People v. Stringfield

Decision Date03 October 1962
Docket NumberGen. No. 48686
Citation37 Ill.App.2d 344,185 N.E.2d 381
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald G. STRINGFIELD, Defendant-Appellant. CITY OF CHICAGO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald G. STRINGFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Raymond L. Jones, Chicago, for appellant.

Daniel P. Ward, Chicago, for appellee.

DEMPSEY, Presiding Justice.

Ronald Stringfield was found guilty of driving while under the influence of liquor and of following too closely the vehicle in front of him under the prevailing traffic conditions. The consolidated cases were tried without a jury. The court fined him $106.00 and revoked his driver's license on the first charge and fined him $25.00 on the second charge.

Stringfield, an employee of a cement contractor, was returning from work about 5:00 p. m. on March 31, 1961. As he approached Clybourn and Wellington Avenues, Chicago, the truck he was driving collided with the automobile driven by Martin Bruchhauser, who had stopped at the intersection because of a red traffic light. Bruchhauser and a policeman who was called to the scene testified that in their opinion Stringfield was intoxicated. Bruchhauser's opinion was based on his observation of the defendant; the officer's on observation and also on tests which he gave at the police station. Another officer administered a 'breathalyzer' test and testified that the result showed '.170.' In his direct examination he did not relate this test to the alcoholic content of the defendant's blood stream, but after being pressed on cross-examination he finally did so. The result of this test itself raised a presumption of intoxication. Ill.Rev.Stat. (1961), ch. 95 1/2, sec. 144(b), par. 3.

The defendant said he had nothing to drink since lunch time, when he had two bottles of beer. He explained that he saw the auto 100 feet ahead, applied his brakes, but they failed to hold; he then shifted through four gears from high to low but the truck still did not stop and was going four to five miles per hour when it hit the auto. It was stipulated that the man who was in the truck with him and three other fellow employees would testify substantially as did the defendant.

While the evidence was sufficient to justify the finding of guilty for driving while under the influence of liquor, the information upon which the prosecution was predicated is attacked in this court as not charging a criminal offense. If an information is void the error can be challenged for the first time in a court of review even if no preliminary motion to quash or in arrest of judgment has been made. People v. Sowrd, 370 Ill. 140, 18 N.E.2d 176, 119 A.L.R. 1396; People v. Green, 368 Ill. 242, 13 N.E.2d 278, 115 A.L.R. 348; People v. Fain, 30 Ill.App.2d 270, 173 N.E.2d 825.

A copy of the information had been given to the defendant. It stated that he drove a motor vehicle upon a public highway in violation of section 47 (U.A.R.T.) State of Illinois by 'driving under the influence.' This section of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Ill.Rev.Stat. (1961), ch. 95 1/2, sec. 144) states that it is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive any vehicle within this state. 'Driving under the influence' does not describe either of these offenses. Later, the record does not show when, the words 'of alcohol' were added to the original information. Still later, after the post-trial motion, there was rubber stamped upon the information: 'driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.' The defendant's attorney filed his own affidavit in conjunction with his post-trial motion in which he swore that the words 'of alcohol' were neither in the original information nor in the information at the time of the trial. He moved that they be stricken. The court denied this motion. A second motion was subsequently made which asserted that the rubber stamp had been added to the information after the insufficiency of the charge had been argued in the post-trial motion. The court sustained this motion and corrected the record by ordering the stamped words stricken.

Someone realized that the charge as originally drafted was inadequate and twice strove to strengthen it. Some time between the arrest and the post-trial motion the information was changed to incorporate the words 'of alcohol.' They were written in a different handwriting than the balance of the charge and at first were placed after the address where the accident took place. They were then crossed out and the words were reinserted after the word 'influence.'

If the alteration was not made before or during the trial, the defendant was tried and convicted of 'driving under the influence,' without the specification of whether 'the influence' was that of intoxicating liquor or of narcotics. The lack of this specification made the information defective. If the alteration was made before or during the trial, the defendant was tried and convicted of 'driving under the influence of alcohol' a charge which, although not in the precise words of the statute, would have adequately informed the defendant of the offense of which he was accused. However, the record does not show when the change was made and the defendant's c...

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24 cases
  • City of Chicago v. Berg
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 7 May 1964
    ...the People of the State of Illinois.' This was a fundamental error which rendered the complaint void ab initio. In People v. Stringfield, 37 Ill.App.2d 344, 185 N.E.2d 381, this court 'Actions for violations of ordinances must be brought in the corporate name of the municipality and prosecu......
  • People v. McClurg, 4-89-0692
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 8 March 1990
    ...Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 95 1/2, § 144 (1965) by 'driving under the influence.' In People v. Stringfield (1962), 37 Ill.App.2d 344, 346 this court 'This section of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Ill.Rev.Stat. (1961), c[h.] 95 1/2, § 144) states......
  • Savage v. Blancett
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 27 April 1964
    ...that intersection.' Under these cricumstances, we do not feel that it was error to refuse this instruction. In People v. Stringfield, 37 Ill.App.2d 344, 185 N.E.2d 381, the court held that the evidence did not support a conviction for violation of a city ordinance which prohibited following......
  • People v. Hill
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 3 February 1966
    ... ... Ill.Rev.Stat., 1963, ch. 38, sec. 114--2(a) ...         If a criminal complaint is void it can be challenged at any time and if need be, for the first time in a court of review. People v. Green, 368 Ill. 242, 13 N.E.2d 278, 115 A.L.R. 348 (1938); People v. Stringfield, 37 Ill.App.2d 344, 185 N.E.2d 381 (1962). In People v. Fore, 384 Ill. 455, 51 N.E.2d 548 (1943) the court said that where an indictment does not charge an offense the judgment of conviction must be reversed notwithstanding the fact that the point was not raised in the trial court, ... '* * * as ... ...
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