People v. Stewart

• Docket Number: 162497
• Decision Date: 31 July 2023
• Citation: People v. Stewart, 999 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. 2023)
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joshua Lamar-James STEWART, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

999 N.W.2d 717

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Joshua Lamar-James STEWART, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 162497

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued on application for leave to appeal January 11, 2023

Decided July 31, 2023.

Michael Callahan, J.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Jon P. Wojtala, Chief of Research, Training and Appeals, and Timothy A. Baughman, Special Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Marilena David) for defendant.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

OPINION

Clement, C.J.

₄₇₇At issue in this case is whether defendant’s statements to law enforcement, made during an early-hours interrogation, were voluntary. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s statements were involuntary and that the trial court erred by failing to suppress them.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 6, 2016, then-18-year-old defendant allegedly aided and abetted two other men in a pair of armed robberies by serving as a getaway driver. Two victims were targeted during the first robbery, and one of the victims (Aaron Foster) was shot. During the second robbery, a shootout ensued between the perpetrators and the victims, and a perpetrator (Deontea White) and a victim (Daniel Claxton) were both shot. The perpetrators’ vehicle, a Dodge Intrepid, was struck by bullets multiple times during the shootout.

Foster, Claxton, and White were all taken to Detroit Receiving Hospital for treatment. Foster arrived first, accompanied by Detroit Police Officer John Siejutt, and was announced dead on arrival. Claxton arrived second, driven by his brother, who had also been present for the second robbery. Finally, White arrived last, driven by defendant.

₄₇₈After defendant and White arrived, hospital security alerted Officer Siejutt that a bullet-riddled vehicle transporting a gunshot victim had arrived at the hospital. Officer Siejutt approached and questioned defendant in the parking lot. Defendant disavowed involvement in any shooting, claiming instead that he had been walking down the street when he saw White lying wounded in the backseat of the Intrepid. According to defendant, he decided to get into the driver’s seat and transport White to the hospital.

While Officer Siejutt questioned defendant, another officer brought Claxton’s brother to the parking lot. There, Claxton’s brother stated that he recognized the Intrepid as the shooters’ vehicle and defendant’s white T-shirt as the white T-shirt worn by the shooters’ driver. Shortly thereafter, the officers determined that the Intrepid had been reported as stolen, and the officers arrested defendant. A subsequent search of the vehicle resulted in the discovery of Foster’s stolen belongings, linking the Intrepid to the first robbery.

The officers interrogated defendant after the arrest, during the early hours of the morning. Defendant eventually admitted to driving the Intrepid during both robberies but denied knowing that the other two men had been armed and intended to commit robberies that day.

Defendant was charged with first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); three counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83; assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH), MCL 750.84; assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89; receiving or concealing stolen property valued between $1,000 and $20,000, MCL 750.535(3)(a); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a ₄₇₉felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the admission of his statements from the May 7, 2016 law enforcement interrogation, arguing, in part, that his statements were involuntarily made because of coercive interrogation techniques and promises of leniency. The trial court disagreed and denied defendant’s motion.

A jury trial commenced, and ultimately, the jury acquitted defendant of murder and AWIM but found defendant guilty of all remaining charges.

[1] On appeal, defendant pursued his claim that his interrogation statements were involuntarily made and should not have been admitted at trial. But, in an unpublished, per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected that claim and defendant’s remaining arguments and affirmed defendant’s convictions. People v Stewart, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 24, 2020 (Docket No. 343755). Defendant sought leave to appeal, and this Court directed oral argument on the application regarding "whether the statement [defendant] made to the police was not voluntary because the interrogating officers employed overly coercive tactics, including promises of leniency. People v Conte, 421 Mich. 704 (1984)[;] see also People v Shipley, 256 Mich App 367, 373 (2003)."¹ People v Stewart, 508 Mich. 941, 941, 964 N.W.2d 363 (2021).

₄₈₀II. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

[2, 3] This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress but reviews all underlying factual findings for clear error. See People v Elliott, 494 Mich. 292, 300-301, 833 N.W.2d 284 (2013). A finding is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113,119, 575 N.W.2d 84 (1997).

A. INVOLUNTARINESS

[4–7] Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions protect citizens against self-incrimination and afford due process of law. U.S. Const., Ams. V and XIV; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17. The use of an involuntary statement elicited by coercive state action in a criminal trial violates these constitutional protections. Colorado v Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165, 107 S Ct 515, 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986); People v Cipriano, 431 Mich. 315, 331, 429 N.W.2d 781 (1988). In other words, "[i]f an individual’s will was overborne or if his confession was not the product of a rational intellect and a free will, his confession is inadmissible because [it was] coerced." Townsend v Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307, 83 S Ct 745, 9 L Ed 2d 770 (1963) (quotation marks and citations omitted), overruled in part on other grounds Keeney v Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S Ct 1715, 118 L Ed 2d 318 (1992). Coercive tactics that can overbear an individual’s will include both physical intimidation and psychological pressure. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 307, 83 S.Ct. 745; see also Jackson v Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389, 84 S Ct 1774, 12 L Ed 2d 908 (1964) (observing that a continuum of means of overcoming a defendant’s free will exist, "from acts of clear physical brutality to more refined and subtle methods"). When the voluntariness of a confession is challenged,₄₈₁ "the burden is on the people to demonstrate voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence." Conte, 421 Mich. at 754-755, 365 N.W.2d 648 (opinion by Boyle, J.) (citation omitted).

[8–11] To determine whether a statement was involuntary because of state coercion, a reviewing court must consider "whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made." Cipriano, 431 Mich. at 334, 429 N.W.2d 781. While all relevant circumstances must be considered, this Court has specifically directed consideration of the following factors:

the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. [Id.]

Further, promises of leniency can render a confession involuntary. Conte, 421 Mich. at 724-725, 365 N.W.2d 648 (opinion by Williams, C.J.). While general observations regarding leniency—e.g., that it would be better if the interrogee told the truth, that the interrogee’s cooperation will be brought to the attention of officials responsible for charging or sentencing decisions, or that cooperation has been looked upon favorably by those officials in the past—will not render a statement involuntary, express or implied assurances that cooperation will aid the interrogee’s defense or result in a lesser sentence may ₄₈₂do so. See id. at 740, 365 N.W.2d 648; see also Givans, 227 Mich App at 119-120, 575 N.W.2d 84. However, promises of leniency remain only one factor to be considered within the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Conte, 421 Mich. at 754, 365 N.W.2d 648 (opinion by Boyle, J.);² Givans, 227 Mich App at 117, 575 N.W.2d 84.

B. DETAILS OF THE MAY 7, 2016 INTERROGATION

To determine whether defendant’s May 7, 2016 statements to law enforcement were voluntary, a closer examination of the interrogation is necessary.

As detailed above, after defendant arrived at the hospital, he was briefly questioned by Officer Siejutt in the hospital parking lot. When officers discovered that the Intrepid that defendant had been driving was stolen, officers arrested defendant.

Defendant’s postarrest interrogation began at 3:36 a.m. and lasted until 6:41 a.m. At the beginning of the interrogation, Detroit Police Officer James MacDonald proposed that they "go through some paperwork real quick" and proceeded to ask defendant general questions about defendant’s background, including the spelling of defendant’s name, his date of birth, and his level of education. Officer MacDonald then presented defendant with an advice-of-rights form and asked defendant to read, sign, and date it; ₄₈₃...