People v. Strodder
| Decision Date | 27 May 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 11,11 |
| Citation | 394 Mich. 193,229 N.W.2d 318 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mandric STRODDER, Defendant-Appellant. 394 Mich. 193, 229 N.W.2d 318 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Robert F. Leonard, Pros. Atty., Genesee County, Flint, by Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Appellate Div., Joel B. Saxe, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
State Appellate Defender Office, by Dennis H. Benson, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Before the Entire Bench.
On September 28, 1970, an employee of a Flint baking company reported to the police that a van was illegally parked in the company's parking lot. The police came to investigate and found the defendant's wallet in the van as well as a palm print later shown to be that of the defendant. At the trial the baking company employee identified the defendant as the man he had observed in the van going through a lady's purse subsequently identified as belonging to Sally Ann Wright.
Sally Ann Wright's body was found in the Flint river near a site described by defendant to his mother. This site was some distance from the place where the van had been parked. It was established that Sally Ann Wright had been driving the van on the day of her death.
Defendant's mother testified that on the day of the crime her son came home and told her that he had raped and killed a woman and that he had thrown the body in the river and that he had left the van in the baking company's parking lot. She testified that the defendant asked her to help find his wallet which he had lost. After riding past the lot where the van had been abandoned and finding the police already there, defendant asked his mother to drive to the site where the body had been thrown into the river in the hope that he could recover his wallet there. Defendant's mother persuaded him to see their family attorney and then took him to a psychiatric clinic where defendant had been undergoing preliminary interviewing and testing. 1
Through arrangements made by defendant's mother, defendant was met and arrested by police at the psychiatric clinic.
At the beginning of the trial defendant and his appointed attorney, William J. Hayes, had some disagreement over the fact that defendant wanted to waive a jury and Attorney Hayes did not. Defendant requested different counsel, additionally complaining that he had been in jail approximately 109 days and had not seen his attorney until just a few minutes prior to trial. Attorney Hayes explained that he had not visited defendant because he had prepared his insanity defense by having weekly meetings with defendant's mother. After a recess, the court convened again and the defendant executed a written waiver of jury trial and the court denied defense counsel's request to withdraw since the event precipitating the dissatisfaction was no longer operative.
The next day defendant again expressed his displeasure with appointed counsel. The court abided by its earlier ruling denying defendant's request that appointed counsel be withdrawn. However, as the trial progressed, defendant expressed his complete satisfaction with Mr. Hayes.
The trial proceeded without incident until the conclusion of the plaintiff's proofs. At that time the defense began to establish a new theory of defense. This theory, as it later developed, was that the victim's husband, a probation officer, for a monetary consideration and a promise to effect a deal whereby defendant Strodder would receive no more than a four-year sentence for the rape charge for which he was awaiting trial and this crime, induced defendant Strodder to assume responsibility for this murder and leave sufficient identification about (print and wallet) whereby he would be apprehended.
Defense attorney Hayes dramatically called the victim's husband to the stand and accused him of murdering his wife. Mr. Hayes then demanded:
Mr. Hayes continued:
'He's willing to live in this society as a free man if the people of the State of Michigan are willing to pick up his expenses for the rest of his natural life. Is that right Mr. Strodder?
'THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.'
When the trial court refused to accede to these requests, defense attorney and defendant refused to have anything to do with the proceedings and the court adjourned. The next day, June 29, 1971, the court appointed Mr. Ivor Jones, co-counsel for defendant Strodder, at the same time indicating that the court would entertain a motion for mistrial. Defendant said that he wanted Mr. Hayes to continue as his attorney and after the judge expressed his doubts about Mr. Hayes's sanity stated that he did not think it necessary that Mr. Hayes submit to psychiatric examination. The court agreed to adjourn the trial for a week in order to give Attorney Jones a chance to familiarize himself with the case.
The court arranged to have a psychiatrist observe defense counsel at trial. The psychiatrist testified that in his opinion defense counsel was able to perform his duty. The court later read into the record a letter from Attorney Hayes's personal physician indicating, . The last comment referred to a physical condition for which Mr. Hayes was being treated.
Throughout the balance of the trial, defense counsel was incredibly abusive to the trial judge, the prosecutor, and other public officials, but the trial judge said that he believed he could freely try the facts and issues without prejudice to either side. Defense counsel Hayes, at the conclusion of the trial, apologized for his attacks on the judge and expressed his confidence that the judge would make an honest decision.
The trial judge, exhibiting unusual patience, repeatedly offered defendant the opportunity to move for mistrial, all of which offers were declined by defendant and his attorney, indicating a complete willingness to proceed to judgment with Judge Elliott.
The judge found the defendant guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
We have carefully considered each of the matters urged on appeal.
They were all considered by the Court of Appeals, and without expressly approving that court's treatment of the various issues, we are not disposed to say their holdings were erroneous in any particular.
Nonetheless from our examination of the entire record we are left with the abiding conviction that the procedure followed here did not accord the defendant a fair trial.
For this reason, without impugning the ability, integrity or good will of the prosecutor, trial judge or Court of Appeals we reverse the conviction and order a new trial, pursuant to GCR 1963, 865.1(7).
SWAINSON, J., not participating.
WILLIAMS, Justice (To Reverse).
The issue in this first degree murder case is whether defendant was deprived of a fair trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel failed to see his client during the 109 days preceding trial, failed to interview or call probably important witnesses, failed to perfect an available insanity defense, concocted an irrational defense, and conducted himself in a bizarre if not contemptuous manner.
This opinion would reverse because of ineffective counsel for failure of adequate competence and adequate diligence to assure a fair trial.
The facts of the instant case indicate the trial judge exhibited unusual patience and heroically attempted to try the facts and issues without prejudice to either side in the midst of a series of amazing attacks on his credibility and honesty. On the other hand, defense counsel abruptly changed course in mid-stream, and instead of presenting a planned insanity defense, dramatically attempted to pin the crime on the victim's husband, during the course of which he was irrational and abusive of the judge.
Defendant Strodder, who was undergoing psychiatric interviewing and testing pending his trial on a rape charge, was arrested and charged with raping and killing another woman in 1970.
Strodder was represented by appointed counsel William Hayes during a competency hearing, the preliminary examination and trial. Hayes filed notice of his intention to use the defense of insanity and indicated he would use only one witness. 1
Almost as soon as trial began, defendant objected that he was not prepared as he had not seen his attorney during the approximately 109 days preceding the opening of trial.
Counsel contended he had been having weekly conferences with defendant's mother concerning the case, and had used that information to prepare the insanity defense. 2 Counsel also noted that defendant had made no request to see him at the preliminary examination.
However, later on at trial, Hayes admitted that he had not seen his client because he was afraid of him.
(153a) (Mr. Black was the prosecutor.)
Still later, he also admitted that the lack of contact may have adversely affected his client's case.
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