People v. Stoddard

• Decision Date: 24 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 3,Docket No. 13722,3
• Citation: 48 Mich.App. 440,210 N.W.2d 470
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theodore C. STODDARD, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 470

210 N.W.2d 470

48 Mich.App. 440

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Theodore C. STODDARD, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 13722.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 3.

July 24, 1973.

Released for Publication Oct. 2, 1973.

James R. Neuhard, State App. Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Eugene C. Penzien, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and DANHOF and ADAMS, ^* JJ.

DANHOF, Judge.

On January 28, 1972, defendant was found guilty by the trial court sitting without jury of murder in the first degree. M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. From a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, he appeals. We affirm.

Defendant's 2 allegations of error concern his defense of insanity. He contends that the trial court relied upon a presumption of sanity in determining his guilt. He further argues that the people failed as a matter of law to prove his sanity because they did not offer expert testimony in rebuttal to the testimony of defendant's expert who was of the opinion that defendant was not criminally responsible for the act charged.

The evidence produced at trial reveals the following facts. The victim was a nurse who lived alone and was last seen alive on the afternoon of September 1, 1971, returning to her apartment located in a building next to a gas station where defendant was employed. Her body was discovered in her apartment on the morning of the following day. The results of an autopsy fixed the cause of death as strangulation. There were also multiple stab wounds, lacerations, and contusions over her body. Chemical tests produced evidence of rape and other sexual molestation. Traces of the victim's blood were found throughout her apartment. Defendant's fingerprints were found on various articles, including a coffee pot and some glasses. Another of defendant's fingerprints made in blood was found on the victim's right foot. A pair of brown slacks and a bath towel which appeared to have blood on them were found in the closet.

On the afternoon of the crime, defendant was last seen at work around 2 p.m. His automobile, however, remained parked behind the victim's apartment house until 6 p.m. Defendant returned to the gas station at 7:45 p.m. and asked if anybody had been looking for him. When informed that everyone around the gas station had wondered where he was, he was reported to have said, 'No, I don't mean them; I mean anybody else.' Defendant also said that he had had an argument with his wife at noontime, when he went home, and that when he came back, the parked his car and walked down by the river; that he was not surprised that everyone wondered where he was because he had not told anybody where he was going.

Two days after the killing, defendant gave a statement to police which was introduced into evidence. Defendant makes no challenge as to the admissibility of this statement. Therein, defendant insisted that he had never been in the victim's apartment. He maintained this denial even when confronted by the fingerprint evidence there found. Instead, defendant claimed that he left work at approximately 2 p.m., went to his brother's house and then returned to get his car, got some gasoline, and went to Flint.

Defendant's expert, Dr. Emanuel Tanay, a certified psychiatrist, stated that he had examined defendant at his office in Detroit on December 27, 1971. The examination consisted of an interview lasting approximately one hour and 15 minutes. The interview was tape-recorded so that no notes were taken. No psychological tests of any kind were administered. Based on his observation of defendant, and based on defendant's prior history as related to him by defendant, Dr. Tanay offered the following opinion: Defendant committed the act while in a state of mental disorganization--a dissociative state; he acted out of an uncontrollable rage directed against his wife, but displaced without conscious control toward the victim. Defendant evidently became enraged when the victim chided him about his drinking and his failure to go to work. The doctor further testified that in the interview defendant did not discuss his sexual activity on the day of the crime beyond denying it. Upon learning of proof of such activity, the doctor questioned defendant about it just prior to the doctor's testimony. He reported defendant as having no recollection of it.

Upon cross-examination, the doctor testified that sometimes impairment of memory is characteristic of dissociative reaction; that dissociative reaction is fairly rare; that defendant's faulty recollection could also be the result of unconscious suppression after the fact; that defendant's history was very significant; that it was important for his diagnosis to have a sufficient history, but not necessarily a complete history. The doctor further testified that knowledge of what happened at the scene might be of value in diagnosis of the defendant and it also might not; that he would not need to know what eyewitnesses had to say in deciding whether an eyewitness account would be essential. If the patient said something at complete variance with the actual facts, this may or may not be of value of him in diagnosing, and probably would not be particularly helpful in determining whether the defendant was lying or faking. If defendant were lying, that fact would not interfere with the doctor's diagnosis.

Upon further questioning, the doctor said that in a case of dissociative reaction and possible amnesia as in the case at bar, if the defendant had lied to him, this would certainly make a difference in the diagnosis; that he had not administered any tests to determine if defendant were lying, but relied upon the prosecution to expose untruths in defendant's history. He further testified that he had not talked to the prosecution; that if there were major discrepancies in defendant's story, that would be brought out in court and might change his opinion in the case.

The doctor further stated that he assumed the following, which defendant had told him, to be true: That the victim had invited defendant in for coffee; that defendant reacted angrily to her remark about his drinking and killed her, but that his anger was really directed against his wife; that he had been in the victim's house on at least 2 prior occasions. The doctor testified that he knew that defendant had been previously committed for a time at Traverse City State Hospital but he did not check with the doctors there because he did not feel that it would be of value in arriving at his opinion.

Further testimony by Dr. Tanay upon cross-examination can be summarized as follows: Defendant's impaired memory was not the essential feature of his diagnosis; of relevance was the fact that defendant's behavior on September 1 was irrational and out of character because defendant had told him that he had never killed before. It could not be said at what exact point in time defendant lost control of his impulses, but it was probably after defendant became angry at the victim for criticizing him.

Defendant first argues that, after the introduction of expert opinion on his lack of criminal responsibility, the legal presumption of sanity ceased to have any probative value; and that it was error for the trial court to rely on the presumption in determining defendant's guilt. After reading the trial court's lengthy opinion we are not convinced that the presumption...