People v. Stoudemire
Decision Date | 21 December 1987 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 75907 |
Citation | 429 Mich. 262,414 N.W.2d 693 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wesley Jerome STOUDEMIRE, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Brian E. Thiede, Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Joe Filip, * Pros. Atty., and Jerrold E. Schrotenboer, * Asst. Pros. Attys., Jackson, for the People.
William Worth, Jr., Jackson, for defendant-appellant.
The habitual offender statute provides escalating penalties for persons repeatedly convicted of felonies. 1 A life sentence may be imposed on a fourth-felony offender where the fourth felony is punishable by a term of five years or more. The question presented is whether Stoudemire was properly charged as an habitual offender with three prior convictions where the three convictions arose out of a single transaction. We hold that he could only be charged as a second offender, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand for trial on the principal charge and a supplemental information charging that he was convicted but one previous time.
Stoudemire was originally charged with assaulting a prison guard 2 and as a fourth offender under the habitual offender statute. 3 The three prior convictions set forth in the supplemental information were for breaking and entering, unarmed robbery, and criminal sexual conduct, and arose out of a single transaction, and a single trial and sentencing.
Stoudemire moved to dismiss the supplemental information, arguing that because the three prior felony convictions arose out of a single transaction, they should count as only one "conviction" under the habitual offender statute. Therefore, Stoudemire argued, any supplemental information should have charged him as only a second offender. 4 The trial court denied Stoudemire's motion, and Stoudemire thereafter pled guilty to the principal charge in exchange for dismissal of the habitual offender charge. Stoudemire subsequently appealed his plea-based conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed, 140 Mich.App. 687, 365 N.W.2d 214.
Legislative purpose is the lodestar of statutory construction. 5 This Court has said:
People v. Gilbert, 414 Mich. 191, 200, 324 N.W.2d 834 (1982).
" 'The particular inquiry is not what is the abstract force of the words or what they may comprehend, but in what sense were they intended to be understood or what understanding do they convey as used in the particular act.' " People v. Lynch, 410 Mich. 343, 354, 301 N.W.2d 796 (1981). 6
In Wymer v. Holmes, 429 Mich. 66, 76, 412 N.W.2d 213 (1987), this Court, discussing "plain meaning," said that
Once legislative intent is discerned, it must be given effect, even if doing so might appear to conflict with the letter of the statute. " '[A] thing which is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, although not within the letter; and a thing within the letter is not within the statute, unless within the intention.' " Council # 23 v. Oakland Co., 409 Mich. 299, 319, 294 N.W.2d 578 (1980). 7
In this case, the legislative history of the statute indicates that the Legislature, by using the phrase "after having been three times convicted," intended that the fourth-offender penalties reach only incorrigible criminals who had failed three separate times to reform--who had been convicted three separate times where the last two convictions were for crimes committed after the prior conviction. The Legislature used the phrase "after having been three times convicted" as shorthand.
When the Legislature uses a shorthand expression, legislative intent controls over an arguably literal reading of the statute inconsistent with that intent. As this Court stated in Elba Twp. v. Gratiot Co., 287 Mich. 372, 394, 283 N.W. 615 (1939), where it encountered a similar question of statutory construction:
8
The habitual offender provisions were first enacted as part of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1927, 9 and adopted in toto the language of New York's habitual offender statute. 10
The author of the New York statute, State Senator Caleb Baumes, 11 aimed the act's escalating penalties--and in particular the mandatory life sentence imposed in the original enactment on fourth offenders--at the professional criminal, the hard-core recidivist who had been repeatedly tried, convicted, and sentenced, and who committed yet another crime. Senator Baumes said:
Baumes, The Baumes laws and legislative program in New York, 52 ABA Rep. 511, 521 (1927). (Emphasis added.)
New York courts have construed the Baumes Act in accordance with Senator Baumes' intent. In People v. Spellman, 136 Misc. 25, 242 N.Y.S. 68 (1930), the court declared that multiple convictions on the same day constitute only one "conviction" for purposes of the habitual offender statute. Spellman was convicted of burglary in 1922. Subsequently, on January 19, 1924, he pled guilty to seven indictments for burglary and grand larceny. After his release from prison, he was again convicted of burglary, and the state charged him as a fourth offender under the habitual offender statute. The court held that the seven same-day convictions constituted only one habitual offender "conviction," and that therefore Spellman could be charged only as a third offender. Before his most recent arrest, Spellman had had only two, not three, opportunities to reform:
Spellman, supra, at p. 29, 242 N.Y.S. 68. 14
Construing the Michigan statute in 1929, this Court echoed Senator Baumes and the New York courts:
People v. Palm, 245 Mich. 396, 401, 223 N.W. 67 (1929). 15 (Emphasis added.)
By borrowing New York's statute in its entirety, the Legislature indicated that it was motivated by the same purpose that underlay the New York statute. The Legislature intended that the habitual offender statute's fourth-felony provision, like the parallel provision in the New York statute, should apply only to a person who had had three opportunities to reform--who had been convicted and sentenced and then subsequently committed another felony for which he was also convicted and sentenced, and then subsequent to the second conviction committed yet another felony, for which he was again convicted and sentenced. Upon this person's conviction for yet a fourth felony, he would be subject to the habitual offender act's fourth-felony provision. He would be subject to mandatory life imprisonment because he had three times failed to reform, "because of the apparent persistence in the commission of crime by the person convicted and his indifference to the laws...."
Stoudemire had one opportunity to reform before he was charged as a fourth-felony offender. Before the assault in the instant case, Stoudemire had been tried and sentenced but once. He could only have been charged as a second offender. 16 To deem Stoudemire a fourth-felony offender, subject to the most severe habitual offender penalties, would be contrary to the legislative purpose of applying the fourth-felony offender penalties against only those persons who, after failing three separate opportunities to reform, were deemed incorrigible criminals.
It is appropriate to infer legislative intent from the purpose of similar statutes enacted in other...
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