People v. Syverson
| Decision Date | 12 November 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-95-0365,3-95-0365 |
| Citation | 227 Ill.Dec. 278,293 Ill.App.3d 199,687 N.E.2d 528 |
| Parties | , 227 Ill.Dec. 278 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph H. SYVERSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
John X. Breslin, Deputy Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Michael James, State's Atty., Criminal Justice Center, Domenica Osterberger, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, for the People.
Following a jury trial, defendant Ralph H. Syverson was found guilty of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12--11(a)(1) (West 1994)) and guilty but mentally ill of second degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9--2(a)(1) (West 1994)). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court concluded that consecutive sentences were mandatory. The court then sentenced the defendant to a 15-year term of imprisonment for home invasion and a consecutive 10-year term for second degree murder. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial
[227 Ill.Dec. 280] court erred in concluding that consecutive sentences were mandatory. We affirm.
At trial, it was established that the defendant was an Illinois state trooper. In 1976, he married Marianne Wielgopolan, and the couple had one child. In May of 1994, Marianne told the defendant that she had been seeing another man and wanted a divorce. Approximately one week later, Marianne moved out of the marital home.
Over the next few months, the defendant attempted to reconcile with Marianne. In late July of 1994, Marianne agreed to go to joint counseling with the defendant. She also told the defendant that she was leaving her paramour, Gale Rapp. However, a few days later Marianne began to see Rapp again. When she informed the defendant, he became angry.
On August 14, 1994, the defendant arrived at Marianne's apartment in the early morning. He brought doughnuts and asked Marianne to give him another chance. After about an hour, the defendant left.
The next day, Rapp came over to Marianne's apartment. The two went to bed around midnight. They awoke in the early morning to find the defendant standing in the bedroom doorway. Marianne said, "How in the hell did you get in here?" The defendant then walked over to the bed and said:
At that point, the defendant brought out his service revolver. Marianne and Rapp both reached for the gun and a struggle ensued. The defendant fired a shot and Rapp fell back, muttering something. The defendant fired a few more shots and Marianne ran out of the bedroom to the kitchen. After a while, the defendant stopped shooting, came out of the bedroom, and put his gun on a bar stool in the living room. He then telephoned the Ottawa police, who arrived at the scene shortly thereafter.
The defendant was found guilty of home invasion and guilty but mentally ill of second degree murder. A sentencing hearing was held at which the trial court found that consecutive sentences were mandatory. The court then imposed a 15-year term of imprisonment for home invasion and a consecutive 10-year term of imprisonment for second degree murder.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that consecutive sentences were mandatory. The defendant correctly notes that consecutive sentences are mandatory if: (1) the offenses "were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective"; and (2) one of the offenses "was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1994). The defendant contends that neither of these prerequisites was met in the instant case.
The defendant first argues that he did not commit the home invasion and the murder "as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective."
After reviewing the applicable case law, it is apparent that there is some uncertainty regarding the meaning of "a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1994). Some cases have suggested this language is unclear. See People v. Bole, 155 Ill.2d 188, 193, 184 Ill.Dec. 423, 425, 613 N.E.2d 740, 742 (1993) ().
Other cases have used various tests in attempting to explain what constitutes a "single course of conduct." See, e.g., People v. Harris, 220 Ill.App.3d 31, 32, 162 Ill.Dec. 720, 721, 580 N.E.2d 903, 904 (1991) (); People v Fritz, 225 Ill.App.3d 624, 629, 167 Ill.Dec. 666, 669-70, 588 N.E.2d 307, 310-11 (1992) (); People v. Kagan, 283 Ill.App.3d 212, 220, 218 Ill.Dec. 713, 719, 669 N.E.2d 1239, 1245 (1996) (). Recently, the merits of these tests have been called into question. People v. Strickland, 283 Ill.App.3d 319, 324, 218 Ill.Dec. 369, 372, 668 N.E.2d 1201, 1204, (1996) (); People v. Guzman, 276 Ill.App.3d 750, 759, 213 Ill.Dec. 247, 254, 658 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (1995) ().
The problem with the above-noted tests is that they place undue emphasis on a rather amorphous concept, a defendant's motivation, while de-emphasizing other relevant factors. We believe it is better to consider the totality of the circumstances, with the defendant's motive being only one of several factors the court should consider. See, e.g., People v. Bilyeu, 102 Ill.App.3d 130, 132, 57 Ill.Dec. 795, 796, 429 N.E.2d 912, 913 (1981); People v. Lee, 41 Ill.App.3d 502, 505, 354 N.E.2d 543, 546 (1976). Among the other factors the court should consider are: (1) the time lapse between each offense (People v. Bole, 155 Ill.2d 188, 184 Ill.Dec. 423, 613 N.E.2d 740 (1993)); (2) the proximity in location of the offenses (People v. Paino, 137 Ill.App.3d 645, 92 Ill.Dec. 251, 484 N.E.2d 1106 (1985)); and (3) the number of victims (People v. Lindsay, 67 Ill.App.3d 638, 23 Ill.Dec. 886, 384 N.E.2d 793 (1978)).
Although each of these factors should be considered by the trial court, no single factor is necessarily determinative. See, e.g., People v. Embry, 249 Ill.App.3d 750, 188 Ill.Dec. 882, 619 N.E.2d 246 (1993) (); Bole, 155 Ill.2d 188, 184 Ill.Dec. 423, 613 N.E.2d 740 (). Moreover, the trial court's determination will be upheld as long as there is evidence to support it. People v. Morris, 237 Ill.App.3d 140, 177 Ill.Dec. 822, 603 N.E.2d 1196 (1992).
In the case at hand, the record reveals that both offenses: (1) occurred seconds apart; (2) occurred in a single location; (3) were committed against a single victim, Gale Rapp; and (4) appeared to have a single motivation, the desire to eliminate Gale Rapp as a threat to the defendant's marriage. Under these circumstances, we find that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court's determination that the defendant committed both offenses during a "single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective."
The defendant also contends that the second prerequisite for mandatory consecutive sentences was lacking because it was not established that "one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1994).
The defendant argues that the home invasion, while a Class X felony, could not be used as the "triggering" felony because it did not "involve" the infliction of severe bodily injury. That offense was complete, the defendant contends, when the defendant entered his wife's apartment and threatened her and Rapp. 1 Since that offense did not involve injury to anyone, it does not satisfy the second prerequisite, argues the defendant. Likewise, the second degree murder conviction, a Class 1 felony, fails to qualify, contends the defendant, because "severe bodily injury" is an inherent element of the offense. The defendant succeeds with his argument only if this Court finds that neither of the defendant's convictions qualify as a triggering Class X or Class 1 felony requiring consecutive sentencing in this case.
First we consider whether the Class X home invasion qualifies. The defendant fails to cite, and we have not found, any authority for his position. 2 The plain language of the statute does not require that the injury be inflicted as part of the triggering felony. So long as a Class X or Class 1 felony is committed and severe bodily injury is inflicted during a single course of conduct, consecutive sentences are required. Having already determined that the defendant committed both offenses during a single course of conduct, we find that the defendant's conduct fell squarely within the requirement of section 5-8-4(a) that the defendant commit a "Class X or Class 1 felony and [inflict] severe bodily injury." Having so decided, it becomes unnecessary for ...
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...severe bodily injury requirement does not have to be inflicted as part of the triggering felony. People v. Syverson, 293 Ill.App.3d 199, 204, 227 Ill.Dec. 278, 687 N.E.2d 528 (1997). Our court has previously examined the general application of section 5-8-4(a). We have held that section 5-8......
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... ... Therefore, the combination of a Class X felony (attempted first degree murder) with severe bodily injury (Eric Smith's death) is all that is required by the statute. See People v. Syverson, 293 Ill. App.3d 199, 227 Ill.Dec. 278, 687 N.E.2d 528 (1997). The court did not err in imposing a consecutive sentence ... Defendant also argues that his 100-year sentence is excessive and constitutes an abuse of discretion because the trial court failed to consider his potential ... ...
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