People v. Stock

• Docket Number: 1-23-1753B
• Decision Date: 18 December 2023
• Citation: People v. Stock, 230 N.E.3d 197 (Ill. App. 2023)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kiel STOCK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

230 N.E.3d 197

2023 IL App (1st) 231753

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Kiel STOCK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-23-1753B

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Filed December 18, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.No. 2023 DV 75012, Honorable Michael J. Hogan, Judge, presiding.

Sharone R. Mitchell Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Mara Adelman, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Gerrard R. Burch Jr., Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE LAMPKINdelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1DefendantKiel Stock is charged with one count of aggravated battery/discharge of a firearm pursuant to section 12-3.05(e)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012(720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1)(West 2022)) and now appeals the trial court’s order denying him pretrial release pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963(Code)(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(West 2022)).The General Assembly used Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act, to amend article 110 of the Code(725 ILCS 5/art. 110(West 2022)) and effect sweeping changes to how our criminal justice system treats pretrial detention and release.SeeRowe v. Raoul,2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 & n.1, 469 Ill.Dec. 248, 223 N.E.3d 1010(noting neither "(SAFE-T)Act" nor "Pretrial Fairness Act" are "official" names but common shorthand for sequence of public acts).Article 110 eliminates cash bail, presumes that alldefendants, regardless of the alleged offense, are eligible for pretrial release, and establishes a number of new procedural rules regarding pretrial re- lease.To succeed on a petition for pretrial detention, the State must make certain showings by clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate why the pretrial incarceration of any defendant is warranted.725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)-(4)(West 2022).

¶ 2 Here, the State failed to prove that no condition or combination of conditions found in section 110-10(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-10(b)(West 2022)) can mitigate the real and present "threat to the safety of any person or the community.725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3)(West 2022).As a result, the trial court erred in denying defendant pretrial release and, in the process, failed to comply with the plain language of section 110-6.1 of the Code, which requires the trial court’s written order to explain why conditions less restrictive than pretrial detention are not sufficient to avoid the threat to any person or the community.For those reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On September 18, 2023, the State charged defendant with aggravated battery and filed a petition seeking to deny pretrial release.The same day, the trial court held a pretrial release hearing.

¶ 5 As article 110 of the Code contemplates, the State made a factual proffer, which is summarized as follows.On September 14, 2023, defendant’s wife, Jennifer, the complaining witness, informed defendant that she wanted a divorce and began packing her belongings before leaving.She returned to the marital home on September 17, 2023, at approximately 5:50 p.m. with several friends to gather her belongings.Defendant’s 15-year-old daughter¹ was home at the time.Defendant became irate that Jennifer brought friends with her, and he threw a broom at them.As Jennifer and her friends began loading a box, defendant went into the bedroom.Jennifer and her friends took a box outside and then returned to the home.Defendant exited the bedroom, yelled at Jennifer and her friends, and returned to the bedroom, where he picked up a handgun.He then discharged one round into the bedroom wall, on the other side of which was an adjoining bathroom.The bullet penetrated the wall.Jennifer, who was in the bathroom, suffered a grazing wound to her stomach and an injury to her hand from shrapnel from a fragmented bullet.Upon the arrival of responding officers, they recovered a 9-millimeter shell casing from the bedroom.Defendant granted officers access to his safe, from which a RugerP89 9-millimeter handgun was recovered.Jennifer transported herself to the hospital but, according to defense counsel, not before she and her friends visited a bar.The trial court subsequently struck the portion of the State’s proffer related to the bullet shrapnel, as such information had not been tendered to defense counsel.

¶ 6 Defense counsel made her own proffer that defendant was 45 years old with a bachelor’s degree in computer science and a graduate degree in software engineering.He was employed full time as the director of technology for a company named Ticket Attendant and could continue to perform that work remotely from home.Both he and his daughter volunteered at the Pilsen Food Pantry.Defense counsel also proffered that, based on the home’s floorplan, the master bedroom does not share a wall with the bathroom in which Jennifer was injured.The conflict ing representations of the bathroom’s location were never resolved.Furthermore, defense counsel stated that a bomb and arson squad was initially brought in to investigate on the belief that something had exploded in the bathroom.Additionally, while defendant knew that Jenifer and her friends had been in and out of the home, he believed they had left at the time he discharged the gun.Lastly, defendant had no criminal background prior to this case and suffered from anxiety and depression, which defense counsel stated had been exacerbated by his marital issues.Defendant requested that the trial court release him to home confinement and expressed a willingness to submit to GPS monitoring if the trial court deemed it necessary.

¶ 7 Pretrial services prepared a public safety assessment of defendant, which reported that he scored a 1 out of 6 on the "new criminal activity" scale and a 1 out of 6 on the "failure to appear" scale.The trial court found that the State had met its burden to show that (1) proof was evident or the presumption was great that defendant committed a detainable offense; (2)defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community based on the specific, articulable facts of the case; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release can mitigate the real and present threat posed by defendant.

¶ 8The trial court ordered that defendant be detained pending trial and entered a written order.In the space provided on the form order to describe why the State had proved the third element of its burden, that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, the trial court simply wrote, "The defendant shot a firearm at the complaining witness."The trial court also ordered that defendant be evaluated for anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation.

¶ 9Defendant timely appealed the detention order.Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2)(eff. Oct. 19, 2023).Defendant did not file a brief or memorandum, instead relying on his notice of appeal, while the State did file a memorandum.In his notice of appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove that (1) proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense, (2)defendant poses a threat to any person or the community, and (3) no condition or combination of conditions contained within section 110-10(b) of the Code can mitigate that threat, See725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(West 2022).Defendant also claimed that the trial court erred in concluding that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably ensure defendant’s appearance or prevent defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.

¶ 10 II.ANALYSIS

¶ 11Section 110-6.1(e) of the Code presumes that all defendants are eligible for pretrial release and places the burden of justifying pretrial detention by clear and convincing evidence on the State.725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(West 2022).

[1–3]¶ 12 Clear and convincing evidence is " ‘that quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder about the truth of the proposition in question.’"In re TiffanyW., 2012 IL App (1st) 102492-B, ¶ 12, 365 Ill.Dec. 84, 977 N.E.2d 1183.We will not reverse a finding that there was clear and convincing evidence unless the trial court’s finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.In re C.N.,196 Ill. 2d 181, 208, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030(2001)."A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented."People v. Deleon,227 Ill. 2d 322, 332, 317 Ill.Dec. 843, 882 N.E.2d 999(2008).

[4]¶ 13We agree with the State that the trial court’s findings on the first two elements were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.As to whether the proof was evident or the presumption was great that defendant committed a detainable offense, he was charged with aggravated battery/discharge of a firearm, which is a detainable offense.725 ILCS 5/110- 6.1(a)(1), (e)(1)(West 2022).There was some conflict over the layout of the home and whether evidence about the bullet shrapnel was properly before the trial court.However, the State’s proffer claimed that defendant discharged a firearm into the wall and, simultaneously, Jennifer was grazed by some sort of projectile while in the bathroom and suffered an injury to her hand.The State’s burden at this stage is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the State’s proffer set out clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or that the presumption was great that defendant committed the charged offense.

[5]¶ 14 As to whether defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons...