People v. Stone

Citation471 P.3d 1148
Decision Date13 February 2020
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals No. 15CA2076
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ryan Cole STONE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Colorado

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jud Lohnes, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE BERNARD

¶1 "Qui peccat ebrius, luat sobrius" means "[h]e who offends while drunk suffers punishment when sober." Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1043 (3d ed. 1969). This venerable Latin legal maxim is expressed in Colorado in section 18-1-804(1), C.R.S. 2019, which states that "[i]ntoxication of the accused is not a defense to a criminal charge ...."

¶2 There is an express exception to this general rule, which is found in section 18-1-804(3) : involuntary intoxication is an affirmative defense to a criminal charge. As an affirmative defense, involuntary intoxication does not "simply challenge the existence of an element of the offense, but [it] seek[s] to justify or mitigate the entire crime, and [is] therefore [a] complete defense[ ]." People v. Miller , 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005).

¶3 As is pertinent to our discussion, section 18-1-804(1), which we will shorten to "subsection (1)" for the rest of this opinion, does two other things.

¶4 First, subsection (1) states that a defendant may introduce evidence of voluntary, self-induced intoxication to "negative the existence" of specific intent. § 18-1-804(1). But such evidence does not create an affirmative defense. Miller , 113 P.3d at 750. Rather, this evidence only challenges the existence of an element of the crime, i.e., specific intent. See id. As a result, the introduction of such evidence establishes only a partial defense. See Brown v. People , 239 P.3d 764, 769 (Colo. 2010). "[V]oluntary intoxication is not a true element-negating defense because it is possible for an intoxicated person to form specific intent." People v. Lara , 224 P.3d 388, 394 n.4 (Colo. App. 2009), overruled on other grounds by People v. Pickering , 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011).

¶5 Second, by expressing the general rule that intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge, subsection (1) makes clear that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general intent crimes. People v. Vigil , 127 P.3d 916, 930-31 (Colo. 2006). To phrase this concept differently, evidence of voluntary intoxication "is incompetent as a defense to general intent crimes," People v. Low , 732 P.2d 622, 628 (Colo. 1987), and "[i]t is the settled law of [Colorado] that evidence of self-induced intoxication is not admissible to negate the culpability element of ‘knowingly,’ " People v. Aragon , 653 P.2d 715, 719 (Colo. 1982).

¶6 The rationale for barring defendants from introducing evidence of voluntary, self-induced intoxication to negate general intent arises from a recognition that "voluntary impairment of one's mental faculties with knowledge that the resulting condition is a source of potential danger to others" involves "moral blameworthiness." Hendershott v. People , 653 P.2d 385, 396 (Colo. 1982). Indeed, "[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that the excessive use of liquor or drugs impairs the perceptual, judgmental and volitional faculties of the user." Id. ¶7 Subsection (1)’s distinction between specific intent and general intent crimes is not new. In fact, in 1906, our supreme court observed that the common law "uniformly held that drunkenness is not an excuse for crime." Brennan v. People , 37 Colo. 256, 261, 86 P. 79, 81 (1906). But, if the mental state for a crime was "willful, deliberate, and premeditated," evidence of intoxication was "a material and necessary subject of consideration by the jury whether the accused [was] in such condition of mind by reason of drunkenness ... to be capable of deliberation and premeditation." Id. at 262, 86 P. at 81.

¶8 In the course of appealing a judgment of conviction, defendant, Ryan Cole Stone, submits that subsection (1) is unconstitutional. He says that it violates his due process rights because it is "an evidentiary rule" that prohibited him "from presenting reliable and relevant evidence to contest his guilt," and that it is unconstitutional as applied because it "preclude[d]" him from introducing evidence of voluntary intoxication where general intent crimes are charged." He adds that the trial court should not have instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication was not a defense to these general intent crimes. We disagree with both contentions, so we affirm. (In a separate appeal, we address defendant's contentions concerning a restitution order. See People v. Stone , 2020 COA 24, 471 P.3d 1159.)

I. Background

¶9 A group of firefighters found defendant wandering the streets and agreed to give him a ride. He asked them to drop him off at a "warming" station. They instead let him out at a gas station.

¶10 Outside the gas station, he found a parked car. Its engine was running, and a four-year-old boy was in the back seat.

¶11 Defendant got in the car and drove it away. Police officers located the stolen car, and they followed it. After leading them on a high-speed chase, defendant abandoned the car. He commandeered a second car, and the chase continued.

¶12 The officers deployed "stop sticks" — sticks with spikes on them designed to puncture a car's tires to disable it — but defendant swerved around them, driving onto the shoulder of the road. In doing so, he hit an officer with the car, causing him serious injuries.

¶13 Defendant continued driving, eventually abandoning the second car and hijacking a third one. His subsequent attempt to steal a fourth car was thwarted, so he ran off. The officers finally caught up with him, and they arrested him.

¶14 The prosecution charged him with several general intent crimes. See § 18-1-501(6), C.R.S. 2019 (stating that offenses using "knowingly" are "general intent crimes"). The prosecution also charged him with theft, which contained an element of specific intent. § 18-1-501(5) (stating that offenses using "intentionally" and "with intent" are "specific intent offenses").

¶15 Before trial, defendant raised the defense of "voluntary intoxication," and he said that he would present the testimony of two expert witnesses. The prosecution asked the trial court to bar defendant from raising the voluntary intoxication defense.

¶16 At a motions hearing, defendant contended that he should be allowed to present "any information that tends to negate an element of the crime," including evidence of voluntary intoxication. The prosecutor asserted that subsection (1) prohibited him from using voluntary intoxication as a defense to a general intent crime.

¶17 The trial court agreed with the prosecutor. It concluded that, "[i]f there are no specific intent crimes listed, then the defense is not entitled to present any evidence as it relates to intoxication because it's simply not relevant." After this ruling, the prosecutor asked the court to dismiss a count of theft, the only specific intent crime that the prosecution had charged. The court granted the request.

¶18 Defendant asked the court to reconsider its ruling barring him from introducing evidence that he was intoxicated at the time of the crimes. He argued that the ruling violated his due process rights for reasons that we describe in more detail below. The court denied this request.

¶19 The jury convicted defendant of attempted manslaughter, first degree assault, vehicular eluding, criminal mischief, six counts of leaving the scene of an accident, two counts of robbery, two counts of child abuse, and three counts of aggravated motor vehicle theft.

II. Constitutionality of the Voluntary Intoxication Statute

¶20 Defendant contends that subsection (1) is unconstitutional because it (1) lightens the prosecution's burden to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) prevents a defendant from presenting a complete defense. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and General Legal Principles

¶21 Defendant's contention requires us to interpret section 18-1-804. Our review is de novo. People v. Jenkins , 2013 COA 76, ¶ 12, 305 P.3d 420.

¶22 When we interpret a statute, we must determine and effectuate the legislature's intent. Colo. Dep't of Revenue v. Creager Mercantile Co. , 2017 CO 41M, ¶ 16, 395 P.3d 741. "We construe the entire statutory scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all [of its] parts," and "[w]e give effect to words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning[s]." Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter , 255 P.3d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 2011). If a statute's language is clear, we apply it as written. Id.

¶23 We also review de novo the constitutionality of a statute. Dean v. People , 2016 CO 14, ¶ 8, 366 P.3d 593. Because we presume a statute to be constitutional, the challenging party must prove that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

B. Montana v. Egelhoff

¶24 Relying on Montana v. Egelhoff , 518 U.S. 37, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996), defendant asserts that subsection (1) is unconstitutional because it constitutes an evidentiary rule that prohibits a defendant from presenting relevant and exculpatory evidence. In Egelhoff , the prosecution charged the defendant with "deliberate homicide, a crime defined by Montana law as ‘purposely’ or ‘knowingly’ causing the death of another human being." Id. at 40, 116 S.Ct. 2013 (opinion of Scalia, J.)(quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102 (1995)). Montana's intoxication statute provides that "an intoxicated condition is not a defense to any offense and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of the offense." Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-203 (West 2019). The court at the defendant's trial allowed him to present evidence of his intoxication, but it...

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1 cases
  • People v. Le
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Colorado
    • March 17, 2022
    ...authority. However, because Le failed to raise these claims below, we decline to address them. See People v. Stone , 2020 COA 23, ¶ 47, 471 P.3d 1148 (The defendant "did not preserve this issue in the trial court, so we will not address it."). Moreover, that the Department has an alternativ......
2 books & journal articles
  • § 24.03 Voluntary Intoxication: Mens Rea
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2022 Title Chapter 24 Intoxication
    • Invalid date
    ...answer should be that D is not guilty of robbery and, therefore, is not guilty of felony-murder.54 --------Notes:[27] People v. Stone, 471 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Colo. App. 2020). See § 16.02, supra, for a definition of a "failure-of-proof" defense.[28] Mowery v. State, 247 P.3d 866, 872 (Wyo. 20......
  • § 24.01 Intoxication and the Criminal Law: An Overview
    • United States
    • Carolina Academic Press Understanding Criminal Law (CAP) 2022 Title Chapter 24 Intoxication
    • Invalid date
    ...soon to go the way of the dinosaur").[5] Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1043 (3d ed. 1969), and quoted recently in People v. Stone, 471 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Colo. App. 2020). See also Regina v. Sheehan & Moore, 1 WLR 739, 744 (1975) ("A drunken intent is nevertheless an intent.").[6] See § 24.06[B......

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