People v. Superior Court

Decision Date06 December 2004
Docket NumberNo. F045226.,F045226.
Citation124 Cal.App.4th 104,21 Cal.Rptr.3d 542
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Tulare County, Respondent; Jorge Junior Vidal, Real Party in Interest.

Phillip J. Cline, Tulare County District Attorney, and Barbara J. Greaver, Deputy, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Michael Shetzer, Tulare County Public Defender, and Berry Robinson, Deputy, for Real Party in Interest.

John T. Philipsborn, San Francisco, for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

ARDAIZ, P.J.

In Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (Atkins), the United States Supreme Court held that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at p. 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242.) The court reasoned that "clinical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18. Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability." (Id. at p. 318, 122 S.Ct. 2242, fns. omitted.)

The court recognized that "[t]o the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded.... Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach ... with regard to insanity, `we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.' [Citation.]" (Atkins, supra, 536 U.S. at p. 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242, fn. omitted.)

The California Legislature responded by enacting Penal Code section 1376, which defines "mentally retarded," sets forth procedures for determining whether an accused is mentally retarded, and, if so, precludes imposition of the death penalty.1 In this case of first impression we address various issues arising under this statute, which applies to cases pending in the trial court at the time of its enactment. (Centeno v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 38, fn. 1, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 533; see, e.g., In re Holladay (11th Cir.2003) 331 F.3d 1169, 1172 [applying Atkins retroactively]; Bell v. Cockrell (5th Cir.2002) 310 F.3d 330, 332 [same].)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

[ ]

On January 24, 2001, Eric Jones was shot and killed outside Delano, California, in rural Tulare County. On January 27, 2001, [real party in interest] Jorge Vidal, Jr. [Vidal] and two others were arrested for his murder. Four additional suspects remained at large.

A preliminary hearing was held October 4-5, 2001 and October 11, 2001. At its conclusion, Vidal was held to answer on all charges. On October 24, 2001, the district attorney filed an information charging Vidal and others with capital murder. [3] At his November 2, 2001, arraignment in Superior Court, Vidal entered pleas of not guilty to all charges and denied all the special circumstance and enhancement allegations. On December 6, 2001, the district attorney announced his intent to seek the death penalty.

On October 1-3, 2003, October 14-15, 2003, October 23-24, 2003, October 28, 2003 and March 8-10, 2004, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on several pretrial motions filed by Vidal. This hearing encompassed the following motions/issues raised by Vidal: a motion to preclude the imposition of the death penalty pursuant to [section 1376] and Atkins [ ]; a motion to preclude the imposition of the death penalty based on a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular [Relations] and [ ] section 834c; and a motion to suppress all of Vidal's statements made to law enforcement after his arrest based on violations of the United States Constitution, Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [Miranda], the Vienna Convention on Consular [Relations] and [ ] section 834c. After both sides rested on March 10, 2004, the Court set the matter for argument on March 15, 2004.

On March 15, 2004, after the argument of counsel, the Court ruled from the bench that Vidal had met his burden of proof by preponderance of the evidence and Vidal was found mentally retarded pursuant to [section 1376, subdivision (a)] and precluded the prosecution from seeking the death penalty.4 In it's [sic] ruling, the Court denied Vidal's motion to preclude death based on a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular [Relations] and [ ] section 834c. The admissibility of Vidal's post arrest statements was taken under submission. At that time, Vidal then attempted to plead guilty to all the charges, special circumstances and special allegations and accept a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Court refused to accept Vidal's plea and set the matter for further proceedings on March 24, 2004.

On March 24, 2004, the Court denied Vidal's motion to suppress his post-arrest statements on all grounds. Again, Vidal attempted to plead guilty to all the charges, special circumstances and special allegations and accept a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Again, the Court refused to accept Vidal's plea.

In a dueling battle of petitions seeking pretrial appellate review, Vidal filed his petition for writ of mandate5 with this Court on March 26, 2004, asking this Court to order the trial court to accept his guilty plea, and on April 1, 2004, the People filed the instant petition asking for review of the trial court's ruling on mental retardation. On April 2, 2004, this Court issued an order to show cause and stayed all trial court proceedings until further notice.6

On April 6, 2004, we directed the parties to brief the following issues:

• What constitutes mental retardation for purposes of section 1376?

• What constitutes adaptive behavior for purposes of said statute?

• By what standard does a trial court determine whether a defendant is mentally retarded within the meaning of said statute?

• Did the trial court apply the correct standard in this case?

• By what standard does an appellate court review a trial court's determination of mental retardation under said statute?

• Should this court uphold the trial court's determination that Vidal is mentally retarded within the meaning of said statute?

The parties additionally addressed whether the People are entitled to pretrial review of a trial court's ruling under section 1376. Because the People cited to, and relied on, Vidal's confession in support of their petition, Vidal asks us also to determine (1) whether all of his postarrest statements should be suppressed because they were involuntary and obtained in violation of the United States Constitution, Miranda, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and section 834c (which concerns the right of an arrested or detained foreign national to communicate with an official from the consulate of his or her country); and (2) whether the People should be precluded from seeking the death penalty because he was not advised of his right to speak to the Mexican Consulate pursuant to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and section 834c.

We decline to address Vidal's issues, as they are neither raised by the petition nor encompassed in our order to show cause. To the extent the People relied on Vidal's confession in addressing the issue of mental retardation under section 1376, we note that the confession was also considered by some or all of the experts who testified below. Moreover, Vidal has advised us that the trial court denied his motion to suppress the confession on all grounds. "Neither a writ of prohibition nor a writ of mandate may be used to resolve an issue as to the admissibility of evidence. [Citations.]" (Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 164, 49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838.) In addition, Vidal has an adequate remedy by way of appeal, should he be convicted. (See Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239, 263, 219 Cal.Rptr. 420, 707 P.2d 793.) Accordingly, Vidal's confession is properly before us at this time.

FACTS

The circumstances of the alleged offenses are not germane to the issues currently before this court. Accordingly, we recite the evidence adduced with respect to the issue of mental retardation.

Vidal was born October 23, 1969. Spanish was his first language. Beginning about fourth grade, in which Vidal was held back in school, it became apparent to his younger sister that he was not very smart and could not read or write like other children his age. Despite extensive help with his homework, he could not understand his schoolwork. By ninth grade, Vidal had improved somewhat in the way he spoke, but still was unable to use correct grammar. He had trouble in both English and Spanish, never learned to read anything but small words, and never really learned to write. He also had difficulty remembering things such as his chores and household rules.

At some point, Vidal married and moved out of his mother's...

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2 cases
  • Seriales v. Harrington
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • February 1, 2012
    ...ruled the death penalty was precluded as to Vidal because he had proved himself to be mentally retarded. People v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, 547 (Cal.App. 2004) (Vidal I). On December 6, 2004, the California Court of Appeal set aside the Superior Court order. The California Suprem......
  • Postelle v. Carpenter
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • August 27, 2018
    ...became the first tribunal to require adjustment of an IQ score to account for the Flynn Effect. See People v. Superior Court, 124 Cal.App.4th 806, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 542, 568 (2004), vacated , 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 568, 109 P.3d 68 (Cal. 2005). Several other courts did the same within the next few yea......

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