People v. Tallent
| Decision Date | 30 January 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 15CA0040 |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randy D. TALLENT, Defendant-Appellant. |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Melissa D. Allen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Esteban A. Martinez, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado; Joseph T. Goodner, Englewood, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN
¶ 1 Defendant, Randy D. Tallent, appeals his judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of theft, second degree burglary, second degree criminal trespass, and theft by receiving. He also appeals his adjudication as a habitual criminal and his sentence. Our division previously reversed the trial court's judgment, People v. Tallent , 2018 WL 2356230 (Colo. App. No. 15CA0040, May 24, 2018) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e) ), People v. Morehead , 2015 COA 131, ¶ 52, 450 P.3d 733, 742 ( Morehead I ), aff'd in part and rev'd in part , 2019 CO 48, 442 P.3d 413 ( Morehead II ), to conclude that the trial court may not hear new arguments on remand in opposition to a defendant's motion to suppress. Following its decision in Morehead II , concluding that the trial court has discretion to hear on remand new arguments opposing a defendant's motion to suppress, the supreme court vacated our decision and remanded the present case. People v. Tallent , 2019 WL 2746936 (Colo. No. 18SC483, July 1, 2019) (unpublished order). We now reverse and remand for further findings.
¶ 2 Because the supreme court vacated our opinion, we restate the background and some of the legal principles below.
¶ 3 Around midnight one night in January 2007, a police officer was in his patrol car in an alley watching for a vehicle that had been illegally parking in a handicapped space. The officer saw Tallent near a garage in the alley. When Tallent saw the patrol car, he turned and ran, ignoring the officer's orders to stop. The officer saw Tallent pass through a fenced backyard, but then lost sight of Tallent and called for backup.
¶ 4 The responding officers followed footprints in the snow and found Tallent hiding on the front porch of a nearby building. He was arrested at gunpoint, handcuffed, and searched. The officers found a set of keys with a remote entry fob in Tallent's pocket. Using the fob, the officers located Tallent's car, which they impounded and eventually searched pursuant to a warrant.
¶ 5 After Tallent's arrest, officers again tracked his footprints, first to a screwdriver dropped in the snow and then to a garage where they found tools that had recently been reported stolen from a nearby construction site, as well as other stolen property. In the meantime, the officers discovered that Tallent had an outstanding warrant for his arrest on a parole violation.
¶ 6 Over the course of the next few months, the police continued investigating leads stemming from property found in the garage. The police also monitored phone calls Tallent placed while in jail. These investigative efforts led the police to additional evidence and witnesses.
¶ 8 After a hearing, the trial court initially granted Tallent's motion in a bench ruling. Then, in a written order, the trial court reconsidered and partially denied the motion to suppress.1 After a jury trial, Tallent appealed, and a division of this court reversed the denial of his motion to suppress. People v. Tallent , 2012 WL 3537006, slip op. at 2 (Colo. App. No. 09CA0981, Aug. 16, 2012) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f) ). The division determined that Tallent was arrested without probable cause. Id. at 21. The division concluded that Id.
¶ 9 On remand, the People filed a "motion to preserve evidence," arguing that evidence obtained after Tallent's illegal arrest was admissible under three exceptions to the exclusionary rule: inevitable discovery, independent source, and attenuation. During a hearing on the People's motion, the trial court heard testimony from the officers involved in the arrest and investigation. The trial court stated that it would also consider the transcripts from the original 2007 suppression hearing and related proceedings.
¶ 10 In two written orders, the trial court concluded that some evidence obtained after Tallent's arrest was admissible either because the People proved that it was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest or officers would have inevitably discovered the evidence through lawful means. The trial court concluded that the People could introduce: (1) evidence of where Tallent's footprints in the snow led, the screwdriver, and all evidence found in the garage; (2) Tallent's name and other identifying information obtained after his arrest; (3) all evidence obtained as a result of monitoring Tallent's phone calls from jail; and (4) statements Tallent made after being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). However, the trial court suppressed: (1) evidence obtained during the search of Tallent incident to his arrest; (2) evidence found during the search of Tallent's car; and (3) statements Tallent made before being advised of his rights under Miranda . A jury convicted Tallent of all charges. He was later adjudicated a habitual criminal by the trial court and sentenced to forty-eight years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
¶ 11 Tallent appealed, and this division reversed, relying on Morehead I , ¶ 52, 450 P.3d at 742, and the supreme court vacated that decision, in light of Morehead II .
¶ 12 On appeal, Tallent contends that the trial court erred in permitting the People to make new arguments on remand regarding the admissibility of the evidence obtained after his illegal arrest. He bases this argument primarily on the law of the case doctrine, relying on People v. Roybal , 672 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo. 1983). We do not reach the question of whether the trial court erred; instead, we remand for further findings in light of the supreme court's decision in Morehead II .
¶ 13 We review a trial court decision to hear new arguments on remand in a suppression hearing for an abuse of discretion. See Morehead II , ¶ 13, 442 P.3d at 418. As a general rule, we review the substance of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress as a mixed question of fact and law. People v. King , 16 P.3d 807, 812 (Colo. 2001). While we defer to the trial court's findings of fact when they are supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record, we review conclusions of law de novo. Id.
¶ 14 We review preserved errors of a constitutional dimension for constitutional harmless error. Hagos v. People , 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11, 288 P.3d 116, 119. Under that standard, we will reverse unless the People prove any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
¶ 15 The United States and the Colorado Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amends. IV, XIV ; Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. Evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed. See King , 16 P.3d at 813. This exclusionary rule "applies both to the illegally obtained evidence itself and to the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ — any other evidence derived from the primary evidence." People v. Schoondermark , 759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1988). However, there are exceptions to the exclusionary rule that "justify admission of evidence even though it is derived from information obtained" through unconstitutional means. Id. These exceptions "have been labeled independent source, attenuation, and inevitable discovery." Id. (summarizing these doctrines).
¶ 16 If an appellate court holds that a trial court erred in denying a defendant's motion to suppress, can the prosecution argue for the first time on remand that illegally obtained evidence is nonetheless admissible under an exception to the exclusionary rule? That question was left open by the supreme court in People v. Briggs , 709 P.2d 911, 924 n.17 (Colo. 1985). In Morehead I , a division of this court concluded that a search of the defendant's home was unconstitutional and that the trial court's erroneous denial of the defendant's motion to suppress was not harmless. Morehead I , ¶¶ 33, 40, 450 P.3d at 739, 741. Further, the Morehead I division concluded that the prosecution could not present a "previously unargued theory of admissibility on remand." Id. at ¶ 47, 450 P.3d at 741. Thus, the People were "precluded from arguing on remand that any of the evidence derived from the unconstitutional search should still be admitted under the attenuation doctrine or one of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule" because they had not raised such arguments in the initial suppression hearing. Id. at ¶ 42, 450 P.3d at 741. However, the supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, concluding that the trial court is best positioned to decide whether to entertain new arguments on remand. Morehead II , ¶ 13, 442 P.3d at...
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People v. Tallent
... , announced a new two-step, multifactor test that trial courts would be required to apply when exercising that discretion. See People v. Tallent , 2020 COA 14, ¶¶ 18–20, 490 P.3d 557, 562 (" Tallent III " ) . Because the trial court relied on new arguments without explicitly applying that......