People v. Sturgess, 1-04-2191.

• Decision Date: 02 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 1-04-2191.,1-04-2191.
• Citation: 845 N.E.2d 741
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Catherine STURGESS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 741

845 N.E.2d 741

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Catherine STURGESS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-04-2191.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

March 2, 2006.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago (Kerry Goettsch, Assistant Appellate Defender), for Appellant.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Marie Quinlivan Czech, Stephanie A. Buck, of counsel), for Appellee.

Justice GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Catherine Sturgess appeals her convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident, as well as her sentence to two years' conditional discharge and fine of $2,500. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Defendant was arrested and charged with the aforementioned offenses on August 18, 2002. Prior to trial, she filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, alleging that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to suspect her of illegal activity. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion simultaneous to a bench trial.

At trial, Dana Banger testified that on August 18, 2002, she was in her vehicle traveling southbound on Interstate 57 near 163rd Street in Oak Forest when the vehicle in front and to the right of hers swerved into her lane. Banger steered to avoid a collision and her vehicle came to rest in a construction zone in the northbound lanes.

Illinois State Police Trooper Tyler testified that he was called to the scene of the accident and observed Banger's vehicle in the northbound lanes and a tan Dodge Intrepid obstructing traffic in the southbound lanes. After speaking with Banger, Tyler requested medical assistance. He noted extensive damage to the Intrepid's right front bumper and observed defendant attempting to move the vehicle off the highway. He asked defendant whether she was injured and required medical attention. Defendant replied that she did not. After defendant moved and exited her vehicle, Tyler detected a strong odor of alcohol on her breath and noted that her eyes were bloodshot and her speech slurred. Tyler requested that another officer transport defendant to the nearest police station and set about clearing the scene of the accident.

Trooper Tyler stated that when he arranged for defendant's transport, defendant was not placed under arrest and had not been issued any Miranda warnings. At the police station, Tyler interviewed defendant and asked whether she had been drinking. Defendant replied that she had not and submitted to sobriety tests. During the tests, Tyler observed that defendant had an odor of alcohol on her breath, swayed when she stood up, at one point became very emotional, and lost her balance several times. Tyler opined that defendant failed all three of the sobriety tests he administered.

Trooper Tyler then asked defendant whether she would submit to a preliminary breath test and advised her that she was under arrest for DUI. Tyler advised her of her Miranda rights and issued citations for DUI and for failure to reduce speed to avoid an accident. Defendant refused to be interviewed any further and refused to submit to a Breathalyzer test. Tyler opined that defendant, at the time of the arrest, was under the influence of alcohol on the bases of her demeanor, comportment, and behavior, as well as his 10 years' experience in law enforcement and his observation during that span of hundreds of individuals under the influence of alcohol.

On cross-examination, Trooper Tyler stated that when he instructed defendant to move her vehicle off the highway, she did so without incident. He never observed her operate her vehicle prior to his arrival at the scene of the accident. He did not detect the scent of alcohol in her breath the first time he spoke with her and asked whether she was injured. When defendant asked Tyler whether she could call her son to pick her up from the scene of the accident, Tyler instructed her to ride in the squad car of a fellow officer. During the interview, defendant was distraught over having had her car stolen and she was worried about her husband's illness.

On redirect, Trooper Tyler stated that when he advised defendant to ride to the police station with another officer rather than her son, he wished to keep the area clear of additional personnel because it was highly congested with traffic.

Illinois State Police Sergeant Robert Evans testified that he assisted Trooper Tyler in securing the accident scene and that Tyler suspected that defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Tyler asked him to place defendant in his squad car, and Evans transported her to the Oak Forest police station. Evans neither handcuffed defendant nor advised her of her Miranda rights; he never indicated to her that she was under arrest.

The State rested and the circuit court denied defendant's motion to quash.

Defendant testified that on the evening of her arrest, she had attended a church service in Harvey and was on her way home when the driver of another vehicle drove very close to hers in a harassing manner and forced her vehicle off the road and into a guardrail. Other motorists stopped to ask whether she was all right and informed her that the police had been called. Trooper Tyler arrived and asked to see her license and registration, then left for about 15 minutes. Meanwhile, defendant called her son on her cellular phone and asked that he take her to a doctor. Tyler returned and told her that she would be transported to the police station and that her son could meet her there.

Defendant arrived at the station and waited at a desk for about 15 minutes. Tyler arrived and informed her that he could not return her license and that her vehicle had been totaled. Defendant asked for and was given permission to call her son to pick her up at the station. Tyler then began writing tickets and informed defendant that he planned to administer some sobriety tests. Defendant responded that she would not submit to any tests and that she was not under the influence of alcohol. She never performed any sobriety tests and accepted the citations.

On cross-examination, defendant stated that she was issued a ticket for speeding but could not produce a copy of it. She again denied participating in any sobriety tests.

The circuit court found defendant guilty on each count. An alcohol and drug evaluation summary (ADES) completed prior to sentencing revealed that defendant had been arrested for DUI on two prior occasions, in 1997 and 1999, and that she had a total household income of $11,000 per year. The circuit court sentenced defendant to two years' conditional discharge and 30 days' participation in the Sheriff's Work Alternative Program (SWAP) on the DUI charge. The State recognized defendant's inability to pay the accompanying $2,500 fine and recommended that the fine be satisfied by defendant's participation in SWAP. The court accepted the recommendation but imposed a fine of $1,046.50 to cover fees and court costs incurred by the State in prosecuting the offenses and mandatory fees pursuant to victims' assistance and subsequent offenses statutes.

On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court's denial of her motion to quash arrest was erroneous, that the State failed to prove her guilty of DUI beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State failed to prove her guilty of failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the trial court erred in imposing the maximum fine and court costs.

We deal first with defendant's contentions as to the propriety of the trial court's denial of her motion. Defendant argues that the circuit court's denial was erroneous because the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that defendant was illegally detained and that her performance on the ensuing field sobriety tests could not be used as evidence against her because it was unlawfully procured. She asserts that her transportation to the Oak Forest police station in a squad car constituted an involuntary seizure without probable cause.

Our review of a circuit court's decision on a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence presents questions of both law and fact. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d 502, 512, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004). We will not disturb the circuit court's findings of fact on review unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d at 512, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93. However, this court may undertake its own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues presented and may draw its own conclusions in deciding what relief, if any, should be granted. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d at 512, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93. Therefore, we review de novo the ultimate question of whether the evidence should have been suppressed. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d at 512, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93.

Defendant alleges that her transportation in a squad car from the scene of the accident to the police station amounted to an unlawful arrest in that Trooper Tyler lacked probable cause to place her in custody and that any evidence gathered during their subsequent conversations was illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible. She asserts that Tyler and the other officers' conduct was indicative of a seizure in that she was not allowed to call her son to come and pick her up at the scene of the accident, she was taken to the police station in a marked squad car, and she was forced to wait there nearly one hour until Tyler arrived to conduct the sobriety tests. She contends that a reasonable person in her position would have believed that she was not free to leave the mfficers' presence, and she concludes that the circumstances constituted an unlawful seizure in violation of her fourth...