People v. Stokes
| Decision Date | 08 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 321303. |
| Citation | 312 Mich.App. 181,877 N.W.2d 752 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. STOKES. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Kym Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Jason W. Williams, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Amy M. Somers, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Lee A. Somerville, Redford, for defendant.
Christopher Wayne Stokes, in propria persona.
Before: TALBOT, C.J., and WILDER and FORT HOOD, JJ.
Christopher Wayne Stokes appeals as of right his convictions by jury of carjacking1 and armed robbery.2 The trial court sentenced Stokes as a second-offense habitual offender3 to concurrent terms of 18 to 30 years' imprisonment for each conviction. We affirm Stokes's convictions, but remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Stokes's convictions arise out of a carjacking that occurred near midnight on July 10, 2013. That night, Charles Jones drove into his driveway in Detroit. Stokes appeared and ordered Jones to hand over his car keys and cell phone. According to Jones, Stokes did so while pointing a pistol at Jones's head. Jones complied, and Stokes fled in Jones's vehicle. Stokes was charged with carjacking, armed robbery, and firearms offenses. At trial, Stokes presented several alibi witnesses. These witnesses generally testified that on the night of the carjacking, Stokes was at a "tattoo party" at a hair salon in Oak Park.4 The jury found Stokes guilty of carjacking and armed robbery, but acquitted Stokes of the firearms offenses. Stokes now appeals as of right.
Stokes argues that he is entitled to a new trial because a juror engaged in misconduct that denied him his right to a fair and impartial trial. We disagree. Stokes raised this issue in a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. 5 We review de novo a defendant's claim that he or she was denied the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.6
After the trial was complete, the attorneys and the judge interviewed the jurors. During this interview, one juror disclosed that he had conducted an experiment in his own home before deliberations were complete. This juror attempted to recreate the crime scene by pointing his own gun at a mirror. Although this juror did not share the results of the experiment with any other juror, Stokes argues that the experiment deprived him of a fair and impartial jury because the experiment influenced this single juror, who contributed to the verdict.
Consistent with a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury, "jurors may only consider the evidence that is presented to them in open court."7 "Where the jury considers extraneous facts not introduced in evidence, this deprives a defendant of his rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and assistance of counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment."8 To establish that the jury was influenced in a manner requiring reversal, a defendant must prove (1) that the jury was exposed to an extraneous influence, and (2) that this extraneous influence "created a real and substantial possibility that [it] could have affected the jury's verdict."9
In People v. Fletcher, this Court explained:
In Fletcher, the jurors collectively reenacted the crime scene in the jury room using the gun that the defendant had used to commit the crime.11 This Court found that the reenactment was not an extraneous influence because it "was closely intertwined with the deliberative process and was not premised on anything other than the jurors' collective account of the evidence presented in open court."12 Similarly, in this case, the juror's experiment was closely intertwined with his deliberative process. The juror's experiment was an attempt to recreate the crime scene, apparently aimed at discovering how the crime was committed. Nothing indicates that the experiment was premised on anything beyond this juror's memory of the testimony. Accordingly, the experiment was not an extraneous influence and cannot be a basis for attacking the jury's verdict.
Stokes relies on Doan v. Brigano13 for support. In Doan, a juror conducted an experiment in her home to determine if the defendant's testimony was truthful.14 The juror then shared the results of her experiment with the rest of the jury.15 The Sixth Circuit concluded that this experiment was an improper extraneous influence on the jury because by sharing the results of her experiment, the juror brought extraneous facts before the jury.16 The present case is distinguishable. The juror in the instant matter did not share the results of his experiment with any other jurors, and thus, no extraneous facts were brought into the jury room. Because the juror that conducted the experiment did not "testify" as an expert witness to the other jurors, the experiment did not amount to an extraneous influence.17 Accordingly, Stokes is not entitled to relief.
Stokes next argues that the prosecution violated the rule of Brady v. Maryland18 by failing to disclose various pieces of evidence. Stokes also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request access to Stokes's cell phone until the first day of trial. We disagree.
This Court reviews due process claims, such as allegations of a Brady violation, de novo.19 "Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law."20 A trial court's factual findings, if any, are reviewed for clear error.21 The ultimate question whether counsel was ineffective is a constitutional issue reviewed de novo.22
"A defendant has a due process right of access to certain information possessed by the prosecution."23 A Brady violation occurs if: "(1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material."24 25 "To establish materiality, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."26
Stokes argues that the prosecutor committed a Brady violation by failing to provide Stokes with access to his own cell phone. On the first day of trial, Stokes's counsel requested access to the cell phone in order to find contact information for the individual who prepared a flyer advertising the tattoo party. The prosecutor agreed to allow defense counsel to view the cell phone for this purpose. The following day, defense counsel acknowledged that she obtained the contact information from another source and that the witness was being interviewed. The same witness testified at trial.
Stokes's Brady claim fails for a variety of reasons. First, the record does not support Stokes's assertion that the cell phone was not provided to him. When Stokes requested access to the cell phone, the prosecutor offered to make it available. The record does not establish whether the cell phone was ever provided to Stokes. Stokes now asserts that the cell phone was lost by the police or the prosecutor and never provided to him. The only mention of the cell phone having been lost appears in a statement by defendant's appellate counsel during a hearing held in the trial court regarding Stokes's motion for a new trial. It appears that counsel, after reviewing the transcripts, simply assumed that the cell phone was lost when no mention of it was made after the first day of trial. We refuse to adopt this assumption, which has no apparent basis in the record. Stokes has not established that the prosecutor actually suppressed evidence.
Nor has Stokes satisfied the third prong by demonstrating that the cell phone contained material information that could have altered the outcome of the trial. To succeed on his claim, Stokes must demonstrate that the cell phone contained evidence that, had it been disclosed, would have been reasonably likely to lead to a different result.27 Stokes first argues that the cell phone contained contact information for the individual who prepared the flyer. However, Stokes obtained this information from another source, and the witness testified at trial. Stokes also argues that the cell phone contained a tracking program that could have shown his location on the night of the carjacking. However, Stokes provides no evidence of what information this tracking program would have provided, nor...
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