People v. Stribel
Decision Date | 31 March 1980 |
Docket Number | No. C-1745,C-1745 |
Citation | 609 P.2d 113,199 Colo. 377 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado and City of Aurora, Petitioner, v. Dale Eugene STRIBEL, Respondent. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
William R. Sprague, Claybourne M. Douglas, Aurora, for petitioner.
David Burnell Smith, Littleton, for respondent.
We granted certiorari to consider whether the record of a police car speedometer calibration test was admissible in the prosecution of Respondent by the City of Aurora (City) for speeding. The trial judge in Aurora Municipal Court admitted the calibration card, but on appeal, the District Court of Adams County held that the record of the calibration test was inadmissible hearsay. We reverse.
Respondent, Dale Stribel, was charged with speeding in Aurora, Colorado. Police Officer Parris Bradley testified that the posted speed limit was 30 miles per hour (m.p.h.) and that the speedometer on his patrol car read 48 m.p.h. as he followed the Respondent at a uniform distance and speed. A comparison of the speedometer reading with the calibration card for the patrol car showed that the speed of the patrol car actually was 46 m.p.h.
At the trial, Mark Harris, Parking Control Officer for the City, testified that he saw James Rowledge, a mechanic in the Aurora Shops, take calibration readings for the patrol car and note them on a calibration card. Rowledge signed the card and gave it to Harris, who countersigned. Harris kept the original card in a locked filing cabinet and put a copy in the patrol car.
Based on Harris' testimony, the City offered in evidence the record of the calibration test to prove the accuracy of Officer Bradley's determination of the Respondent's speed. The Respondent objected, arguing that the admission of the record was hearsay, and as such, it should be excluded from evidence because of the lack of opportunity for the Respondent to test, by cross-examination, the accuracy of the calibration test. 1 The objection was overruled by the municipal court, but the district court held that the test was not admissible under either the business records exception or the official governmental records exception to the hearsay rule. 2
The City argues that the record is admissible under both the official records 3 and business records exceptions to the hearsay rule. The record in this case is not sufficient for us to determine whether the calibration card is an official City record. Therefore, we turn to the business records exception.
The business records exception, Crim.P. 26.2, provides in part:
Crim.P. 26.2 permits the admission of business records which ordinarily would be excluded as hearsay in criminal cases. The issue presented here is whether the records of the police department may be considered as business records.
Crim.P. 26.2(c) defines "business" to include "business, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind." The rule does not indicate whether governmental activity is included in the definition of "business." The Hawaii Supreme Court held that a statutory exception for business records which does not specify governmental activity (Haw.Rev.Stat. section 622-5 (1976)) does include the records of government agencies. State v. Ing, 53 Hawaii 466, 497 P.2d 575 (1972). 4 This case indicates a recent trend expanding the definition of "business" for the exception. Not-for-profit institutions such as schools and hospitals now generally are included within the exception. (See Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) and CRE 803(6) which include "institution" and "association . . . whether or not conducted for profit" within the business records exception.) Thus, the trustworthiness of the business record is based upon its nature as a routine entry in the ordinary operations of the enterprise and not upon the nature of the enterprise. We therefore hold that activities of government agencies may be considered business records for purposes of Rule 26.2 if the other requirements of the rule are met and the proper foundation is laid. 5 (See Fed.R.Evid. 803(6), Note of Advisory Committee which contemplates that a police officer's report will be included within the exception if the other requirements of the rule are met.)
Often, however, police records are held inadmissible for failure to comply with the business records exception because the records are "accident reports." See Layne v. Hartung, 87...
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...Colorado case law, however, has taken a less technical approach to the business records exception. See generally People v. Stribel, 199 Colo. 377, 609 P.2d 113 (1980); Empire Diesel, Inc. v. Brown, 146 Colo. 477, 361 P.2d 964 (1961); Rocky Mountain Beverage, Inc. v. Walter Brewing Co., 107 ......
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