People v. Stropoli

• Decision Date: 04 September 1986
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 2-85-0262
• Parties: , 100 Ill.Dec. 314 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Michael W. STROPOLI, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 194

497 N.E.2d 194

146 Ill.App.3d 667, 100 Ill.Dec. 314

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Michael W. STROPOLI, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 2-85-0262.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

Sept. 4, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 25, 1986.

Edward T. Graham, Wheaton, for defendant-appellant.

James E. Ryan, DuPage Co. State's Atty., Wheaton, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Atty. Appellate Service Com'n, Springfield, William L. Browers, Deputy Director, Andrea Becker, Staff Atty., State's Atty. Appellate Service Com'n, Elgin, for plaintiff-appellee.

Presiding Justice NASH delivered the opinion of the court:

After a jury trial defendant, Michael W. Stropoli, was convicted of reckless driving (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-503) and sentenced to six months of court supervision and fined $50. He appeals, contending (1) the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to charge the necessary elements of reckless driving; (2) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) the court erred in refusing to give defendant's tendered jury instructions; and (4) the court violated defendant's right to be present at all proceedings when it responded to jury questions outside the presence of defendant and his counsel.

On October 11, 1984, defendant, a 17-year-old high school student, was driving his father's automobile westbound on Raven Lane when he approached a dead end intersection with Thrasher Drive in a residential subdivision of Bloomingdale, Illinois. Mrs. Janice Schumacher, who was doing yardwork outside her home, located at the southeast corner of the intersection, heard defendant's tires squealing and then saw defendant stop at the intersection. Cora Schumacher, her 3 1/2-year-old daughter, was standing on a neighbor's front lawn on the northeast corner of the intersection approximately 10 feet north of Raven Lane.

Mrs. Schumacher testified defendant backed up a distance of approximately six car lengths at a fast rate while squealing his tires. Defendant then drove forward and made a wide right turn onto Thrasher Drive, again squealing his tires. While making the turn onto Thrasher Drive defendant's vehicle occupied a major portion of the road and the vehicle's left rear end slid or "fishtailed" as it turned the corner, causing the front end of the car to aim toward the child. Defendant then straightened the car and proceeded down Thrasher Drive. Mrs. Schumacher notified the Bloomingdale police, who arrested defendant shortly thereafter.

Defendant testified that as he approached the intersection at 20 mph, he observed the child standing on the property to his right and stopped. He then backed up one car length, made a wide turn onto Thrasher Drive to avoid losing sight of the child, and proceeded northbound. Although defendant admitted the car wheels squealed, he denied the car fishtailed or pointed at the child.

Gerald Stropoli, defendant's father, testified the vehicle was equipped with a high performance differential, causing the wheels to rotate quickly and squeal when the vehicle is accelerating.

Officer Carolyn Vallas of the Bloomingdale Police Force testified the streets in that area of Bloomingdale have neither curbs nor sidewalks, but are bounded only by a small amount of gravel and the neighboring lawns. The blacktop streets have no lane markings and are approximately 20 to 25 feet across. The speed limit in that area is 25 mph. Vallas stated defendant told her he had been driving 30 mph on Raven Lane.

Prior to trial, defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to set forth a sufficient factual basis was denied by the court. The court also refused to submit jury instructions tendered by defendant which defined "willful and wanton conduct" and required the jury to conclude defendant's conduct constituted a "gross deviation" from the reasonable standard of care in order to find him guilty. During deliberations, the jury requested a legal definition of "wanton" and a dictionary. The court refused the requests without consulting or communicating with defendant or his counsel. After deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty and the court sentenced him to six months of court supervision and imposed a $50 fine. Defendant appeals.

Defendant first contends the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the complaint because it failed to charge the necessary elements of the offense of reckless driving as required by section 111-3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 111-3(a)). The purpose of section 111-3(a) is to inform the accused of the nature and elements of the offense against him so that he may prepare his defense and protect himself from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. (People v. Smith (1984), 99 Ill.2d 467, 471, 77 Ill.Dec. 108, 459 N.E.2d 1357; People v. Thompson (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 665, 672, 80 Ill.Dec. 928, 466 N.E.2d 380, appeal denied; People v. Puleo (1981), 96 Ill.App.3d 457, 463, 51 Ill.Dec. 859, 421 N.E.2d 367.)

The offense of reckless driving is committed when one "drives any vehicle with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-503(a).) Neither intoxication nor actual damage to persons or property are necessary elements of the offense. People v. Cox (1985), 130 Ill.App.3d 1073, 1078, 86 Ill.Dec. 251, 475 N.E.2d 248; People v. Tuell (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 849, 852, 53 Ill.Dec. 285, 423 N.E.2d 954.

The complaint at issue here charged:

"Reckless driving in violation of Section 11-503(a) of Chapter 95 1/2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes of said State, in this to wit; that the said defendant drove a motor vehicle, a 1984, blue, chevrolet, IL, 85, LY7457, with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons, specifically, Cora B. Schumacher, age 3 yrs., and property, in that Michael W. Stropoli drove his vehicle W/B on Raven Lane approaching Thrasher Lane at a high rate of speed. [He] drove the vehicle in reverse at a high rate of speed, squealing the tires, and then drove forward at a high rate of speed onto N/B Thrasher and driving in wrong lane."

Defendant argues the complaint is fatally defective because it fails to identify what property was threatened or define how his conduct threatened the safety of Cora Schumacher or such property.

Although it is true the precise property threatened and the manner in which defendant's conduct threatened the safety of Cora Schumacher or such property are not particularized in the complaint, these details are not necessary to satisfy the requirements of section 111-3(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 111-3(a)). The test is whether, by the language used, a defendant is "apprised with reasonable certainty of the precise offense with which he or she is charged." (People v. Graves (1982), 107 Ill.App.3d 449, 455, 63 Ill.Dec. 217, 437 N.E.2d 866; People v. Miles (1981), 96 Ill.App.3d 721, 725, 52 Ill.Dec. 324, 422 N.E.2d 5.) The complaint here adequately informed defendant of the time, place and manner of his conduct which constituted the basis of the charge of reckless driving. The State is under no obligation to itemize each act of the accused surrounding the commission of the offense, but must merely allege all the necessary elements of the offense. People v. Smith (1983), 112 Ill.App.3d 1033, 1036, 68 Ill.Dec. 526, 446 N.E.2d 260, aff'd (1984), 99 Ill.2d 467, 77 Ill.Dec. 108, 459 N.E.2d 1357; Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 111-3(a).

Defendant cites People v. Johnson (1975), 30 Ill.App.3d 974; 333 N.E.2d 258, for the proposition that a charge of reckless driving requires the presence of "aggravated circumstances which reasonably could be construed to endanger life or property * * * " (30 Ill.App.3d 974, 976, 333 N.E.2d 258). However, that case involved the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; the court did not find it necessary to discuss the sufficiency of the complaint. Moreover, unlike the complaint in Johnson, the present complaint specifically alleged the presence of a young child in the immediate vicinity which formed the basis of the charge.

We conclude the complaint adequately informed defendant with reasonable certainty of the necessary elements of the specific offense with which he was charged such that he was able to prepare his defense and protect himself against subsequent prosecution. See People v. Parr (1970), 130 Ill.App.2d 212, 264 N.E.2d 850.

Defendant also contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, arguing that the State failed to show his conduct actually endangered or threatened the safety of Cora Schumacher or any property.

From our review of the record, we find there was sufficient evidence to prove defendant's conduct threatened the safety of Cora Schumacher and the nearby residential property. Mrs. Schumacher testified defendant rapidly backed his vehicle six car lengths for no apparent reason, squealing his tires in the process. He then made a wide turn around the corner at a fast rate, causing the car to "fishtail" to the left and take up a major portion of the road. A result of defendant's conduct was that the vehicle pointed directly at Cora Schumacher, a 3 1/2-year-old child. Although defendant disputes this version of the facts, the credibility of witnesses is uniquely a matter for the trier of fact to determine and its judgment will not be set aside lightly. (People v. Pittman (1982), 93 Ill.2d 169, 175, 66 Ill.Dec. 275, 442 N.E.2d 836; People v. Bergman (1984), 121 Ill.App.3d 100, 107, 76 Ill.Dec. 570, 458 N.E.2d 1370,appeal denied.) A jury's verdict of guilty will not be disturbed unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. (People v. Holloway (1985), 131...