People v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County

• Decision Date: 23 July 1969
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; Harry Edward REDD, Jr. and William Todd Jordan, Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 34603.

Page 704

79 Cal.Rptr. 704

275 Cal.App.2d 49

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent;

Harry Edward REDD, Jr. and William Todd Jordan, Real Parties in Interest.

Civ. 34603.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

July 23, 1969.

Evelle J. Younger, Dist. Atty., Harry Wood, Head, Appellate Division, and Robert

J. Lord, Deputy Dist. Atty., for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Carl E. Stewart, Hollywood, and Felix Slater, Los Angeles, for real parties in interest.

HERNDON, Associate Justice.

The People petition for writ of mandate requiring respondent court to annul its order of April 4, 1969, as amended Nunc pro tunc May 6, 1969, which purports to suppress certain statements of defendants, the real parties in interest herein, Under the authority of Penal Code section 1538.5. The sole issue presented for our consideration is this: 'Does section 1538.5 provide a procedure for obtaining pre-trial rulings concerning the admissibility of evidence other than evidence obtained as a result of a search and seizure?' We have concluded that this question must be answered in the negative.

The defendants in the instant proceeding are charged in a 22 count information with the crimes of forgery and grand theft. So far as here relevant, it appears that defendants, the owner and manager respectively of an automobile service station, used a stolen credit card theretofore issued by Union Oil Company in preparing and submitting for credit several hundred forged credit card 'charge slips' or 'invoices.' Within a relatively brief period several hundred invoices were submitted solely by defendants' station and no other, in a total amount exceeding $2,500, showing on their face some 140 different automobile license numbers, many of which were patently non-existent. It therefore became immediately apparent that of necessity these forgeries and thefts were being committed by at least one of the four or five persons operating the particular station rather than by a customer thereof.

This information was communicated to the authorities who thereafter questioned the defendants separately and without prior admonition concerning their constitutional rights to remain silent or to obtain the services of an attorney. The officers requested defendants to examine the many forged invoices and indicate which of them they had prepared. Defendants did so and when they acknowledged preparation of invoices bearing non-existent license plates they were arrested.

Defendants subsequently moved under the provisions of section 1538.5 to suppress the forged invoices and their statements made in reference thereto. The court's order, as corrected, provides: 'Defendants' motions to suppress the evidence under Section 1538.5 P.C. is denied as to the Credit-Card Charge Slips, and the motion to exclude, Under Sec. 1538.5 P.C., is granted as to the statements of the defendants in relation to the Credit Cards prior to their being given a warning of their constitutional rights pursuant to the Miranda decision (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694).' (Emphasis added).

Section 1538.5 expressly provides: '(a) A defendant may move for the return of property or to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing Obtained as a result of a search or seizure on the ground that: (Et cetera).' (Emphasis added.) Various analyses of this section make it clear that it is indeed a limited statute relating solely to searches and seizures conducted by governmental agents. (Cf. People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 70 A.C. 129, 134--136, 74 Cal.Rptr. 294, 449 P.2d 230; Legislative Counsel's Opinion, 1967 S.J. 744.) The report of the Assembly Committee on Criminal Procedure entitled 'Search and Seizure Procedure for Challenging Evidence Obtained by Search and Seizure' (Committee Reports, Vol. 22, No. 12, pp. 9, 18--21 (1967)) concludes with the following recommendations:

'1. Search and seizure. The committee recommends that the procedure for challenging the legality of a search and seizure Be changed (1) to provide for final determination of these questions prior to trial and (2) to allow the prosecution greater latitude in initiating appellate review of an adverse decision on a search and seizure issue. * * * 2. Feasibility of pretrial procedure for all questions of admissibility. The committee recommends That a study be undertaken to determine the feasibility of establishing a pretrial procedure for the resolution of all questions concerning the admission of evidence in criminal cases.' (Emphasis added.)

Subsequently, in accordance with the committee's recommendations, section 1538.5 was enacted changing the procedure for challenging the legality of searches and seizures. Presumably further study is being given to other problems relating to the admissibility of evidence. Particularly pertinent here is the committee's observation under its second recommendation, quoted Supra:

'One of the major defects in the present law is that it permits, if not encourages, search and seizure issues to be raised during the trial of a criminal case. As we have pointed out, the determination of these questions during trial breaks the continuity of the proceedings and results in lost jury time. The same thing may be said about the resolution of questions concerning the admissibility of other forms of evidence, e.g., confessions, admissions, and dying declarations, during trial.

'Judge Alarcon pointed out to the committee that the new Evidence Code requires questions concerning the admissibility of a confession or admission to be decided by the court outside the presence of the jury and that these proceedings can result in a significant interruption in the trial process. He suggested that the proposed procedure for resolving search and seizure issues be expanded to cover these and other questions pertaining to admissibility of evidence.

'The committee believes that this suggestion has merit and that it should be studied to determine what impact its implementation would have on the...