People v. Steubenvoll

• Decision Date: 08 July 1886
• Citation: 28 N.W. 883,62 Mich. 329
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. STEUBENVOLL. [*]

28 N.W. 883

62 Mich. 329

PEOPLE v. STEUBENVOLL. ^[*]

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 8, 1886

Error to Saginaw.

The Attorney General, for the People.

Tarsney & Weadock, for defendant and appellant.

CHAMPLIN J.

An information was filed against the respondent for the murder of William Pickel, and upon a trial the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter. The death was caused by a pistol ball discharged by respondent as he claims, for the purpose of frightening the deceased and that he intended to shoot over Pickel's head, but, by accident, the ball took effect in Pickel's body, and he soon expired.

The legislature, in 1869, passed an act entitled "An act to prevent the careless use of fire-arms." The first and second sections of this act make it a misdemeanor for any person, intentionally and without malice, to point, aim, or discharge any fire-arm, without injury, at another person. The third section enacts: "Any person who shall maim or injure any other person by the discharge of any fire-arm, pointed or aimed intentionally, but without malice, at any such person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars, or imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than one year; and if death ensue from such wounding or maiming, such person so offending shall be deemed guilty of the crime of manslaughter."

The council for respondent requested the court to charge the jury: "If you find that the death of William Pickel resulted from the accidental use, or careless use, of the revolver in the hands of the defendant, without malice, you must acquit him of any offense, under the information in this case, and your verdict will be 'not guilty.' " And again: "If you find, as a fact, that the defendant did not intend to do any bodily harm to the deceased, but, through careless use of a revolver, death resulted, he is not guilty of murder in any degree, nor of manslaughter, under the information against him in this case, and it will be your duty to acquit."

These requests the court refused to give. They were rightly refused. The public prosecutor was not compelled to frame his information under the third section of the statute cited. The testimony of the prosecution tended to prove murder. It was competent for the prosecutor to file his information simply for murder, and leave the matter to be dealt with as the proof should disclose the character and grade of the crime committed, which might range all the way from murder in the first degree down to a simple assault and battery. The statute has nowhere attempted to define the crime of manslaughter, but has left the offense as known at the common law, and this the court properly defined.

He also told the jury that, under the evidence, there could be no conviction for murder in the first degree, and, after defining the different degrees of murder and of manslaughter, he instructed the jury as follows: "If you find, at the time of the homicide, that the defendant intentionally discharged a pistol at the person of Willie Pickel, while Pickel was running in the highway, with malice in his heart at the time, and that such malice was the moving cause of the act, and as a result of the shot Willie Pickel received a wound from the effects of which he died, the defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree. If you find that the defendant was chasing Willie Pickel in the highway, with the intention to compel him to seek a place of shelter from the defendant, and for the purpose of frightening him he discharged a pistol, not intending to inflict any personal injury upon Willie Pickel, but only to frighten him, the defendant was engaged in an unlawful act; and if you find the shot did inflict an injury from which Willie Pickel died, the defendant is guilty of manslaughter. If you find that the defendant was chasing Willie Pickel in the highway, intending to overtake him and inflict some personal chastisement on him, and while so chasing him designedly discharged a pistol, not intending to inflict any injury on Pickel by such discharge, but only to frighten him, and as a result of the shot a wound was inflicted on the person of Willie Pickel from the effects of which he died, the defendant is guilty of manslaughter."

These instructions presented the law of the case correctly to the jury.

The court also instructed the jury as follows: "The burden of proof is upon the people, who make the charge, and you are required to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, and of the degrees of guilt that you find. What is meant by a 'reasonable doubt' is, as the term implies, a doubt arising out of the facts and circumstances of the case in maintaining which you can give some good reason."

That portion of the charge defining "reasonable doubt," and especially the last clause, is excepted to by the counsel for respondent. Many efforts have been made to define the expression "reasonable doubt," and hitherto I think the definitions given are not remarkable for clearness of thought or accuracy of expression. They appear generally to be involved in the uncertainty of the subject which they are attempting to define, and it is much easier to say what is not a correct definition of the term than to determine the precise signification of the expression as used in the trial of criminal cases. The following explanation of the term was not disapproved by Mr. Justice CAMPBELL in People v. McGuire, 44 Mich. 286; S.C. 6 N.W. 669: "The expression itself seems to comprehend the whole subject-matter, 'reasonable doubt.' Of course, that is not a far-fetched one. It is not a speculative one; it is not an arbitrary one; but it is just what it assumes to be, a 'reasonable doubt.' If you, after looking over the testimony, and considering all the facts proven to your satisfaction in the case, and the natural circumstances that surround those facts,--if you are still unable to say that the prisoner is guilty, it is your duty to acquit. And that, we apprehend, is what is understood by 'reasonable doubt,' in the law." And the following instruction as to what was meant by "reasonable doubt" was approved by CAMPBELL, C.J., in People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482, viz.: "A 'reasonable doubt' is a fair doubt, growing out of the testimony in the case. It is not a mere imaginary, captious, or possible doubt, but a fair doubt, based upon reason and common sense. It is such a doubt as may leave your minds, after a careful examination of all the evidence in the case, in that condition that you cannot say you have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge here made against the respondent." While Mr. Justice GRAVES, in People v. Marble, 38 Mich. at page 125, considered the following instructions misleading and inaccurate, viz.: "What I mean by a 'reasonable doubt' is that it must be such evidence as would satisfy you,--as you would be willing to act upon in any of your own important concerns,--your own business. Such evidence as would satisfy you it would be proper for you to act upon in any of your own private concerns,--that would be evidence that would satisfy you beyond a 'reasonable doubt.' That is what this means."

We do not think that the phrase "reasonable doubt" is of such unknown or uncommon signification that an exposition by a trial judge is called for. Language that is within the comprehension of persons of ordinary intelligence can seldom be made plainer by further definition or refining. All persons who possess the qualifications of jurors know that a "doubt" is a fluctuation or uncertainty of mind arising from defect of knowledge, or of evidence, and that a doubt of the guilt of the accused, honestly entertained, is a "reasonable doubt." We repeat here what was said by Mr. Justice CAMPBELL upon this subject in Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich., at page 194, namely: "But we do not think that juries can derive any help from attempts, by numerous and complicated requests, to explain what would be much better without them. If a jury cannot understand their duty when told they must not convict when they have a reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt, or of any fact essential to prove it, they can very seldom get any help from such subtleties as require a trained mind to distinguish. Jurors are presumed to have common sense, and to understand common English; but they are not presumed to have professional or any high degree of technical or linguistic training."

Conceding, in this case, that the exposition of the phrase by the circuit judge was not strictly accurate, yet it is apparent that it could have produced no practical consequence in this case.

Steubenvoll was sworn in his own behalf, and we give his testimony in full, as appears in the record before us. He testified that he was 33 years of age, that he was at the time of the shooting, and for some time previous had been, engaged by the East Saginaw Gas-light Company, inspecting meters, from the south side of Genesee avenue to the south end of town, in business blocks and residences. "We call it 'taking statements.' Keep a memorandum book showing amount of gas consumed. I purchased the revolver, and carried it, because I had been attacked one night on Warren street after I had been taking statements. I drank beer regularly in the old country and have drunk beer daily since I came to this country. I drank some on the night Willie Pickle was shot. Was sober that night. I quit work that night before six o'clock, and did not go home to supper. I had no lunch,--had nothing to eat. After quitting work I went to Zeigner's saloon, and bought a small bottle of beer, and drank it all myself, and went to the gas-office, and then back, and drank another small...