People v. Superior Court of S.F. Cnty.
| Decision Date | 06 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | S221296 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Francisco County, Respondent; Daryl Lee Johnson, Real Party in Interest. City and County of San Francisco ex rel. City and County of San Francisco Police Department, Petitioner, v. The Superior Court of San Francisco County, Respondent; The People et al., Real Parties in Interest. |
George Gascón, District Attorney, Jerry P. Coleman, Laura L. vanMunching, James R. Thompson and Allison G. MacBeth, Assistant District Attorneys, for Petitioner and Real Parties in Interest the People.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan and Seth K. Schalit, Deputy Attorneys General, for California Attorney General as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Parties in Interest the People.
Gregory D. Totten, District Attorney (Ventura) and Michael D. Schwartz, Assistant District Attorney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Parties in Interest the People.
Rains Lucia Stern, Michael L. Rains and Zachary A. Lopes, Pleasant Hill, for Peace Officers' Research Association of California, The PORAC Legal Defense Fund and The San Francisco Police Officers' Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Parties in Interest the People.
Nancy E. O'Malley, District Attorney (Alameda), Michael O'Connor, Assistant District Attorney, and Jeff Rubin, Deputy District Attorney, for Appellate Committee of the California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Parties in Interest the People.
Bonnie M. Dumanis, District Attorney (San Diego), Laura Tanney and Linh Lam, Deputy District Attorneys, for San Diego District Attorney as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Parties in Interest the People.
Laura Tanney and Linh Lam, Deputy District Attorneys (San Diego), Jeff H. Rubin, Deputy District Attorney (Santa Clara) and Mark Zahner for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Parties in Interest the People.
Jeffrey F. Rosen, District Attorney (Santa Clara) and David A. Angel, Assistant District Attorney, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner and Real Parties in Interest the People.
Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney, Jeremy M. Goldman and Christine Van Aken, Deputy City Attorneys, for Petitioner City and County of San Francisco.
Green & Shinee, Richard A. Shinee and Elizabeth J. Gibbons for Association of Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner City and County of San Francisco.
Nina D. Sariaslani for Petitioner City and County of San Francisco Police Department.
Sedgwick and Michael L. Fox, San Francisco, for Respondent.
Jeff Adachi, Public Defender, Matt Gonzalez, Chief Attorney, and Christopher Gauger, Deputy Public Defender, for Real Party in Interest Daryl Lee Johnson.
Molly O'Neal, Public Defender (Santa Clara), and Andy Gutierrez, Deputy Public Defender, as Amici Curiae.
Manning & Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Eugene P. Ramirez, Tony M. Sain and Scott Wm. Davenport, Los Angeles, for City of Azusa and City of South Gate as Amici Curiae.
In City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202, 52 P.3d 129 (City of Los Angeles ),1 we considered the interplay between the prosecution's constitutional duty under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (Brady ) and its progeny, and statutory procedures by which the parties can seek discovery of information in confidential peace officer personnel records. We do so again.
Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, generally obligates the prosecution to disclose to the defense material evidence favorable
to the defendant. Separately, the Legislature has enacted procedures to implement the decision of Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305 (Pitchess ), which allow criminal defendants to seek discovery from the court of potentially exculpatory information located in otherwise confidential peace officer personnel records. If a party bringing what is commonly called a Pitchess motion makes a threshold showing, the court must review the records in camera and disclose to that party any information they contain that is material to the underlying case. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1043, 1045.)
In this case, the City and County of San Francisco Police Department (police department), acting pursuant to procedures it has established, informed the district attorney that confidential personnel records of two peace officers who are potential witnesses might contain exculpatory information. Before us are two interrelated questions: (1) May the prosecution examine the records itself to determine whether they contain exculpatory information, or must it, like criminal defendants, follow the procedures the Legislature established for Pitchess motions? (2) What must the prosecution do with this information to fulfill its Brady duty?
We conclude that the prosecution does not have unfettered access to confidential personnel records of police officers who are potential witnesses in criminal cases. Rather, it must follow the same procedures that apply to criminal defendants, i.e., make a Pitchess motion, in order to seek information in those records.
Because criminal defendants and the prosecution have equal ability to seek information in confidential personnel records, and because such defendants, who can represent their own interests at least as well as the prosecution and probably better, have the right to make a Pitchess motion whether or not the prosecution does so, we also conclude that the prosecution fulfills its Brady duty as regards the police department's tip if it informs the defense of what the police department informed it, namely, that the specified records might contain exculpatory information. That way, defendants may decide for themselves whether to bring a Pitchess motion. The information the police department has provided, together with some explanation of how the officers' credibility might be relevant to the case, would satisfy the threshold showing a defendant must make in order to trigger judicial review of the records under the Pitchess procedures.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which reached different conclusions.
We take this procedural background primarily from the opinion of the Court of Appeal.
The underlying criminal action charges real party in interest Daryl Lee Johnson (hereafter defendant) with domestic violence crimes. Two San Francisco police officers are potentially important witnesses in the case. In December 2013, the prosecution filed a “Notice of Motion for Discovery of San Francisco Police Department Peace Officer Personnel Records Under Brady and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 [, subdivision ](e).” The motion asked the court to review in camera those officers' personnel records to determine whether they contain any material exculpatory information under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, that is subject to disclosure. It also asked the court to “disclose to the District Attorney's Office and the defense any Brady material located in the personnel files, and ... issue a protective order to protect the officers' statutory right of privacy in their personnel files.”
Attached to the motion was a declaration by the prosecutor assigned to the case stating that the officers in question “are necessary and essential” prosecution witnesses. The police department had informed the prosecution that each officer had “material in his ... personnel file that may be subject to disclosure under” Brady. The declaration stated that the records were in the “exclusive possession and control” of the police department and the district attorney did not have “actual” or “constructive” possession of the records. The prosecutor stated that, based on police department representations that the files contained potential Brady material, she
believed the officers' personnel files contain The declaration further stated that the records “are material to the pending litigation in that they pertain to the credibility of a necessary and material prosecution witness, and could either impeach said witness or lead to evidence exonerating the defendant.”
The prosecution's motion was filed in accordance with the police department's Bureau Order No. 2010–01 (Bureau Order), which established department procedures for Brady disclosure of materials in employee personnel files. (We have attached a copy of the Bureau Order as an appendix to this opinion.) The Bureau Order explains that because
The Bureau Order defines and gives examples of what may constitute “potential ‘Brady material.’ ” It contemplates that the police department will identify potential Brady material on an ongoing basis and notify the district attorney's office on an ongoing basis that the personnel files for particular officers may contain Brady material. When...
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Chapter 4 - §1. Overview
...is a constitutional duty and applies regardless of whether the defense requests disclosure. People v. Superior Ct. (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 709; see U.S. v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 106-07; In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 879. Thus, failure to disclose Brady material violates th......
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...App. 3d 759, 225 Cal. Rptr. 762 (3d Dist. 1986)—Ch. 5-A, §2.2.1(1) (b)[3][b] People v. Superior Court (Johnson), 61 Cal. 4th 696, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 377 P.3d 847 (2015)—Ch. 4-C, §1.4.3(2)(a)[1]; §6.3.1; §6.5 People v. Superior Court (Johnson), 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. ......
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Obtaining Information from Law Enforcement Personnel Files: a Defense Attorney's Perspective
...can then make its own Pitchess motion or provide the "Brady alert" to defense counsel. (People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696.)PRACTICE TIP: Although the prosecutor's duty under Brady may be deemed self-executing, defense counsel should make both general and specific requ......