People v. Sullivan

• Decision Date: 08 April 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-671,80-671
• Citation: 51 Ill.Dec. 60,420 N.E.2d 474,95 Ill.App.3d 571
• Parties: , 51 Ill.Dec. 60 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Melvin SULLIVAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 474

420 N.E.2d 474

95 Ill.App.3d 571, 51 Ill.Dec. 60

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Melvin SULLIVAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80-671.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

April 8, 1981.

Rehearing Denied May 14, 1981.

Ralph Ruebner, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Gordon Berry, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; Marcia B. Orr, Mary Ellen Dienes, Joseph J. McNerney III, Asst. State's Atty., Chicago, of counsel.

McNAMARA, Justice:

Defendant, Melvin Sullivan, was charged with the murder of Michael Grayson. After a trial without a jury, he was found guilty of that crime and was sentenced to a term of 20 years. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a continuance and his post-trial motion for a new trial, and that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In the alternative, defendant urges that failure of his court-appointed counsel to investigate witnesses favorable to the accused deprived him of adequate representation at trial.

Michael Grayson was shot and killed at 2:30 a. m. on March 18, 1979, in front of the Pepperbox Lounge in Chicago. The State's principal witness was Elnora Barnes, a prostitute.

Barnes testified that she knew and lived with defendant at a nearby hotel for about two weeks before the murder. On the night in question Barnes went to the Pepperbox because she was told defendant was looking for her and she knew he would be there. Defendant and deceased were in the rear of the lounge talking and then went to the bar together to order drinks. Near closing time, defendant, deceased, Barnes, a man named Cory, and a woman named Cynthia left the bar together. After first telling Barnes about a marijuana deal with deceased, defendant told her he planned to rob the deceased. Barnes had seen defendant with a gun that morning and had noticed in the lounge that he was carrying a gun. As Barnes began to cross the street, she heard a shot, turned, and saw deceased falling. Barnes saw defendant and Cory standing near deceased, and she ran. Defendant had red hair, a beard and was wearing a long, grey coat.

When defendant arrived at the hotel room about thirty minutes later, he responded to an inquiry by Barnes by stating he had "just killed a nigger" at the corner. Defendant and Barnes moved to another hotel, but about two weeks later she left the State because defendant was always "jumping on her and shooting up the money." Upon her return, the police contacted her.

Sam Titus, an employee of the Pepperbox, testified for the State that he saw defendant, whom he knew as "Red," in the lounge on the morning in question. Titus did not see defendant talk to anyone and did not know when he arrived or left.

Willie Davis testified for the State that he was at the Pepperbox on March 18. At 2:30 a. m. he went outside to get some air. Davis heard a shot and saw two women running. He also saw a person in a long, grey coat running from the scene, but could not say whether it was a man or a woman. Davis recalled seeing defendant in the lounge after midnight; he also had seen the deceased in the lounge earlier in the evening.

Defendant testified in his own behalf that he had been in the Pepperbox on March 17, 1979, but had departed by 11:45 p. m. He walked two blocks to his aunt's residence, where he was living, and she threw the door key down to him from an upstairs window. He let himself in and went to bed. He had known Barnes as a good friend and they had registered in hotel rooms together. Their friendship ended on bad terms. Defendant had seen Barnes in the morning on March 17, but he did not see her at the Pepperbox that evening.

Defendant's aunt testified that defendant arrived home on March 18 at 1:00 a. m. She threw the keys to him and he let himself in and went to bed. The doors were locked when she went to bed and they were locked when she arose. She distinctly remembered defendant's arrival the night before because the following morning he told her there had been a shooting the night before. When cross-examined about defendant having knowledge of the shooting at breakfast, she stated that defendant had awakened, had gone out for a short while for a newspaper or something, and had told her of the shooting when he returned.

After defendant presented his witnesses, defense counsel requested a continuance so that he could interview some of the witnesses listed by the State in its discovery response. When the trial court asked for an offer of proof as to what these witnesses would say, counsel stated that he lacked personal knowledge because he had not interviewed them. He stated that in light of what was contained in the police reports, however, their testimony would be contrary to the State's evidence. Defense counsel also stated that he did not know the availability of these witnesses because the State had difficulty in locating them. The court denied the motion for continuance and thereafter, defendant was found guilty and sentenced.

Subsequently, defendant, represented by privately retained counsel, requested a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The new evidence purported to be the testimony of the five occurrence witnesses who had been listed in the State's response to discovery. Defendant was given leave to file an amended motion for a new trial with the affidavits of the five witnesses attached. At the hearing on the motion, the State argued that the proffered testimony was not newly discovered in light of the State's disclosure of the names of the witnesses to defendant prior to trial. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial.

We initially address, albeit briefly, defendant's contention that he was not proved guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject his contention that the testimony of a prostitute is per se incredible for purposes of the reasonable doubt test. (See People v. Cosey (1980), 82 Ill.App.3d 968, 38 Ill.Dec. 425, 403 N.E.2d 656.) In this trial without a jury, the trial court observed the witnesses and believed the detailed and credible testimony of Elnora Barnes. We will not disturb the court's finding. People v. Collins (1978), 63 Ill.App.3d 843, 20 Ill.Dec. 649, 380 N.E.2d 858.

Defendant also urges that the trial court's denial of his request for continuance constitutes reversible error. It is within the trial court's discretion to grant a continuance, and the court's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. (People v. Polk (1979), 70 Ill.App.3d 903, 26 Ill.Dec. 863, 388 N.E.2d 864.) It is incumbent upon the party moving for the continuance to present facts to the trial court showing that diligence to procure the witnesses has been exercised. (People v. Polk; People v. Boyce (1977), 51 Ill.App.3d 549, 9 Ill.Dec. 403, 366 N.E.2d 914.) Defense counsel clearly failed to make this requisite showing. He stated that he had not interviewed the witnesses nor was he able to make an offer of proof as to their testimony. He also told the court that he could not say whether the witnesses could be located. Presented with such a request for a continuance at the conclusion of trial, the trial court properly denied the motion for continuance.

Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in denying his post-trial motion for a new trial. A request for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence will not be granted unless the evidence is non-cumulative and is of such...