People v. Stewart
| Decision Date | 28 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 124055. COA. No. 1. |
| Citation | 472 Mich. 624,698 N.W.2d 340 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leonard Lamont STEWART, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Michael D. Thomas, Prosecuting Attorney, and Janet M. Boes, John T. Horiszny, and A. George Best, II, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, Saginaw, MI, for the people.
Carolyn A. Blanchard for, Northville, MI, the defendant.
Stuart J. Dunnings III, President, Jeffrey L. Sauter, Prosecuting Attorney, and William M. Worden, Senior Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for amicus curiae the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
This case is one of statutory interpretation. Under MCL 791.234(10), a prisoner may apply for a judicial certificate of cooperation. If the prisoner is found to have cooperated with law enforcement, then the prisoner is eligible for parole 2.5 years sooner than otherwise. The questions presented are: (1) when the prisoner's cooperation must occur, and when a court may make a determination that cooperation has occurred; (2) what constitutes "cooperation" under MCL 791.234(10), and whether defendant's actions met that standard; and (3) whether this case should be remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant has cooperated within the meaning of the statute.
We hold that a prisoner's cooperation may occur at any time before the prisoner is released on parole. But the cooperation must occur before the filing of a motion for judicial determination of cooperation. Similarly, the statute imposes no limits on when a court may make a determination that cooperation occurred.
Cooperation means that a prisoner engages in conduct where the prisoner is working with law enforcement for a common purpose, provides useful or relevant information to law enforcement, or establishes that although the prisoner provided law enforcement any information he or she had, and it turned out not to be relevant or useful, the prisoner never had any relevant or useful information to provide. A prisoner who had relevant or useful information to provide and chose not to provide this information, however, cannot be considered to have cooperated with law enforcement.
Under these standards, defendant did not meet his burden of initially showing, by affidavit or otherwise, that he had cooperated with law enforcement. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
To the extent that People v. Matelic, 249 Mich.App. 1, 641 N.W.2d 252 (2001), and People v. Cardenas, 263 Mich.App. 511, 688 N.W.2d 544 (2004), conflict with this opinion, they are overruled.
We affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for judicial certification of cooperation.
The police intercepted a package of cocaine at the Saginaw office of United Parcel Service. The police set up surveillance at the house to which the package was addressed and had a police officer deliver the package. David Harrell, a codefendant, signed for the package. A short time later, police officers raided the house. Harrell told the police that defendant asked him if defendant could have packages delivered to Harrell's house, and that three or four packages had been delivered in 1994. Harrell stated that defendant had come to the house earlier with Bryant Fields, and that defendant had said that Fields would be picking the package up. During the raid, Fields came to the house to pick up the package. When the police arrested Fields, they found two rocks of cocaine wrapped in $50 and a green pager. Fields stated that the pager belonged to the man for whom he was picking up the package; Harrell said that the pager looked like the one that defendant carried. During the raid, the pager went off three times, displaying defendant's home phone number. The package originated in Pomona, California, and there were several calls made from defendant's home phone to Pomona.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), and conspiracy to commit possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a(a). At the time that defendant was convicted and sentenced in 1995, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i) provided that an individual found guilty of possessing with the intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine would receive a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Further, there was no possibility of parole for an individual sentenced to a mandatory life sentence "for a major controlled substance offense ...." MCL 791.234(4).1 Consequently, defendant was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole.
In 1998, three years after defendant was sentenced, the Legislature revised the statutes. The revisions removed the mandatory life imprisonment for those convicted of possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine and replaced that punishment with "life or any term of years but not less than 20 years." MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i). The revisions further provided that such an offender would be eligible for parole after either twenty years (if the offender "has another conviction for a serious crime") or after 17.5 years' imprisonment (if the offender "does not have another conviction for a serious crime ...."). MCL 791.234(6). These same amendments also created MCL 791.234(10), which permits an offender convicted of possession with intent to distribute over 650 grams of cocaine to be eligible for parole 2.5 years earlier if the offender is found to have "cooperated with law enforcement ...."
Under MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), defendant was found to be eligible for parole after 17.5 years' imprisonment. Defendant subsequently petitioned to be certified as having cooperated with law enforcement under MCL 791.234(10). The trial court denied defendant's request, stating:
The Defendant states that he had no relevant or useful information to provide to law enforcement officers previously. Additionally, he states that he is "ready and willing to proffer any relevant or useful information that he may have, without undue haste.["] He, however, fails to allege how he will have any relevant or useful information for law enforcement officials approximately eight years after his arrest. The Court finds that due to a lack of facts, it cannot enter an order of cooperation.
Defendant sought leave to appeal, and the Court of Appeals denied defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal. Unpublished order, entered May 21, 2003 (Docket No. 243562).
This Court then granted defendant leave to appeal, asking the parties to address the following:
(1) What constitutes "cooperation" for the purpose of MCL 791.234(10), and did defendant's actions satisfy that requirement? (2) Does MCL 791.234(10) contain a temporal limitation on when cooperation must occur? (3) Does MCL 791.234(10) contain a temporal limitation on when a court may make a determination that cooperation occurred? (4) Was People v. Matelic, 249 Mich.App 1, 641 N.W.2d 252 (2001), properly decided?2 (5) Should this case be remanded to the Saginaw Circuit Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant has cooperated within the meaning of MCL 791.234(10)? [People v. Stewart, 470 Mich. 879, 683 N.W.2d 143 (2004).]
This case involves the interpretation of MCL 791.234(10). We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. People v. Jones, 467 Mich. 301, 304, 651 N.W.2d 906 (2002). The primary goal in construing a statute is "to give effect to the intent of the Legislature." In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich. 396, 411, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999). We begin by examining the plain language of the statute. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999).
The statute at issue, MCL 791.234(10), provides:
If the sentencing judge, or his or her successor in office, determines on the record that a prisoner described in subsection (6) sentenced to imprisonment for life for violating or conspiring to violate section 7401(2)(a)(i) of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7401, has cooperated with law enforcement, the prisoner is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board and may be released on parole as provided in subsection (6), 2-1/2 years earlier than the time otherwise indicated in subsection (6). The prisoner is considered to have cooperated with law enforcement if the court determines on the record that the prisoner had no relevant or useful information to provide. The court shall not make a determination that the prisoner failed or refused to cooperate with law enforcement on grounds that the defendant exercised his or her constitutional right to trial by jury. If the court determines at sentencing that the defendant cooperated with law enforcement, the court shall include its determination in the judgment of sentence.
The first issue we must address is what temporal limits MCL 791.234(10) imposes on when cooperation must occur and when a court may make a determination that cooperation occurred.
We agree with the conflict panel in People v. Cardenas that the only temporal limitation the statute places on a prisoner's cooperation is that the cooperation must occur before the filing of a motion for judicial determination of cooperation. Other than that limitation, the cooperation may occur at any time before the prisoner is released on parole. Specifically, we agree with the following reasoning set out by Judge Wilder in his partial dissent in Matelic and adopted by the Cardenas conflict panel:
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