People v. Superior Court
Decision Date | 05 May 1970 |
Citation | 468 P.2d 211,86 Cal.Rptr. 83,2 Cal.3d 527 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 468 P.2d 211 The PEOPLE et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; Peter Alec SYVINSKI, Real Party in Interest. L.A. 29711. |
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Mark L. Christiansen, Deputy Atty. Gen., James Don Keller, Dist. Atty., and Dick Hanscom, Deputy Dist. Atty., for petitioners.
Bertram McLees, Jr., County Counsel, and Mary Gell, Deputy County Counsel, for respondent.
James N. Pendleton, San Diego, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for real party in interest.
In December 1968, the real party in interest, Syvinski, was arrested for possession of marijuana. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11530.) At the time of his arrest, Syvinski was confined at a prison forestry camp operated by the Department of Corrections and was serving a prison sentence on an earlier charge of possession of marijuana. Syvinski was tried and convicted for the subsequent offense, but on April 23, 1969, prior to sentencing him, respondent court suspended further criminal proceedings pending a determination, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 3051, whether Syvinski was addicted, or in imminent danger of becoming addicted to narcotics. 1 On May 16, after a hearing on the question, respondent court found that Syvinski was in danger of becoming addicted, and thereupon committed him to the custody of the Director of Corrections for confinement in the California Rehabilitation Center (hereinafter referred to as 'CRC').
On July 28 the Superintendent of CRC, acting pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 3053, evaluated Syvinski as not being a fit subject for treatment in the civil addict program, based upon his prior, uncompleted prison sentence, and referred him back to respondent court for resumption of criminal proceedings. 2 However, the court determined that CRC and the Department of Corrections had erroneously rejected Syvinski from the rehabilitation program, and on September 12 respondent ordered the sheriff to transfer Syvinski back to CRC 'for a minimum of sixty days to determine whether or not he is suitable for treatment under the California Rehabilitation Center program.' The court also ordered CRC to prepare a full psychiatric study of Syvinski prior to his removal from CRC. The basis for the court's ruling was disclosed during argument upon a subsequent motion to vacate the September 12 order, which motion was denied by order of October 28. The court reasoned that it was improper to reject Syvinski solely because of his status as a prisoner serving a prior sentence; that CRC's determination should have been based upon its appraisal of Syvinski's fitness and suitability to treatment and rehabilitation.
Following the court's orders of September 12 and October 28, Syvinski was returned to CRC for further study and evaluation. Although the record indicates that CRC has completed its reevaluation of Syvinski and has recommended that he be returned to prison rather than undergo treatment, apparently Syvinski still remains at CRC awaiting the resumption of criminal proceedings. Since counsel for respondent has indicated that the court may not accept CRC's latest evaluation and therefore may order additional CRC proceedings to determine Syvinski's suitability for treatment, the case has not yet become moot, and we may properly consider the question whether the court had jurisdiction to commit Syvinski to CRC.
The People seek mandate to vacate respondent court's orders of September 12 and October 28 and to compel the immediate resumption of criminal proceedings against Syvinski. We have concluded that these orders were beyond the court's jurisdiction, in that there is no statutory or other procedure for committing a prisoner to CRC who at the time of commitment is in the custody and under the supervision and control of the Adult Authority pursuant to a valid prior commitment.
Section 3051 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which provides for the commitment of persons determined to be addicted or in danger of becoming addicted to narcotics, does not authorize the commitment of persons who are currently serving prison sentences. (People v. Ballin, 66 Cal.2d 80, 82, 56 Cal.Rptr. 893, 424 P.2d 333; In re Teran, 65 Cal.2d 523, 525, fn. 3, 55 Cal.Rptr. 259, 421 P.2d 107; see People v. Victor, 62 Cal.2d 280, 293--296, 42 Cal.Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 391.) By its terms, section 3051 is limited to persons who have been convicted but not yet sentenced to prison.
As stated in People v. Victor, Supra, 62 Cal.2d 280, 294, 42 Cal.Rptr. 199, 207--208, 398 P.2d 391, 399--400, involving Penal Code section 6450, the predecessor to Welfare and Institutions Code, section 3050 ( ), ineligibility of persons serving prison sentences
Victor pointed out that if a commitment were permitted in such cases, either the commitment would have to stand by until defendant had served his prison sentence, or else that sentence would have to be suspended; however, neither alternative is provided for by statute. (62 Cal.2d at p. 295, 42 Cal.Rptr. 199, 398 P.2d 391.) 3
Parolees, as distinguished from prisoners who remain in custody in prison, are eligible for commitment to the rehabilitation program. (People v. Rummel, 64 Cal.2d 515, 517--518, 50 Cal.Rptr. 785, 413 P.2d 673; In re Swearingen, Supra, 64 Cal.2d 519, 521--522, 50 Cal.Rptr. 787, 413 P.2d 675; In re Teran, Supra, 65 Cal.2d 523, 525--527, 55 Cal.Rptr. 259, 421 P.2d 107; People v. Ballin, Supra, 66 Cal.2d 80, 82, 56 Cal.Rptr. 893, 424 P.2d 333.) However, under these cases once his parole has been revoked by the Adult Authority, a defendant becomes ineligible for commitment and must be returned to prison.
As stated in People v. Ballin, Supra, 66 Cal.2d 80, 82, 56 Cal.Rptr. 893, 894, 424 P.2d 333, 334 (Italics added.)
Aside from the lack of statutory authority for the commitment of persons serving prison sentences, there is a sound practical reason why such persons should not be eligible for commitment. (Belton, Civil Commitment of Narcotics Addicts in California: A Case History of Statutory Construction, 19 Hastings L.J. 603, 632--633; see People v. Sateriale, 247 Cal.App.2d 314, 317, 55 Cal.Rptr. 500; People v. Zapata, 220 Cal.App.2d 903, 913, 34 Cal.Rptr. 171; cf. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 3052.) It is apparent that unlike a parolee, who has demonstrated an ability to function without maximum supervision, a person serving a prison sentence for a prior criminal offense cannot be placed in a 'minimum security setting' without substantial risk. The initial determination whether that risk should be taken must be left to the sound discretion of the Adult Authority in exercising its parole function.
Counsel for respondent suggests that since Syvinski's offenses involved possession of marijuana, the facilities of CRC should be available to him. However, the applicable statutory provisions disclose no intent to create any exception in favor of prisoners serving sentences for marijuana crimes. On the contrary,...
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