 160, 302 N.E.2d 321. The record is simply too incomplete to show that the weapons were derivative contraband stemming from the commissio......