People v. Swain

• Decision Date: 26 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97SC16,97SC16
• Parties: 98 CJ C.A.R. 2671 PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Robert SWAIN, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 426

959 P.2d 426

98 CJ C.A.R. 2671

PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Robert SWAIN, Respondent.

No. 97SC16.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

May 26, 1998.

Sarah F. Law, District Attorney, Sixth Judicial District, Paul J. Schmidt, Deputy District Attorney, Durango, for Petitioner.

Richard D. Unruh, Telluride, M. Colin Bresee, Denver, for Respondent.

Justice MARTINEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the La Plata County District Court's order in People v. Swain, No. 96CR152 (Colo.Dist.Ct. Dec. 9, 1996). ¹ The district court reversed Robert Swain's convictions for driving while ability impaired (DWAI) and driving without a driver's license and remanded for a new trial to the La Plata County Court. The district court concluded that the county court erroneously instructed the jury that the term "drove," within the meaning of section 42-4-1301(1), 17 C.R.S. (1996 Supp.), is defined as "actual physical control" of a vehicle. ² Based on our analysis in Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564 (Colo.1986), we hold that proof of "actual physical control" of a vehicle is sufficient to establish that Swain "drove" a vehicle within the meaning of section 42-4-1301(1). Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case to the district court with directions to reinstate the judgments of conviction and sentences imposed for DWAI and driving without a driver's license.

I.

On the evening of September 13, 1995, Swain met some friends in Durango, Colorado for dinner. The meal lasted approximately one hour, during which Swain consumed two beers. After dinner, Swain and his friends walked around downtown Durango to see if "there was anything happening." They agreed to have a beer at a bar located on Main Street and upon their arrival, ordered beers and began to drink. Sometime between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Swain and his friends decided to leave the bar because they were being soaked by thrown beer. As Swain and his friends resumed walking around downtown Durango, Swain felt tired and informed his friends that he had to drive to New Mexico that night because he had a "get together" with friends in Farmington the following day.

At approximately 10:30 p.m., Swain got into his white pick-up truck and proceeded to drive out of Durango. Some time later, Swain got lost and had to backtrack to Hesperus, Colorado in order to find Highway 140 to Farmington. At an unknown time during the night of September 13, 1995, or the early morning of September 14, 1995, Swain felt sleepy, pulled his pick-up truck over to the southbound side of Highway 140, and fell asleep. ³

On September 14, 1995, at approximately 2:00 a.m., La Plata County Sheriff's Deputies Todd Hitti and Shelly Williams noticed a white pick-up truck parked one to three feet off of Highway 140 in the grass. Deputy Hitti pulled the patrol car over to the side of the highway and radioed central dispatch that they were investigating an "abandoned vehicle." As the deputies exited their patrol car, they both heard loud music coming from the truck.

The deputies approached the truck and found Swain lying, either asleep or passed out, in the front seat. Swain was curled in a fetal position with his feet near the driver's side door and his head resting towards the passenger's side door. The keys were in the ignition and the truck's radio was playing. ⁴ The engine was not running and no evidence was introduced concerning whether the truck's headlights were on.

Deputy Hitti knocked on the window of the truck three times before Swain responded. Swain sat up, wiped his face, and rolled down the window. Deputy Hitti requested Swain's vehicle registration, driver's license, and proof of insurance. After fumbling through some leaflets, Swain was able to produce his proof of insurance but informed Deputy Hitti that he was unable to locate his driver's license and vehicle registration. Both deputies smelled an odor of alcohol on Swain's breath, noticed that his speech was slow and slurred, his eyes were bloodshot, and his clothes were dirty and in disorder. The deputies also observed a twelve-pack of beer on the floor of the truck, with two cans opened.

Swain told Deputy Hitti that he was on his way to Farmington from Norwood, Colorado, and that he had been drinking earlier in Durango. After providing his proof of insurance to Deputy Hitti, Swain lay back down on the seat. Deputy Hitti returned to the patrol car and radioed central dispatch to check for any outstanding warrants. As the deputies were waiting for the results of the warrants check, they conducted a DUI investigation. Swain failed a number of voluntary roadside sobriety tests and refused to submit to any form of chemical testing. Consequently, Swain was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to section 42-4-1301(1)(a), 11 C.R.S. (1997), ⁵ and driving without a driver's license pursuant to section 42-2-101(5), 11 C.R.S. (1997). ⁶

The case proceeded to jury trial on May 23, 1996, in La Plata County Court. At the close of all evidence, the People submitted the following jury instruction, over the objection of Swain, based upon case law applicable to the express consent provisions of section 42-4-1301(7)(a), 11 C.R.S. (1997): ⁷

In Colorado, a person "drove" if he or she was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.

"Actual Physical Control" is present when a person exercises bodily influence or direction over a motor vehicle; which is to be decided by a totality of the circumstances.

Factors you may consider in deciding whether or not a person was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, include, but are not limited to the following:

A. Where the vehicle was found;

B. Where in the vehicle the person was found;

C. Whether or not the keys were in the motor vehicle's ignition;

D. Whether or not the motor vehicle was running;

E. Any other factor which tends to indicate that the person exercised bodily influence or direction over a motor vehicle or not based on your every day experience.

No one factor listed above definitively decides whether or not a person was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle.

The jury found Swain guilty of DWAI, ⁸ a lesser included offense of DUI, and driving without a driver's license. The trial judge sentenced Swain to ten days in the La Plata County Jail, and suspended the sentence on the condition that Swain pay $388.00 in fines and court costs, complete twenty-four hours of useful public service, obtain a drug/alcohol evaluation, and follow all treatment recommendations.

On appeal to the La Plata County District Court, Swain asserted in his notice of appeal that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that "drove," an element of DUI, meant "actual physical control." ⁹ Without the benefit of briefs from either party, the district court ruled that the definition of "drove" as "actual physical control" of a vehicle is a civil concept applicable to driver's license revocation cases only and not criminal prosecutions. The court observed that "[w]hile the express consent law may apply to anyone who is a driver, the criminal inquiry is 'did the defendant drive a motor vehicle' not 'did the defendant have the status of "driver." ' " The district court concluded that the Colorado DUI statute only criminalizes the act of "driving" a vehicle under the influence and therefore "some movement of the vehicle is generally required." The district court reversed both convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial.

II.

The People contend that the district court erroneously relied on a civil/criminal law distinction in concluding that this court's analysis in Brewer v. Motor Vehicle Division, Department of Revenue, 720 P.2d 564 (Colo.1986), was inapplicable to the DUI context. ¹⁰ According to the People, the term "driver," as defined in section 42-1-102(27), applies to both the civil and criminal portions of Title 42. Therefore, the People contend that the district court's conclusion that the term "drove" requires "some movement of the vehicle," is erroneous, and that the term instead requires "actual physical control" of a vehicle. We agree.

Title 42, Part 13 of Article 4 sets forth vehicle and traffic regulations involving alcohol and drug offenses. In Colorado, it is a misdemeanor for a person to "drive" a vehicle while under the influence or while impaired by the use of alcohol, drugs, or both. See 42-4-1301(1)(a)-(b), 11 C.R.S. (1997) ("DUI statute"). By enacting this legislation, the General Assembly sought to foster public safety by discouraging individuals from driving while under the influence of alcohol. See Noe v. Dolan, 197 Colo. 32, 37, 589 P.2d 483, 486 (1979) (recognizing that "the health, safety and welfare of [citizens] ... are endangered by those who drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquors"); see also People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 487 (Colo.1990) (recognizing that "[i]t is beyond debate that drunken driving is a serious problem, and that the state has a substantial interest in preventing the loss of life and damage to property caused by drunk drivers").

In construing a statute, the intent of the legislature is to be ascertained and given effect whenever possible. See Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039, 1044 (Colo.1991). The General Assembly may furnish its own definitions of words and phrases in order to guide and direct judicial determination of the intendments of the legislation although such definitions may differ from ordinary usage. If the General Assembly has defined a statutory term, a court must apply that definition. See R.E.N. v. City of Colo. Springs, 823 P.2d 1359, 1364 (Colo.1992) (recognizing that "[w]hen the legislature defines a term in a statute, statutory construction requires that the term be given its statutory meaning"); see also Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory...